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In 1968 the assassinations of Martin Luther King in Memphis
and Robert F. Kennedy in Los Angeles seemed to confirm the gen-
eral disintegration of American society. In that year the United
States experienced social unrest on a massive scale. Decades of ra-
cial segregation, oppressive conformity, and war in Vietnam had
bred the civil rights, counterculture, and antiwar movements. Vio-
lence exploded as frustration overcame moderation in those circles.
Urban areas were especially hard hit by riots as many blacks seem-
ingly abandoned King's ideal of nonviolence. In reaction to the fail-
ure of full integration in earlier years, ethnic separatism gained mo-
mentum. 1 Not only did many blacks reject integrationist ideals,
other minoritiescalled for "self-determination," as a solution to the
problems of their communities.Among these other minorities were
Mexican Americans, the Chicanos of the Southwest.
By 1968 in California, the Chicano movement had become a po-
tentforce, sparked by the grape strike and its leader Cesar Chavez.
By that year the movement had penetrated the cities, including the
Los Angeles area, home of the largest Mexican-American popula-
tion in the nation. Though Chavez like Martin Luther King advo-
cated nonviolence, other activists, especially the youth of the urban
barrios, were growing impatient. Influenced by black radicals, such
as Malcolm X and Huey P. Newton, the Brown Berets and other
Chicano activists advocated militant defense of their communities
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and self-determination in the conduct of their affairs. Thus, Chi-
cano radicals hoped to counter police brutality, crime, poor educa-
tion, poverty, and the other pervasiveproblems of thebarrios. 2
Despite the apparent fragmentation of society, many liberals
sought to hold the nation together, even as they themselves were
drawn increasingly to the left. Exemplifying this left-of-center posi-
tion was the East Los Angeles Labor Community Action Commit-
tee, an initially obscure but ultimately significant Chicano organiza-
tion founded by liberals amidst the dissension of 1968. Soon re-
named the East Los Angeles Community Union (TELACU), this
organization's liberal founders advocated self-determination, but
also encouraged reconciliation with the "system."3 This seemingly
contradictory position contributed to an enigmatic image of TELA-
CU—as an institution symbolizing recovery of the historic place of
Mexican Americans in the Southwest, but also as a model encour-
aging national integration through socioeconomic development.
TELACU Defined
Established to improve conditions in the barrios on the Eastside
of the Los Angeles area, the East Los Angeles Community Union
has promoted Mexican-American recovery and self-determination
holistically. It has provided social services, trained leaders, partici-
pated in electoral politics, preserved culture, and enhanced ethnic
pride, especially by developing the economy of the Mexican-
American community. A few years after its founding in 1968, TE-
LACU became a federally funded community development corpo-
ration (CDC), a quasi-public, semiprivate institution that defies
easy definition because it does so many things and takes so many
forms. In early practice a federally funded CDC was usually a non-
profit entity established to improve the economic well-being of a
"special impactarea." To accomplish its ends, however, a CDC of-
ten had for-profit subsidiaries, businesses designed to provide local
jobs, remove blight, and contribute to charity by making profits for
the "nonprofit" holding company. This paradoxical form led some
early observers to call the CDC an attempt at socialism through the
use of capitalist structure. Be that as it may, this enigmatic struc-
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ture allowed TELACU's major contribution to Chicano self-deter-
mination—economic development on a scale unmatched by any
other Mexican-American community organization in the country.4
Interestingly, this development rests primarily on real estate, a
fact that has permitted TELACU to impress its image on the land-
scape of the local community. Indeed, TELACU is attached to
place as are few other Mexican-American organizations. The insti-
tution's founders designed it to serve a particular geographical
area—Greater East Los Angeles, popularly known as the Eastside.
Furthermore, as the CDC grew, it found real estate development
the most dramatic way to serve the community. This activity has
made TELACU visible in the barrio in a way possible for few other
groups. It has constructed buildings and encouraged the renovation
of many structures throughout the Eastside in a pattern that has
left the community with landmarks to TELACU's brief history. In-
deed, to a large degree the CDC has measured its success through
the changes it has brought to the local landscape.
The Eastside as Homeland
Though the federal government once confined TELACU to a
clearly delineated "special impact area," the Eastside as a whole has
vague boundaries. Most observers would agree that it includes at
the least Boyle Heights, Lincoln Heights, El Sereno, and East Los
Angeles; indeed, these communities formed most of TELACU's
original special impact area. Others would add Highland Park,
Commerce, Montebello, and even Monterey Park, each of which
had sections in the original special impact area. Though not initially
within TELACU's purview, Eagle Rock, Vernon, Maywood, Hunt-
ington Park, and Bell also merit consideration as parts of the East-
side. The latter thus embraces, to some degree, not only separate
municipalities, but communities governed directly by the city and
county of Los Angeles. This political fragmentation is nevertheless
obviated by a high degree of demographic and cultural unity, for
the Eastside shapes distinctly Mexican-American Los Angeles. TE-
LACU's founders dedicated the institution to the recovery of this
"homeland" in 1968.6
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If we consider Hispanic landmarks, the Eastside expands even
farther. If we use population and culture as the defining criteria,
the plaza area, the cornerstone of Los Angeles, belongs to the East-
side despite its location downtown. Also downtown are the Million
Dollar Theater and the Grand Central Market patronized by Mexi-
cans for most of this century. Whittier Boulevard, another perhaps
less obvious landmark, stretches from central Los Angeles beyond
the county to the southeast. Many Mexican Americans have fol-
lowed this section of Spain's old Camino Real in their migration to
the suburbs. Certainly, San Gabriel Mission, birthplace of the me-
tropolis, remains a landmark of Mexican-American Los Angeles.
Clearly, the Eastside has outliers—outliers joined to it by the His-
panic heritage.7
Though the landmarks of Mexican-American Los Angeles stand
throughout the county, we find that heritage particularly identified
with unincorporated East Los Angeles. This community shares a
boundary with the city of Los Angeles, Indiana Street, the eastern
edge of the pueblo's original Spanish land grant. To the north of
East LA lies Monterey Park, to the west Montebello, to the south
Commerce. East LA remains the heart of the Eastside and has the
monuments to prove it—Soledad Church, Garfield High School,
New Calvary Cemetery, and the Roybal Medical Center. Some,
like the cemetery, decorated on the Day of the Dead (All Souls'
Day), are old Hispanicized sites. Others, like the Roybal Center
with its pre-Columbian-style frieze, are much newer. The TELACU
Center, headquarters of the East Los Angeles Community Union,
exemplifies the newer monuments.8
TELACU Center as Landmark
The TELACU Center stands just outside of East LA, in the city
of Commerce, although its postal address is Los Angeles. Despite
these complications, we find TELACU very near the heart of the
Eastside. Featuring "a glass exterior supported by columns of black
volcanic stone," the center was obviously intended to be a landmark
from its dedication in 1983. Gracing the headquarters building, The
Pride of Our Heritage, an epic mural, depicts Mexican-American
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
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history, particularly in the local area. Indeed, according to TELA-
CU's president and chief executive officer, David C. Lizarraga,
"TELACU Center stands as a monument to our corporation's com-
mitment to building a better East Los Angeles. . . ."9
The landmark TELACU Center, especially because of its "forty-
foot ceramic tile mural," merits more than casual attention. The
mural moves from the universal to the particular and back again.A
blue sky embodying the supreme being forms an arch extending
down the sides of the mural. Below the deity are Hernan Cortes,
Malintzin, and Cuautemoc, the key figures in the Spanish conquest
of Mexico. Farther down appear the Franciscan missionaries come
to convert the Indians of California, a group focused on the found-
ingof Los Angeles in 1781. A huge cauldron follows, pouring forth
the intermixed descendants of Spanish and Indian that form the
modern Mexican American. The lower quarter of the mural em-
phasizes Mexican-American contributions to the United States,
California, and Los Angeles. Servicemen, farm workers, students,
children, and representatives of TELACU itself fill out the lower
panel. At the lower right, TELACU's first executive director, Este-
ban Torres, holds onto a globe with the American continents facing
the viewer.10
The TELACU mural presents an image übiquitous in Chicano
thought since the late 1960s—a view of Mexican Americans as a
people indigenous to their land of residence. The Southwest, Cali-
fornia in this case, appears as a native land, rather than simply a
land to which Mexicans have immigrated. While the Spanish mis-
sionaries appear as colonists, early immigrants, the significance of
the cauldron in the mural must not be lost. In contrast with the
melting pot of Anglo-American tradition, the ingredients in this
cauldron form the mestizoof Spanish and "Indian" descent, not the
intermixture of European groups implicit in the East Coast model.
While Spanish ancestry gives Mexican Americans a claim to long-
term residence in the region, ultimately the Indian biological and
cultural heritage gives them their claim to indigenous status.
Nevertheless, The Pride of OurHeritage remains incomplete his-
torically. It moves directly from the Spanish colonial period in Cali-
fornia to the twentieth century, bypassing the Mexican period
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
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(1821-48), the Mexican War (1846-48), and the late nineteenth
century. Omission of the war limits the scope of the mural com-
pared with other works on the same theme, a general intellectual
theme that has been called the "image of the Chicano homeland."
That general theme depicts people of Mexican descent as belonging
to the Southwest, and not alien to it, as so often presented in the
mass media. In its simplest form the theme presents these people
as long-term residents of the region; in a second, more inclusive
form, the theme depicts them as natives. As we have seen, the mu-
ral incorporates both these forms. However, it lacks a third, more
complex form of the image of the Chicano homeland—a depiction
ofthe region as lost. 12
Mexico's loss of its northern borderlands, as a result of the war
with the United States, changed history for the region's Mexicans.
In fact it created the Mexican-American minority. The absence of
this historic loss from The Pride of Our Heritage reflects the con-
ciliatory side of the East LA Community Union. Throughout its
history TELACU has emphasized positive contributions to the com-
munity and minimized confrontation with the larger society. The
servicemen in the mural's lower quarter clearly reflect this attitude
of loyalty to the larger society. Despite the conciliatory motif, so-
cial conflict does appear in the mural's lower left-hand corner,
conflict represented by the banner of the United Farm Workers
union. On the whole, however, the mural leaves the impression
that Mexicans had never lost California and Los Angeles and that
Mexican Americans had always experienced equality in society. 13
The significance of the mural's representation of the relationship
between ethnicity and land should not be lost. Geographer David
E. Sopher has commented insightfully that "Land on one scale or
another serves as the chosen symbol of a people's being. ..." The
Southwest has served as such a symbol for many Mexican Ameri-
cans since the United States officially acquired the region in 1848.
Subdivisions of the region have served the same purpose on smaller
scales, as we have seen in the representation of California and Los
Angeles in The Pride of Our Heritage. In microcosm, landmarks
such as the TELACU Center also serve as symbols of the ethnic
identity of Mexican Americans. Because of its close involvement
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
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with real estate, TELACU as an institution has taken on the sym-
bolism of land as well. 14
An Imagist Interpretation
As the TELACU Center and its mural suggest, TELACU has car-
ried out its construction projects in ways that deliberately empha-
size imagery. Indeed, throughmuch of the institution's history, TE-
LACU's leaders have concerned themselves with its public image.
Wishing to conform to the larger society, they have stressed not
only beautiful buildings, but attractive offices, company cars, and
business suits for the staff. But TELACU's ideas regarding land have
been most significant because they have left the greatest physical
impression on the community. While TELACU's leaders have had
no formally articulated theory of imagery, they have clearly sought
to make a mental, as well as physical, impression on the local com-
munity and larger society.15 In this, TELACU hasreflected the con-
cern with image especially evident in business and government
since the advent of television. Of course, artists and others have
felt that concern for centuries.
More recently, a number of cultural historians and geographers,
including Henry Nash Smith and D.W. Meinig, have examined the
imagery of land in ways conducive to interpretation of TELACU's
image making. Founded on Smith's Virgin Land published in 1950,
the "myth and symbol" school of American studies posits that ideas
about land form pictures in the mind, mental views, intellectual
landscapes. These ideas, and concepts about space and place in
general, usually take a form peculiar to one's own situation. For ex-
ample, a Mexican-American Angeleno on reading the abbreviation
LA might imagine a local seascape, such as the beach at Santa
Monica frequented by Latinos. This picture would probably reflect
the individual's personal experience in that locale, but would only
be partially accurate if LA meant areas strictly within the city lim-
its. 16
Such mental pictures are images, combinations of fact and fic-
tion, reason and emotion. For example, if a publicist mentions TE-
LACU Industrial Park, we may imagine the TELACU Center (fact)
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with the mural on the wrong side (fiction). As we entertain this
picture, we may realize "rationally" that the center occupies only a
fraction of the park. But we may "feel" quite content with the per-
ception since the full extent of the park is difficult to picture. The
image of the center alone, though imperfect, adequately "sym-
bolizes" the whole park. 17
Such images strung together with a narrative resemble motion
pictures, strips of individual frames moving rapidly through the
mind. (Scholars with a literary bent have generally used myth to re-
fer to these fuller, narrative images.) Specific mental landscapes
form the background to characters and action, locations for our
perception of historical events. Consequently, we might take San
Gabriel Mission as a symbol of Hispanic history in Los Angeles, the
mission's surroundings changing from rustic to urban as we consid-
ered historical events from the daysof vaqueros to those of motor-
ists. This "mythopoeic" (image-making) ability of the mind is what
creative writers, advertisers, and politicians have always sought to
tap in their attempts to influence their audiences. TELACU, more
than any other Mexican-American organization, has sought such in-
fluence through imagery. 18
The image the East LA Community Union has most sought to
project is one of wealth and power acquired through integration
into the democratic, free-enterprise system. While the CDC has
always provided social services, its leaders have consistently denied
its being an antipoverty agency or a charitable institution. TELA-
CU's managers have increasingly presented the organization as a
business corporation that belongs to the community. They have
presented the CDCs direct social services as equivalent to any
other corporation's community programs, by-products of its profit-
able ventures. The major benefit to the community claimed by the
managers has been the employment created by TELACU's busi-
nesses. Politically, the CDC, like other corporations, has attempted
to gain influence through contributions to the campaigns of politi-
cians who have favored its interests and those of Mexican Ameri-
cans. Consequently, as corporate headquarters, TELACU Center
symbolizes the successful acquisition of wealth and power.19
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
10 Introduction
The Colonial Image of the Eastside
Ironically, despite its more recent corporate orientation, TELA-
CU's origins lie in the labor movement. And despite its conciliatory
side, the CDC, as we have seen, also rests on the radicalism of the
19605. The East Los Angeles Labor Community Action Committee
was founded by Walter Reuther's United Auto Workers and even-
tually funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, the federal
agency at the core of the War on Poverty. While these liberal
founding institutions certainly formed part of the "establishment"
as conceived by the New Left in the 19605, conservatives and some
moderates considered them radical. The right had reason to be
suspicious as some radical ideas and radicals found their way into
federal programs. Interestingly, TELACU would rest on one of
these ideas, a theory with separatist implications.20
This idea was internal colonialism, informally discussed by radi-
cal activists in the middle and late 1 960s and formally advanced by
scholars such as Robert Blauner and Mario Barrera in the 19705. In
the simplest terms these theorists argued that racial minorities in
the United States existed in a situation analogous to that of peoples
in Third World countries colonized by Europe. That situation was
one in which the dominant European nations for their own benefit
subordinated the peoples and lands of the Third World. Within the
boundaries of the United States, the dominant Anglo-American
majority exploited nonwhites in much the same way.21
The colonial relationship had originally been examined in broad-
er contexts in a series of works by Third World thinkers, such as
Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and Paulo Freire. They in turn influ-
enced thinkers in the United States, especially blacks, such as Mal-
colm X and Stokely Carmichael. American radicals advanced inter-
nal colonialism in direct opposition to traditional theories of ine-
quality based on the experience of European immigrants to the
United States. American racial minorities experienced inequality
not because of conditions in some foreign place of origin, but be-
cause of involuntary and unequal incorporation into the United
States. Furthermore, since the proverbial melting pot did not in-
clude minorities, they should seek self-determination, rather than
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
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integration into the nation. The colonial analogy seemed to allow
little room for reconciliation with the larger society.22
Naturally, Chicano activists looked at their own history through
the same lenses as their peers in the black power movement. All
the major leaders of the Chicano movement—Cesar Chavez, Reies
Lopez Tijerina, Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales, Jose Angel Gutierrez—
in one way or another reflected the internal colonial analogy, either
through contact with black activists or by way of Latin American
thought. Unsurprisingly, Esteban E. Torres, Chavez's ally, Reu-
ther's lieutenant, and TELACU's first executive director, applied
the theory to his owncommunity:
East Los Angeles, like other Mexican-American communities, is but a
colony dependent on outside forces that control the ownership and
flow of economic resources. Because of that condition, such communi-
ties are rendered helpless to affect the social and political institutions
about them. Given the ability to own and control their own economic
resources, the community can then reverse the situation by attaining
political power which then influences the attitudes of the social and
political institutions. Moreover, it allows for eventual control, allowing
for self-determination.
Despite the conciliatory message of The Pride of Our Heritage, TE-
LACU's founders clearly established the organization with the co-
lonial analogy in mind. They designed TELACU to win independ-
ence for East LA.23
Torres's comments reveal that behind the CDC lie more inclu-
sive forms of the image of the Chicano homeland than depicted in
the mural at the TELACU Center. For if East LA is a colony, ac-
cording to the thesis, outsiders for their own benefit have expropri-
ated the economic resources belonging to the area and its people.
On a regional scale, activists argue, this expropriationbegan when
the United States conquered the Mexican people and land that be-
came the Southwest. This situation illustrates the third form of the
image of the Chicano homeland, the view of the region as lost. This
form presents a radical view of Mexican Americans because it de-
picts them as people disinherited—unequal members of the soci-
ety. However, TELACU has frequently deemphasized this idea for
fear ofoffending the larger society.24
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
Introduction12
Ethnic Recovery and National Integration
Most significantly,Torres stresses reversing the colonial situation
and gaining self-determination. This reflects the fourth and most
comprehensive image of the Chicano homeland, the image of the
land as recovered. Torres and his allies established TELACU to help
Chicanos secure their rightful place in the city, state, and region.
The Pride of Our Heritage projects this aspect of the image of re-
covery because of its optimism. That Chicanos must recover from
conquest, however, is not made evident since this would under-
mine the conciliatory spirit of the mural. Indeed, in this integration-
ist spirit, the mural reveals TELACU's attempts to help Mexican
Americans play a greaterrole nationally and eveninternationally. As
we have seen, in the lower right-hand corner of the work pose TE-
LACU's leaders with blueprints of the future before them, Esteban
Torres with the world in his hands. 25
We could interpret this representation negatively, as crass self-
aggrandizement. In fact, strong criticism has been leveled at TELA-
CU for projecting an image of power and wealth, interpreted by
some as corruption and extravagance.Critics have charged that TE-
LACU's executives have simply succeeded in acquiring luxurious
offices and fancy cars, rather than solving the real problems of East
LA. These critics have charged that behind the elegant surface
stands a structure that benefits the CDCs management, rather
than the community. They have argued that rather than gaining
self-determination for the community, TELACU has "sold out" to
the world of big business and big government. In fact, the federal
government and the Los Angeles Times leveled substantive charges
of corruption, financial mismanagement, and campaign improprie-
ties against TELACU in 1982. Ironically, convicted during the scan-
dal was Joe L. Gonzalez, the former board chairman and artist who
executed The Pride of Our Heritage.26
Despite this, by establishing a visual presence in East LA, TELA-
CU has not only demonstrated the importance of real estate for
economic recovery, but offered Mexican Americans a renewed
symbol of their being. This symbol is one of power, power based on
ownership and control of land. In spite of its tarnished image, TE-
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LACU reflects an important development in Mexican-American
history, the gradual but increasing recovery of the Chicano home-
land. TELACU represents a reassertion of the Mexican Americans'
place in Los Angeles and the Southwest, but also integration into
the nation. As such, for Latinos and other regional or ethnic mi-
norities, TELACU also serves as a model of self-determined and
equal participation in the responsibilities and benefits of the nation
as a whole.
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 




Visions ofRecovery and Self-Determination
Despite the Stars and Stripes and the Bear Flag flying over its
public buildings, East Los Angeles by the 1960s did not resemble
the typical American community. Visibly different from the Anglo-
American majority, the residents and their neighborhoods formed a
colonia, a Mexican-American community perennially augmented
from Mexico since the 1840s. In addition to the Coke, Marlboro,
and Texaco ads along the commercial strips, storefronts displayed
Spanish-language signs and Mexican wares, signs advertising Tecate
beer and Pico Pica hot sauce. These and the botdnicas, wedding
boutiques, carnicerias, and other small businesses were symbols of
the area's people that made their ethnicity even more evident. 1 By
the 1960s the county had paved the commercial strips and most of
the residential streets; indeed, the greenery had given way to as-
phalt and concrete to a degree considered extensive even in south-
ern California. Nevertheless, to those familiar with eastern slums,
the area could seem pleasant. No tenements existed here. There
were mostly small two-bedroom houses, often two to a small lot,
but with yards the envy of many a ghetto dweller in the East. Just
the same, the povertymaterialized in the peeling paint of porches,
the cracking plaster of garden walls, and the tottering doors of ga-
rages. Indeed, poverty and its attendant problems pervaded East
LA.
Despite its relatively benign appearance, East LA in the sixties
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16 National Precursors andLocal Founders
faced serious difficulties according to almost every socioeconomic
indicator. East LA's median family income of $4,800 compared
poorly with the $13,000 of surrounding suburbs. Consequently, 45
percent of the area's population received some form of public assis-
tance. For all men ages 16 to 24, the total unemployment rate in
East LA stood at 30 percent. Much of this resulted from the high
school dropout rate of 5 1 percent, more than double that of nearby
Anglo-American schools. Given the low income level and high un-
employment in the commuity, home ownership naturally fell below
the 43 percent median for the city of Los Angeles. From 20 to 27
percent of families lived in overcrowded housing. Because of the
absence of densely populated, high-rise apartment buildings, East
LA did not look as poor as it actually was, but close inspectionre-
vealed that in some neighborhoods deteriorating or dilapidated
structures made up as much as 60 percent of the housing. 2 In 1 968
the East Los Angeles Community Union (TELACU) was dedicated
to therecovery of this area.
Though established for the improvementof the community, TE-
LACU from its beginnings acquired a mysterious image. This re-
sulted partially from its unusual institutional structure. Since vari-
ous outside institutions, especially the United Auto Workers and
the Office of Economic Opportunity, contributed to TELACU's
foundation and evolution, the founders of this community develop-
ment corporation (CDC) aroused suspicion among other activists in
the community.3 Controversy also resulted from the various visions
superimposed in TELACU's creation. These visions, involving the
relationships between self-determination and reconciliation, be-
tween separationand integration, between collectivism and capital-
ism, and between place and people, were those of such prominent
sixties' leaders as Elijah Muhammad, Walter Reuther, Cesar Cha-
vez, and Robert Kennedy. The varied interpretationsof these lead-
ers' visions by their lieutenants added to the complexity. The re-
sulting structure evolved within a series of labyrinthine develop-
ments that would make TELACU an enigmatic symbol of Chicano,
self-determined, socioeconomicrecovery and integration.
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
National Precursors andLocal Founders 17
Black Community Organizations
The structural origins of TELACU and the CDC in general lie as
far back as those of the business corporation itself; the Massachu-
setts Bay Company would certainly qualify as a precursor of the
community development corporation. TELACU's ideological roots
date back at least to the late nineteenth-century economic national-
ismof the mutualistas, the mutual aid societies of the Mexican bar-
rios in the Southwest. But TELACU's more recent ideological ori-
gins stem from developments in black communities. As early as the
19305, the controversial Black Muslims had applied a radical vision
ofeconomic self-help in their communitiesby setting up businesses
independent of the white world. Though structuring their efforts in
ways very different from those CDCs would adopt, the Muslims
advanced the principle of economic nationalism to the point where
in the sixties it would dramatically influence more mainstream or-
ganizations in black and other minority communities.4
Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam
By 1960 the Nation of Islam was a controversial, but ongoing re-
ligious institution founded for the advancement of the "Black Na-
tion." Elijah Muhammad, spiritual leader of the Muslims since the
thirties, had by 1960 become the major proponent of black na-
tionalism in the United States. Unlike Martin Luther King and oth-
er leaders of the civil rights movement, Muhammad rejected inte-
gration and favored separation of blacks from whites. If blacks inte-
grated, Muhammad believed they would "still be servants of the
white race." He believed that blacks should survive on their own.
Consequently, the Muslims sought to instill hard work, thrift, and
the desire to accumulate wealth in their individual members. Nev-
ertheless, they also developed a "radical" concept of "communal-
ism" to organize the economic activities of their temples. In this
systemfollowers regularly gave part of their income as alms for the
supportof the nation.5
Much of this money went toward the establishment of busi-
nesses operated for the common good. Malcolm X later described
the purpose of the system thus: "Our businesses sought to demon-
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strate to the black people what black people could do for them-
selves—if they would only unify, trade with each other—exclusive-
ly where possible—and hire each other, and in so doing, keep black
money within the black communities. . . ." In 1960these businesses
remained small—barber shops, laundries, grocery stores, clothing
stores, bakeries, and small restaurants—but they would expand dra-
matically through the decade.6
Though centered in the industrialized North, the Muslims had
temples in ghettos throughout the United States by 1960. Perhaps
because of this, they did not develop a nationalism based on a spe-
cific place or region in this country. To some extent Muslims be-
lieved North Africa met the people's need for a homeland because
it was the original homeland of some blacks and because of its long
connection with Islam. Nevertheless, Elijah Muhammad did ex-
press the desire for land within the United States where blacks
could form "a state or territory of their own." However, he more
often advanced this idea in practical economic, rather than political
terms. According to Muhammad Speaks, the major Muslim news-
paper, one of the basic principles of the "program of economicre-
habilitation and freedom for the Negro in America is the acquisi-
tion of 'some of this earth.' Thus ownership of land by Negroes is
the key to development. . . ."7 This clearly paved the way for simi-
lar thoughts regarding real estate by more moderate minority or-
ganizationssuch as TELACU.
Elijah Muhammad also spoke of the Nation of Islam as a "Nation
in a Nation." By this he meant that the Muslims existed as a nation
within the Black Nation, but also that the latter existed within the
United States. In addition, by 1963 Muhammad Speaks had begun
to refer to blacks in the United States as a colony. With a corre-
spondent reporting from Africa during Algeria's civil war, that con-
tinent's anticolonialism clearly influenced the newspaper and its
readers. Combining this current thought with the ideas of Marcus
Garvey, the Muslims adopted and promoted the nascent internal
colonial thesis, then also being advanced by the budding New Left.
The thesis fit well into their beliefs in economic nationalism and
self-help. Consequently, the Muslims began speaking of self-deter-
mination, despite the political, rather than religious connotations of
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the term. While the Nation of Islam did not rest on a specific land
base, nor on a particular corporate structure, the Muslims would
have a significant if indirect influence on TELACU and other
CDCs. The Muslim stress on nationalism and minority self-deter-
mination would have great impact.
Progress Enterprises
Structurally closer than the Nation of Islam to TELACU was
Progress Enterprises of Philadelphia, a comprehensive self-help ef-
fort launched in 1962 by the Reverend Leon Sullivan of the Zion
Baptist Church. Like the Muslim efforts, an important aspect of
Progress Enterprises lay in its stress on the generation of capital by
urban blacks for their own development. Sullivan, like the Muslims,
came to the conclusion that economic problems largely caused the
social problems ofhis community. As a result, he believed, "to have
durable power black men must develop economicpower." Both he
and the Muslims encouraged businesses, certainly traditional insti-
tutions; yet the stress on community self-help and minority self-
interest seemed radical because it suggested socialism and racial
separatism. Despite this, Sullivan's approach remained integration-
ist, rather than separatist, and he encouraged accommodation,
rather than confrontation with the system.9
Unlike the Muslims, Progress Enterprises incorporated in a
manner that would serve as a structural model for many institutions
later called community development corporations. Sullivan and the
members of his church pooled individual monthly contributions
(shares, not alms) into a nonprofit trust fund for social services and
into a for-profit holding company. Both the fund and the company,
nevertheless, rested under the nonprofit, tax-exempt umbrella of
Progress Enterprises. While initial capitalization would later vary
from one CDC to another, Sullivan's combination of nonprofit um-
brella over nonprofit and for-profit ventures would remain the hy-
brid structure common to those CDCs most like TELACU. 10
Significantly, Progress Enterprises embarked on a number of
ventures involving real estate. Sullivan's organization purchased an
apartment building in an all-white neighborhood in an effort at de-
segregation. This initial project clearly linked the drive for econom-
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ic development to the goal of integration, rather than to the sepa-
ratism advocated by the Muslims. Progress Enterprises followed
with a million-dollar housing project and a shopping center. The
first provided low-cost housing for the needy; the second provided
opportunities for entrepreneurial training by requiring black man-
agement of the tenant companies. While Progress Enterprises
would also venture into electronics and retailing, its base remained
real estate. Seemingly, to Sullivan the path to economic power, at
least on the local level, lay in the control of land. This too would be
a pattern followed by CDCs like TELACU. Sullivan, however,
made no direct early reference to land as a base for black national-
ism, nor did he speak of blacks as a colony, as had the Muslims. His
approach remained basically integrationist; he sought black eco-
nomic power so that blacks could have greater access to the system.
In this, Sullivan prefigured the conciliatory attitude ofTELACU. 11
Federal Programs
While minority communities engaged in self-help efforts, the
federal government entered the picture tentatively with the elec-
tion of John F. Kennedy in 1960. More important to TELACU and
other CDCs than John Kennedy's election, however, was the ap-
pointment of his brother as attorney general. Robert F. Kennedy's
ideas regarding community development corporations evolved from
the time of his appointmentin 1961 to his death in 1968. As part of
the administration, he participated in several federal attempts to
alleviate poverty, including the president's Area Redevelopment
Administration and his own programs to counter juvenile delin-
quency. During the Johnson administration, Robert Kennedy and a
key group of his associates, including Jack Conway (later directly
involved in TELACU's founding), established the Community Ac-
tion Program. This soon became the most radical and controversial
component of the War on Poverty, a component reflecting the vi-
sion of Kennedy, rather than Lyndon B. Johnson.12 Eventually,
Robert Kennedy recognized that an integrated society could only
come about when its distinct communities developed sufficient
economic strength to interact on an equal social basis.
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President Kennedy's Area Redevelopment
Administration
In 1961 shortly after his inauguration, John Kennedy convinced
Congress to establish the Area. Redevelopment Administration
(ARA), a forerunner of the War on Poverty. Kennedy's concern
with geographical areas, rather than poverty and unemployment in
general, made this agency distinct. These geographical areas prefig-
ured the special impact areas later served by federally funded
CDCs. The CDCs' interest in place and its relationship to people,
especially in terms of economics, would hark back to Kennedy's
concern. Kennedy had sponsored early versions of the Area Rede-
velopment Act during his time in the Senate. But during his presi-
dential campaign, he became especially corrimitted to the bill when
he encountered dreadful conditions among poor rural whites in
West Virginia.13
The legislative struggle leading to enactment of the agency fo-
cused on the advantages and disadvantages of supplying assistance
to specific areas, rather than to the unemployed in the nation as a
whole. (In addition, the issue of government intervention in the
economy played a role, as we might expect.) National and local in-
terests clashed over economic issues throughout the legislative de-
bate. 14 This forecast later controversies over direct federal funding
of community action agencies and CDCs, organizations serving lo-
calities, rather than the entire nation. Behind these controversies
were fears that too much emphasis on the problems of local areas
and their populations undermined national cohesion.
In general, concern with underdeveloped areas, called "dis-
tressed" or "depressed" areas in the early sixties, had evolved after
World War II from the issue of unemployment. During the Great
Depression unemployment had been a national problem, but as
prosperity returned during and after the war, Washington only
gradually realized that "labor surpluses" remained in certain areas.
Recessions, which periodically struck nationwide, had hidden the
fact that some areas never seemed to escape depressed conditions
even after the rest of the country had recovered. These areas gen-
erally had industries that were dying or disappearing—Appalachia
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with its declining coal fields or Maine with its departing textile
mills. President Kennedy established the Area Redevelopment Ad-
ministration to help such areas recover economically. However, the
ARA focused on small cities and rural areas; by contrast most CDCs
later focused on big cities. 15
The Area Redevelopment Act called for loans to nonprofit cor-
porations to build modern factory buildings in depressed areas to
replace declining industries. However, the idea of federal loans to
companies willing to move or start up in these areas formed the
core of the Area Redevelopment Administration. The act also con-
tained the following provisions: long-term loans for new businesses,
a public works program, technical assistance, retraining for the un-
employed, and allowances for workers during retraining—all com-
ponents eventually connected to CDCs. But the vision of the Area
Redevelopment Act was limited to economics and did not include
broad social issues. It did not encompass problems involving health
care, education, housing, politics, or culture. These and other diffi-
culties also contributed to an area's distress. The Black Muslims
and Progress Enterprises had already shown that the problems of
depressed areas required comprehensive approaches, a view that
most CDCs would later share. 16
The Area Redevelopment Administration had a short life. Not
long after the agency opened its doors, opponents accused it of be-
ing slow, showing political favoritism, making unsound expendi-
tures, creating unfair business competition, promoting cheap labor,
supporting areas not depressed, being old-fashioned and narrow.
Actually, the ARA was simply spread too thin to have any signifi-
cant effect on the many geographical areas that it funded. Finally,
the Economic Development Administration and the rest of the ho-
listic War on Poverty replaced the ARA in 1965.17
Despite its brief existence, the Area Redevelopment Admini-
stration proved significantfor the future development of CDCs be-
cause it stressed place in addition to people. In funding local re-
gions, rather than the nation as a whole, the ARA had of course fol-
lowed a precedent set by the Tennessee Valley Authority in the
19305. Like the Tennessee Valley, the regions funded by the ARA
overlapped the political boundaries of specific states and local gov-
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ernments. Moreover, the ARA distributed funds to private groups,
as well as political bodies. While many of the funds went to rural,
white areas, the practice of assigning funds to economically needy
areas would eventually lead to greaterfederal expenditures in poor,
urban, minority areas. 18
Such areas would have more in common than poverty, however.
Race and culture would tie them together, making the allocation of
funds to such areas politically explosive, especially when this proc-
ess bypassed local governments.Local politicians would feel threat-
ened because more federal money would mean more local control
by people traditionally outside the power structure. Of course, the
Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 had projected no images of colo-
nialism or economic nationalism. John Kennedy had hoped to pro-
vide jobs to poor areas so that poor individuals could help them-
selves. Nevertheless, his ARA eventually revealed that many of the
"pockets of poverty" envisioned by its proponents actually resem-
bled nations within the nation. 19
Despite the limited results of the Area Redevelopment Admini-
stration, Robert Kennedy later cited its influence on his own
thinking. He believed the ARA had illustrated the multiplier effect
newbusinesses could have on job creation in poor areas. Because of
this effect, he came to believe economic development would solve
theproblems of the inner city:
The process of community development must begin on an economic
base: a foundation of individual and community self-support, at last es-
capingfrom degrading and imprisoning dependency. . . .
To have a maximumimpact on the problems of the poor, the new
enterprises must be established, the new jobs must be created, in the
ghetto itself.
This was not the integrationist ideal of drawing workers out of the
ghettos and into the suburbs, but an approach closer to that first
advanced in the early sixties by the Black Muslims. By 1968 Rob-
ert Kennedy would be calling for "the building of self-sufficiency
and self-determination within the communities of poverty them-
selves. . . ."20
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The Committee on Juvenile Delinquency
Crucial to Robert Kennedy's thought was his chairmanship of
the president's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, formed in
May 1961. Though the committee never actually met, it permitted
a number of Kennedy's lieutenants to develop policy within his
brother's administration, policy that would profoundly affect the
structure of future poverty programs. David Hackett, a friend of
Kennedy since adolescence, took charge of the effort. In that capac-
ity Hackett called together a number of sociologists from the Uni-
versity of Chicago to implement their ideas on juvenile delinquen-
cy. Since the 1930s the "Chicago school" had advanced the theory
that juvenile delinquency was not an individual psychiatric prob-
lem, but one that derived from the defects of the social environ-
ment. As a result, the Chicago school advocatedrestructuring neigh-
borhoods to give youth greateropportunity. Organizerscould do this
by allowing poor youth to develop their leadership skills while de-
signing their ownprojects.21 This, of course, meantallowing the poor
self-determination, an idea that would have a profound influence
on Kennedy's thought and serious implications for many future pro-
grams.
By September 1961 Congress had allocated $30 million for
Hackett's projects through the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Offenses Control Act. Having lobbied vigorously for the bill in the
House, Robert Kennedy played an indispensable role in its passage.
(Hackett had taken him on several trips into Harlem, where direct
exposure to ghetto life gave Kennedy a greater commitment to so-
cial change than ever.) Hackett established the first project, Mobi-
lization for Youth, on New York's East Side. It was a "compre-
hensive attempt to prevent delinquency by unlocking opportunity";
it "included, among other things, public service jobsfor teenagers,
neighborhood service centers offering a variety of welfare services
in one convenient place, employment of neighborhood people as
subprofessionals in service institutions, and organizing residents into
groups to solve their own problems." Hackett's group then applied
the Mobilization model in cities throughout the United States.22
Significantly, though this model focused on social services rather
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than economics, it stressed self-determination, empowerment of
thepoor.
By 1963 the idea of empowering the poor in general gained
credibility amongKennedy's lieutenants because they saw their ju-
venile delinquency projects scuttled in city after city by local bu-
reaucracies that had little desire to transform themselves or their
neighborhoods for the benefit of the poor. Hackett and his group
believed that they had erred in relying too much on professionals
like themselves to implement their model, that they had not placed
enough power in the hands of local residents themselves. The ju-
venile delinquency projects had had limited success because they
lacked a constituency to challenge the local power structures that
simply ignored the professional reformers. Hackett's reformers ul-
timately decided their approach had been too elitist; unfortunately,
they had nearly exhausted their funds by the fall of 1963.23
Robert Kennedy's lieutenants would get a second and greater
opportunityto test their theories because of the rising militancy of
the civil rights movement. As black and white demonstrators clam-
ored for the elimination of segregation and the recovery of black
voting rights, intellectuals became increasingly critical of socioeco-
nomic conditions in the country. Most influential among the intel-
lectuals was Michael Harrington, whose The Other America docu-
mented serious inequities ignored for a generation. Influenced by
this work and by the growing demonstrations for better living con-
ditions among blacks, John Kennedy in late 1962 called for his ad-
ministration to take up the issue of poverty. Robert Kennedy's ju-
venile delinquency specialists turned out to be the only people in
the governmentwith any real knowledge ofthe issue. Led by David
Hackett again, the group began planning what would become the
War on Poverty, 24 a comprehensive attack on problems the Area
Redevelopment Administration had barely engaged.
President Johnson's Community Action Program
Before the war could be declared, John Kennedy was assassi-
nated. The plan then passed to President Lyndon B. Johnson, who
approved of it wholeheartedly. Hackett's team put together the
Community Action Program, a series of demonstration projects
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based on the juvenile delinquency projects previously funded.
Though the original model had only had limited success, the team
hoped to salvage and transform the best projects experimentally
into comprehensive antipoverty agencies. However, Johnson, anx-
ious for bold solutions, discarded the experimental phase and
launched the all-out war with unproven agencies. Both Robert Ken-
nedy and Hackett worried over the haste and the changes made in
the program they had initially envisioned. Kennedy, no longer at
the right hand of the president, could not maintain the integrity of
Hackett's initial plan. Nevertheless, both Kennedy and Hackett
chose to support the Community Action Program, a controversial
proposal for therecovery of local areas.25
The Community Action Program made up a major part of the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, itself the major act embodying
the War on Poverty. Congress stipulated that the program involve
the "maximum feasible participation" of the residents of poverty-
stricken communities.Though the drafters of the act did not know
what this would mean in practice, in general they believed poor
people should take control of their own neighborhoods. This would
mean institutional reform since many of the new community action
agencies, created by the act, would remain independent of local
governments. These agencies would provide many of the antipov-
erty services that local governments had traditionally provided, but
poor people would now more often make the decisions regarding
the services they wanted. This was a radical provision because it
threatened to deprive local governments and the class interests be-
hind them of power they had traditionally held. 6 Congress had
linked the idea of self-determination with federal aid to economi-
cally depressed areas. Somewhat unwittingly, Congress and Presi-
dent Johnson had linked the ideals of political self-determination
and economic self-sufficiency.
The Labor Movement and Community Unions
In the heady period following President Johnson's declaration of
the War on Poverty in January 1964, liberals outside government
sought to assist the war effort by involving private organizationsas
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well. Naturally, labor formed the vanguard of this movement. As
the administration experimented with specific program designs to
fulfill Johnson's martial vision, labor unions and their allies
launched a parallel attack on poverty by incorporating their own
images of social recovery into national and local organizations. Of
these, influential in the founding of TELACU was the national Citi-
zens' Crusade Against Poverty (CCAP), an organization including
such prominent leaders as Martin Luther King and Michael Har-
rington, and headedby Walter P. Reuther, president ofthe United
Auto Workers (UAW).27
Walter Reuther, Jack Conway, and the
Community Union
The CCAP's importance lay in its role as a major national orga-
nization behind the "community union." The community union
emerged in concept and form, if not name, in late 1964. It was the
brainchild of Walter Reuther and his lieutenant Jack Conway, for-
merly of the UAW, but then serving as head of the Industrial Union
Department of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Reuther, head ofthe "militant"
CIO before its merger with the AFL in 1955, believed that the la-
bor movementby the 1960s had become complacent. He sought to
reinvigorate its crusading spirit by organizing more workers in the
traditional fashion, but also by organizing the workers' neighbor-
hoods. He believed labor could alleviate the problems of poor areas
by applying time-tested organizing techniques outside the walls of
the work place. In other words he envisioned unions embracing en-
-28
tire communities.
While Reuther generally receives credit for creation of the con-
cept of the community union, Jack Conway put it into practice.
Though a Detroit native, Conway had an unusual background for a
union leader. He had received a Ph.D. in sociology from the Uni-
versity of Chicago and had taught at the University of Washington
for two years before returning to Chicago to work in the personnel
office of General Motors. While employed there, he joined the
UAW in 1942 and served as Reuther's administrative assistant from
1946 to 1961. Conway then served as a deputy administrator of
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housing for the Kennedy administration and even took charge of
Johnson's Community Action Program. By late 1965 he had left the
government to head the Industrial Union Department. Conway's
experience with the Community Action Program would clearly in-
fluence his own ideas of community organization.29
Borrowing from the structure of a community action agency,
Conway imagined an action committee, but in this case comprised
of union personnel living in the target area, a group of residents.
This committee would organize a grass-roots membership, provide
technical assistance in program design, and assist the community in
negotiations with the powers-that-be. Beyond that, conceptual
flexibilitywas necessary because the residents themselves had to
give the community union its final form. Clearly, the ideal of self-
determination had carried over from the Community Action Pro-
gram. Given the source of the community union concept, it natu-
rally received national support from the AFL-CIO, especially the
UAW. 30
The Watts Labor Community Action Committee
In early 1965 the Watts Labor Community Action Committee
gave the concept of the community union concrete form in the
largest black ghetto of Los Angeles. Paul Schrade, head of the
UAW's western region, took charge of the initial effort and chaired
an advisory committee representing seven interested international
unions. Each union checked its rosters of local leaders and staff for
those living in Watts and willing to participate in the new effort.
About 350 individuals were identified and became the core, the la-
bor action committee of the WLCAC. They elected officers; they
formed an executive board and working committees. A local UAW
member, TedWatkins, became chair ofthe organizationas a whole.
Though Schrade and others outside the area established the first
community union, they turned it over to local leadership almost
immediately. Nevertheless, the stigma of outside provenance gave
the new organizationa controversial image.31
Initially, Ted Watkins and his supporters had planned to im-
prove the WLCAC's image and gain the trust of residents by ex-
tending union membership to "all low-paid people" in the Watts
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area. Initially, they imagined the "community union" as a broad-
based, mass organization. Local residents would frame the issues,
elect leaders, suggest action, ratify decisions, and receive personal
benefits. In other words, the residents would gain the self-de-
termination that labor union members ideally enjoyed. However, at
some point Watkins and his staff decided that such an ambitious
plan was impractical. Instead, the labor action committee, originally
intended as the core of the union, remained the whole with Wat-
kins as the leader. Consequently, the Watts Labor Community Ac-
tion Committee never adopted the full structure of a labor union,
nor did it ever adopt the "community union" label. Watkins and his
staff would seek to overcome the stigma of outside origin and elit-
ism in other ways.32
Watkins decided to improve the WLCAC's image by designing
programs togetherwith people from the areafrom "the bottom up,
and the inside out, rather than from the top down and the outside
in." This permitted a limited amount of self-determination, less
than originally conceived, but the influence of the ideal remained.
The first projects were two locally designed youth manpower pro-
grams that affected about seven thousand people in the area. These
programs apparently gained Watkins some trust in the community.
Despite this, the WLCAC remained an outside organization in
terms of funding, funding ironically provided by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. Though designed with self-sufficiency in mind, the
WLCAC would find that goal illusive, and the need to accommo-
date various external funding sources would continue indefinitely.
Nevertheless, by providing technical assistance in program design
and negotiatingfor grants, Watkins and his staff did assist the com-
munity in concrete ways.33
Interestingly, the WLCAC met the requirements for soliciting
federal funds because it became a nonprofit corporationunder Cali-
fornia law. Despite its nonprofit status, the WLCAC's new corpo-
rate image would have a decisive, long-term effect on the evolution
of the organization. Ironically, the WLCAC would move away from
its origins in the labor movement and take on the form ofabusiness
corporation. Despite the initial labor and social service orientations
of the WLCAC, economic development would eventually become
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its major activity. As the WLCAC became more business oriented,
it also became more accommodating in its dealings with govern-
ment and the corporate world. The radicalism implicit in the com-
munity union concept tended to blend into the background of the
WLCAC's new corporate image. The same phenomenon would oc-
cur with the East Los Angeles Community Union.34
The Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty
With the founding of the WLCAC, by 1967 Walter Reuther
could boast that "A newconcept of union organizationhas been de-
veloping in areas such as Delano and Watts, California. . . . This
new organizing effort is called 'the community union.'" Indeed, by
that time the general idea had also received concrete form in Chi-
cago and New York. In most of these efforts, the leaders were
prominent liberals dedicated to reforming the system, even as they
adapted to it: Cesar Chavez in Delano, Martin Luther King and An-
drew Young in Chicago, and Robert Kennedy in New York. Except
for the New York project, the United Auto Workers and the Indus-
trial Union Department of the AFL-CIO had strongly supported
the new efforts for change through self-determination. Moreover,
the union brass had gained allies beyond labor throughthe Citizens'
Crusade Against Poverty.35
Founded in October 1964, the CCAP formed a private front in
the nation's antipoverty war. The Crusade joined together repre-
sentatives of labor unions, the civil rights movement, social welfare
organizations, churches, and academic institutions from throughout
the United States. Eventually, local organizations of the poor were
necessarily included. For the various projects of the CCAP, funding
came primarily from the Ford Foundation though many other phil-
anthropic groups also contributed. However, the UAW and the In-
dustrial Union Department paid the essential administrative costs
since Walter Reuther and Jack Conway had initiated the Crusade's
key ideas. Thus, though the members ofthe Crusade varied in their
particular aims, much of the funding found its way into labor's
communityunions. 36
While the CCAP's programs were quite specific, its goals as a
whole were necessarily general. As indicated by its representation,
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the Crusade's liberal leaders believed in a partnership between
groups of the poor and groups dedicated to eliminating poverty. In
addition the leaders had designed the Crusade partly as a watch-
dog over the War on Poverty; they wished to assure that public
moneys did indeed reach the poor, and sought this end partly by
monitoring legislation. On the other hand, CCAP's leaders had es-
pecially dedicated the organization to self-help for individuals and
local groups. "We could best devote ourselves," wrote CCAP direc-
tor Richard Boone, "to organizing and training poor people—
increasing their bargaining power. ..." As a national organization,
the Crusade's key function would be "to get resources to poor
people" so they could carry out the fight against poverty on their
own. The economic independence ofthe poor was the fundamental
goal.37
The most important specific activity of the CCAP became its
National Training Program, an effort to prepare community organ-
izers and technicians to assist the poor in their struggle for eco-
nomic independence. Naturally, the community unions initiated by
the UAW and the Industrial Union Department received most of
this support for training. Besides the WLCAC, the National Farm
Workers Service Center received such assistance. Founded by the
United Farm Workers in Delano in January 1967, the service center
related significantly to TELACU's history. The significance, of
course, lay in the fact that the UFW and its center were Mexican-
American organizations. The WLCAC and the others funded by the
UAW and CCAP wereblack organizations.38
Cesar Chavez and the National Farm
Workers Service Center
The National Training Program provided leadership training, es-
pecially in community organizing, human services delivery, and eco-
nomic development. The particular stress depended on the needs
of the local organizations themselves. In the case of the UFW, the
training program produced union organizers among its first gradu-
ates. Obviously, the UFW needed them to assist in the immediate
battle then being waged against California grape growers. But also
among the first graduates were technicians needed to staff the Na-
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tional Farm Workers Service Center, the component of the UFW
most similar to the WLCAC. While the UFW per se remained
structurally a labor union, the service center gave it the community
component that led Reuther to include it among community un-
-39ions.
Cesar Chavez had always conceived of the United Farm Workers
as more than a standard labor union. In his eyes he and the UFW
had to build a broader social and moral movement. With this in
mind, they constructed a cooperative service center to help the
workers, their families, and their communities. They located the
center on forty acres of their own land and built it of adobe to
symbolize the self-determination of the farm workers. The service
center eventually established "a death benefit plan; a cooperative
grocery, drug store, and gas station; a credit union; a medical clinic;
a social protest theatre group . . . ; and a newspaper. ..." In these
endeavors former CCAP trainees provided critical technical exper-
tise. For example, one graduate managed the credit union; another
raised funds and developed programs with organizations sympa-
thetic to the UFW. In helping staff the National Farm Workers
Service Center, the Crusade gave the kind of assistance similar to
that later given to TELACU.40
The UFW's service center would remain closest structurally to
the community union concept originally envisioned by Reuther and
Conway because of its broad-based membership. However, that
membership derived from the occupation of farm labor, rather than
a local geographical community. Consequently, rather than becom-
ing a local neighborhood organization, the service center remained
an appendage of the national labor union. Besides this, the service
center continued to focus on human services, rather than on the
economic development that became the forte of TELACU and
other community development corporations. Nevertheless, the
UFW's moderate but vital emphasis on ethnic solidarity would in-
fluence TELACU.41
While the United Auto Workers, the Industrial Union Depart-
ment, and the Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty all obviously at-
tacked poverty, significantly all their efforts targeted the problem
in minority areas. This of course was in reaction to the civil rights
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movement andracial unrest of the 1960s and to the realization that
poverty was disproportionately represented in minority areas.
Though most of the efforts targeted black communities, the advent
of Cesar Chavez's grape strike in 1965 drew attention to the plight
of Mexican Americans, not only in central California, but through-
out the nation. Naturally, the labor movementfound itself in sym-
pathy with Chavez's strike and that feeling transferred to the ethnic
group as a whole.42
The Founding of TELACU
Shortly after the founding of the Watts Labor Community Ac-
tion Committee in early 1965, Walter Reuther, Jack Conway, and
Paul Schrade began to consider a similar organizationfor Mexican-
American East Los Angeles. They delayed this move while the
United Auto Workers concentrated on Watts, especially after the
riot in that area in the summer of 1965. During 1966, however,
Glenn O'Loane, a local Mexican-American member of the UAW,
constantly reminded the union of his community's needs. O'Loane
worked at the Ford assembly plant in nearby Pico Rivera, in the
same shop that employed Ted Watkins of the WLCAC. O'Loane
consequently kept abreast of the UAW's efforts in Watts and
pressed for similar aid to East LA.43
Glenn O'Loane and George Solis, Local Founders
Despite his Irish surname, O'Loane was the product of a Span-
ish-speaking family that went back generations in the Southwest.
He had grownup in Alamogordo, New Mexico. While still in high
school, he lost a jobfor participating in a union protest. After serv-
ing in the military during World War 11, he settled at age twenty-
three in Los Angeles, where he briefly worked for Boeing Aircraft.
By 1948, however, he was working for the Ford Motor Company
and active in the UAW. As a union committeeman, O'Loane de-
scribed his job as that of a social worker, one who dealt with rela-
tions between the union and the community where workers lived.
He once commented, "My thing was always social services, the
people. You're dealing with little people, people with problems and
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on a one-to-onebasis. I grewup in that environmentand I enjoy it.
It's an experience you can't buy." By March 1966 O'Loane had
convinced the UAW to set up a new advisory committee, chaired
by Paul Schrade, the committee that would establish the East Los
Angeles Community Union.44
Following the pattern for the founding of the WLCAC, Schrade,
with Jack Conway's assistance, brought together local representa-
tives of about twelve national unions to serve as the advisory
committee. Of these unions the most active in the founding of TE-
LACU were the UAW, the Packinghouse Workers, the Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers, and the Teamsters. The rest showed only
a passing interestand ultimately provided little directly in terms of
personnel or resources. Naturally, the UAW spearheaded the ef-
fort. 45 Besides O'Loane, the UAW provided one other key partici-
pant from the local community, George Solis, an employee of
General Motors. These two Mexican Americans became Schrade
and Conway's major contacts in the community.
Though a native of Cheyenne, Wyoming, George Solis had re-
sided in East Los Angeles since 1956. His father's employment ex-
plains his interesting place of birth. His father worked for the rail-
roads, as did many other Mexicans throughout the West, especially
the Southwest. Because of this, Solis visited Texas and Mexico of-
ten as a child on passes his family received through his father's
employment. Drafted during World War 11, he left Cheyenne per-
manently at age eighteen. After serving in the navy in the South
Pacific and New Guinea, he lived in El Paso, where he took some
college courses and worked as an inspector for the air force. Solis
finally settled in East LA tobe close to his mother, who had moved
there previously. He found employment as a scheduler in the Gen-
eral Motors plant in nearby South Gate. From that point on, he be-
came active in the UAW, especially in developing manpower pro-
grams, a taskthat occasionally took him to the union's headquarters
in Detroit. This experience made Solis highly qualified for the advi-
sory committeeestablished by Schradefor East LA.4
Through 1966 and 1967 the advisory committee held many
meetings at the United Auto Workers' regional offices on 9th
Street in downtown Los Angeles. Regularly in attendance at these
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meetings were Schrade, O'Loane, Solis, Jess Avelar of the Packing-
house Workers, and Lucy Sanchez of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers. Representatives of other unions attended on and off. Ini-
tially, Schrade simply asked the committeemembers to go out into
the community and get a feel for what the people needed. None-
theless, he clearly had the WLCAC in mind when imagining the
new organization. Indeed, Jack Conway himself made several ap-
pearances before the committee to discuss the community union
concept. Throughout these meetings, Walter Reuther kept himself
informed of progress,but never participated directly.47
By February 1968 the advisory committee had formally estab-
lished the board of directors of the East Los Angeles Labor Com-
munity Action Committee (ELALCAC). Naturally, the directors
came largely from the UAW and from those who had participated
on the advisory committee. O'Loane was elected president and
Avelar, treasurer. Ed Tovar became vice-president, and Ruben Im-
perial, secretary—both of the UAW. Besides Solis and Sanchez, the
board included George Gruhle, also of the UAW, and David Lara,
who joined simply as an East LA resident. ELALCAC then readied
to open the first office of what would later be called the East Los
Angeles Community Union. 48
In February this office opened in a shopping center at the inter-
section of Kern and Hubbard in East Los Angeles. Glenn O'Loane
became the first employee and initially the entire staff of the new
office. Under the UAW's contract with Ford, he received a leave of
absence from the auto plant to participate in union activities. Prov-
ing its commitment to the new organization, the UAW covered his
salary and benefits entirely. However, compared with TELACU's
later multimillion dollar budgets, its first was miniscule, only $150.
With this the board gave O'Loane his first assignment, to gain the
confidence of the community: "We had to assure the people that
we weren't a big union movement coming in to take over but we're
[sic] here to lend our help." Even as the new organizationopened
its doors, its outside origins threatened to give it a negativeimage.49
O'Loane immediately embarked on a social service program
aimed at youth, a particularly important group in East LA because
of the community's pervasive gangproblem. Under the sponsorship
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of the WLCAC and thecity of Los Angeles, ELALCAC arrangedfor
six hundred youth, ages seven to sixteen, to spend a week in sum-
mercamps in the mountainsat Saugus from July 8 to September 1,
1968. More importantly, ELALCAC provided summer jobsfor fifty
teenagerswith funding from the Neighborhood Youth Corps of the
Department of Labor. The youth worked helping senior citizens in
East LA. O'Loane designed this program, not merely to get youth
off the streets, but toput them back in touch with their elders for
their mutual benefit. 50 In these efforts the package deals put to-
gether by ELALCAC proved structurally significant. Drawing on
assistance from government as well as the labor movement, the or-
ganization was forming the complex network that would typify TE-
LACU's activities from then on. Curiously, these first activities
showed little sign of the self-sufficiency emphasized in the com-
munity union concept. Indeed, funding depended heavily on gov-
ernment.
Esteban Torres, First Executive Director
Even before the launching of these summer programs, however,
the UAW had taken another critical step to strengthen ELALCAC.
Paul Schrade, as chairman of the advisory committee, recom-
mended that the board of directors appoint Esteban E. Torres ex-
ecutive director of ELALCAC. This proved a touchy situation since
the recommendation came from outside and above the community,
hardly an example of self-determination. On the other hand, the
advisory committeerealized Torres's exceptional qualifications, and
he was a product of East LA. Of course, Schrade made the rec-
ommendation with the understanding that the board could reject
the candidate orremove him at a later date if necessary.51
A native of the Southwest, Esteban Torres had extraordinary
qualifications. Born in Miami, Arizona, he had experienced the
hardships of the Great Depression. During the repatriation cam-
paigns of that period, his father was deported to Mexicobecause of
his union activities in the copper mines. His mother, employed by
the New Deal's Works Progress Administration, moved to East Los
Angeles with her children. Thus, at the tender age of three, Torres
found himself in a broken family. On the Eastside he attended local
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schools, including Garfield High School, eventually East LA Col-
lege, and finally Los Angeles State College. After serving in the
army, where he reached the rank of sergeant first class, Torres in
1954 found work at Chrysler in nearby Maywood. He soon became
involved in UAW activities,won union office, and eventually rose to
the upper echelons of the labor movement.52
In the early sixties Torres moved to Washington, D.C., as direc-
tor of Inter-American Affairs, a division of the UAW's International
Affairs Department. In that capacity, he served as a special assis-
tant to Victor Reuther, Walter Reuther's powerful brother. Be-
cause of Torres's ethnicity, language skills, and college courses in
Latin American studies, he proved especially valuable in the UAW's
international efforts. As U.S. auto manufacturers had established
assembly plants in different parts of Latin America, the UAW had
followed, organizing union locals in those areas. Torres directly in-
volved himself in these efforts, as both an organizer for the UAW
and a consultant to other auto unions. Traveling throughout Latin
America, in labor and social democratic circles, he met many of the
region's most prominent leaders, including the presidents of Vene-
zuela, Costa Rica, and Chile. As a consultant and negotiator, he also
worked in conjunctionwith agencies of the Organization of Ameri-
can States and the United States. The offer of his talents to ELAL-
CAC certainly signaled the UAW's strong commitment to the so-
cioeconomicrecovery of East Los Angeles.5
Torres became interested in returning to the barrio in early
1966. At that time he had joined Walter Reuther and Cesar Chavez
in a trip to Mexico City. There in meetings with their Mexican
counterparts, the union leaders discussed the employment of im-
migrant labor by agribusiness in the United States. In the process
Torres learned much more about the conditions ofMexicanAmeri-
cans as well. More importantly, he came to share Chavez'svision of
the United Farm Workers as a broad social and moral movement to
uplift not only farm workers, but Mexican Americans. In addition,
Torres accepted Chavez's vision of the UFW as a cooperative, bene-
fiting workers and their families and communities. This cooperative
vision, coupled with the "radical" ideas of Reuther and Conway, led
Torres toreturn to East LA "to build a community union that could
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act as a support arm to the farmworkers and to build a community
organization that could harness its own economic and social pow-
er." Torres thus implicitly advocated self-determination, not only
for the East LA community and California's farm workers, but for
Mexican Americans as a whole. In May 1968 ELALCAC was offi-
cially chartered, with Esteban Torres as its executive director and
self-determination as its goal.54
CommunityDevelopment Corporations
As the labor movement established its community unions, Rob-
ert Kennedy, elected New York's junior senator in 1 964, developed
a distinct but parallel project. Having visited the nation's largest
slum in 1966, Brooklyn's predominantly black Bedford-Stuyvesant,
Kennedy vowed to do something about the appalling conditions
there. Together with Republican Senator Jacob Javits, also of New
York, Kennedy introduced an amendment to the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act of 1964, an amendment that established the Special Im-
pact Program, legislation that would eventually lead to a profound
transformation of the structure and vision of TELACU.55 The sig-
nificance of the new legislation and the resulting organizations de-
rived from their clear goal of economic development, but from the
perspective of business, rather than labor. A business perspective
was clearly moreconducive to the capitalist system.
Robert Kennedy and the Special Impact Program
In November 1966 Congress enacted the vague Title I-D ofthe
Economic Opportunity Act, but Kennedy and Javits would gradu-
ally clarify the Special Impact Program as they put it into practice.
Essentially, they sought a comprehensive approach to poverty that
addressed the problem as one of areas, rather than individuals. The
senators designed the new program to rehabilitate poor areas eco-
nomically, socially, and physically. The program's new organizations
would train residents for careers and deliver social services in a
more coordinated fashion. Most importantly, private enterprise
would have the opportunity for full participation in the War on
Poverty. To embody this vision, in 1966 Kennedy established the
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Bedford-Stuyvesant project funded by the Special Impact Pro-
56gram.
In launching this project Kennedy organized two corporations to
work as allies in the assault on poverty in Bedford-Stuyvesant—the
Development and Service Corporation and the Restoration Corpo-
ration. The racial compositionof their leadership demonstrated an
integrationist, rather than a separatist approach. The Restoration
Corporation had the responsibility of implementing development
projects in the community; consequently, its board and staff com-
prised a wide range of black leaders, politically tied to Kennedy.
The chairman, however, was a New York Supreme Court judge;
thepresident, a former deputy police commissioner—hardly typical
residents ofthe local community.57
This elitist, "top-down" arrangement appeared even more clearly
in the D & S Corporation comprised almost entirely of white busi-
nessmen. On its board of directors sat Kennedy, Javits, and repre-
sentatives of such corporate giants as International Business Ma-
chines and the Columbia Broadcasting System. Their role primarily
involved fund raising for the Restoration Corporation. While few
other organizations would copy Bedford-Stuyvesant's dual corpo-
rate structure, they would certainly note its source of funding. In
1967 it became the first "community development corporation" (a
term not yet in common use) to receive federal funds for its gen-
eral operations.58 This would, of course, compromise the claims of
self-determination made by the Bedford-Stuyvesant project and
other CDCs.
While the dual corporate structure limited the community's ac-
tual control over the Bedford-Stuyvesant effort, the results looked
promising. The allied corporations rapidly moved into economic
development projects involving real estate, job training, and manu-
facturing. Within the next three or four years, the corporations
convinced the city university to build a four-year college in the
area, created a neighborhood park closed to traffic, began redevel-
opment of a four-block commercial area with an old-dairy-turned-
office-building at its center, rehabilitated housing, trained con-
struction workers, loaned funds to local entrepreneurs and home
buyers, and established an IBM plant in the area. These were only
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some of the major activities; the Bedford-Stuyvesant corporations
also carried out strictly social service programs.59 While the dual
corporate structure had little influence, its activities, especially in
real estate, had much. Indeed, they became the model activities
followed by all the community development corporations eventu-
ally funded under the Special Impact Program, including TELACU.
Despite the influence of Bedford-Stuyvesant, the concept of the
community development corporation did not originate there, or
with Kennedy and Javits. They originated federal funding coordi-
nated with outside business participationin such efforts. Indeed, in
the sixties several CDCs under different labels existed prior to en-
actment of the Special Impact Program. In addition to Progress En-
terprises, a number of other "community development corpora-
tions" had formed independentof the governmentand of the new
program. Among these were the Hough Area Development Corpo-
ration in Cleveland, the East Central Citizens Organization in Co-
lumbus, Circle Associates in Boston, and Yeatman District Com-
munity Corporation in St. Louis. Although all these organizations
would eventually receive some federal funding, they began as indig-
enous neighborhood groups. They were designed to serve the poor
and minorities, especially blacks; they were designed to promote
self-determination. These organizations provided Kennedy and Ja-
vits with models for community development corporations, the ul-
timate vehicles of the Special Impact Program.60 This program
would not fully fund TELACU until 1972, well after the latter's
founding and Kennedy's death. Nevertheless, Kennedy's vision
greatly influenced the community union's development. Ultimate-
ly, the Special Impact Program would shift TELACU away from
the labor movement toward a greaterbusiness orientation.
Robert Kennedy's death sidetracked the prospects of the com-
munity development corporation as a vehicle for national social
policy. In his presidential campaign of 1968, Kennedy had made the
CDC central to his proposed domestic policy. In his last campaign,
Kennedy offered a seven-pointplan to assist the cities: (1) jobs, (2)
training for new jobs, (3) subsidies for businesses in poor areas, (4)
education directly linked to jobs, (5) jobs linked to community so-
cial needs, (6) new careers developed from the urban redevelop-
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ment itself, and (7) community development corporations to co-
ordinate the efforts of business, government, and the neighborhood
to assure accountability to the latter. 61 Although the Bedford-
Stuyvesant project had limited the control exercised directly by the
community, Kennedy seemed increasingly torecognize such control
as critical.
In To Seek a NewerWorld, the campaign book outlining his pro-
posed policies, Robert Kennedy clearly envisioned economic self-
sufficiency and political self-determination institutionalized through
"Community Development Corporations":
Everything that is done must be in direct response to the needs and
wishes of the people themselves. To do this, it will be necessary to cre-
ate new community institutions that local residents control, and
through which they can express their wishes. . . . [C]ommunity corpo-
rations would ensure that what is done to create jobs and build homes
builds the community as well. . . . not just the physical development of
the community, but the development of its educational system, its
health services—in short, all the services itsresidents need.
These corporations would apparently rest on real estate develop-
ment, physical development that created employment, but they
would also provide social services of various kinds. 62 Kennedy thus
advocated the holistic approach based on economic development
that TELACU and other CDCs adopted.
In the California campaign just days before his death, Robert
Kennedy placed his proposals for community development in the
context of his vision for American society as a whole: "it must be
understood that the building of a truly integrated society depends
on the development of economic self-sufficiencyand security in the
communities of poverty, for only then will the residents of these
areas have the wherewithal to move freely within the society."
Clearly, RFK saw integration into the larger society, rather than
separatism, as the goal of his community corporations. But he also
understood that minority individuals could hardly gain social equal-
ity in the larger society as long as their own communities could not
provide them with the training and economic opportunities re-
quired for social mobility: "Those who speak of ending the colonial-
ism of the ghetto must therefore recognize that the economic and
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social development of that community is at the heart of any policy
of creating mobility." Interestingly, in elaborating on this point,
Kennedy alluded to the colonial analogy advanced by the radical
left, an analogy that implied independence, rather than integration.
Despite the apparent contradiction, he dreamed of institutions that
could bring about both community self-determination and national
integration.63
Robert Kennedy was shot on June 5, 1968, at the Ambassador
Hotel in Los Angeles. His death dashed the hopes of many in East
LA, which voted overwhelmingly for him in the primary. Given
Hubert Humphrey's support among Democratic power brokers,
Kennedy had had little chance of winning the presidency. Nonethe-
less, he had offered practical solutions to the problems of the
Mexican-American community and had exhibited unusual empathy
with minority groups. Indeed, what Kennedy stated only weeks
earlier in homage to Martin Luther King could have applied to him-
self: "He lighted corners of our country . . . [some] prefer to keep
in darkness. He .. . threatened to upset .. . hundred[s of] years in
this country in which Negroes and Mexican-Americans and Indian-
Americans have been second-class citizens." Recognizing the sub-
ordinate status of minorities, Kennedy had realized that both their
liberation and national integration depended on major change in the
larger society.64
Present at the Ambassador the night of Kennedy's death were
several other people involved with CDCs and TELACU itself. In his
final remarks at the celebration of his victory in the California pri-
mary, Kennedy thanked Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta of the
United Farm Workers for their participation in the campaign. He
also thanked Paul Schrade of the United Auto Workers for his sup-
port. Indeed, only moments later Schrade, accompanying Kennedy
into the kitchen of the hotel, was seriously wounded by the same
gun that killed the senator.65
Robert Kennedy's death did not, of course, mean the death of
community development corporations. But no other major presi-
dential candidate ever again offered to make them the centerpiece
of domestic policy. Immediately after his death, a concerted effort
arose to pass national legislation in that direction, but by 1970 that
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drive failed. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), a Kennedy
ally, had initiated the Community Self-Determination Act, intro-
duced in both the House of Representatives and Senate in July
1968. The Senate version ofthe bill gainedthe most attention. That
bill proposed $30 billion for the nationwide establishment of "com-
munity development corporations," the term receiving its first of-
ficial use in legislative language. Charles E. Goodell had introduced
the first version of the self-determination bill as a member of the
House. Appointed to Kennedy's Senate seat, Goodell reintroduced
thebill in 1969 and 1970, but to no avail. Community development
corporations, thereafter, remained tertiary weapons in the federal
arsenal against poverty.66
An Organization for
Chicano Recovery and Integration
Despite the eclipse of the CDC effort on the national level, TE-
LACU was only beginning in East Los Angeles. Still a community
union, TELACU under the leadership of Esteban Torres hadby the
summer of 1968 already begun moving from social service toward
economic development. Before long the new organization had also
become deeply involved in politics. The effort came nonetoo soon,
for political conditions in East LA mirrored the socioeconomic.
Unincorporated and gerrymandered, the Mexican-American com-
munity completely lacked representation on the Los Angeles City
Council, on the county board of supervisors, and in the state sen-
ate. The community also remained seriously underrepresented in
the assembly and in Congress. This situation persisted despite the
fact that of the area's 85 percent Spanish-surnamed population, 75
percent had been born in the United States. Such figures supported
Torres's contention that East Los Angeles remained "but a colony
dependenton outside forces." 67
Torres's use of the colonial analogy reflected the radical side of
the East Los Angeles Community Union. The colonial analogy im-
plied the need for independence, for separation, of the Chicano
community. It implied a struggle for self-determination, thus sug-
gestingconfrontation—possibly even conflict with the dominant so-
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ciety. Moreover, the emerging structure of the CDC seemed revo-
lutionary; conservatives interpreted it as socialism through capitalist
methods. But the controversial, multifaceted TELACU received
criticism from the left too. TELACU's paradoxical, integrationist
position—especially its accommodating corporateorientation—vis-
a-vis the dominant society contributed to the enigmatic image of
the organization. To left-wing activists, this position meant capital-
ism had coopted the organization from the beginning. They be-
lieved accommodation with Anglo institutions could eventually lead
to integration and the disappearance of Chicanos as a people. Tor-
res and TELACU had to reconcile the contrary visions that had led
to its founding. TELACU had to superimposethesevaried visions in
an institution that would contribute to both Mexican-American re-
covery in the Southwest and integration into the nation.




To End Colonialism and Recover the Homeland
When the East Los Angeles Community Union began operations
in 1968, the United States was in turmoil. In the few months fol-
lowing the openingof TELACU's office in February, Martin Luther
King and Robert F. Kennedy were assassinated, swelling the radical-
ism of the antiwar and black nationalist movements. The rising
wave of radicalism included the Chicano movement. Though not
yet known by that name, the movementbegun by Cesar Chavez in-
undated the normally quiescent barrios ofEast Los Angeles in 1968.
Within weeks of TELACU's founding, massive protests against the
Los Angeles school system had deluged the colonia. Similar demon-
strationsrecurred throughout the following months, impelling Rob-
ert F. Kennedy to campaignheavily in the area just before his assas-
sination in June. His death only deepened the anger and frustration
ofmany in the community.1
In founding TELACU the United Auto Workers had sought to
head off the riots and other disturbances that had already damaged
communities throughout the United States. In doing so, however,
the UAW sought to solve the underlying causes of turmoil, rather
than simply the symptoms. Because internal colonialism seemed to
fit the Mexican-American experience and offer solutions to local
problems, Esteban Torres and other activists embraced the radical
theory then being advanced in black communities. According to the
colonial analogy, Anglo-Americans, in their occupation of what they
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called the Southwest, had subordinated Mexicans in a pattern sim-
ilar to that experienced by Indians in the Spanish conquest of the
same region and by blacks in the European colonization of Africa.
As newcomers had colonized these regions, native peoples had lost
control militarily, politically, economically, and in every other way.
They had come under the control of outside powers for the benefit
of outsiders. The consequences of these historical events persisted,
establishing the modern relations between minority communities
and the majority in the United States. Mexican Americans, like
other minorities, remained a people dominated by the majority in
every way, but especially economically. 2
To end colonialism—to recover self-determination—Torres and
TELACU argued that economic development had to take place
within minority communities, such as East LA, for the benefit of
their own residents. Such development would establish the basis
for general social recovery and genuine integration into the larger
society. Such development, however, would be a long-term proc-
ess, and fuses in East LA were getting short. Economic develop-
ment also implied reconciliation in a period when confrontation
seemed to win the greatest concessions from the larger society. TE-
LACU's attempt to merge the radical colonial analogy with a tradi-
tional message of economic development made the organizationun-
attractive to militants. In addition, TELACU's complex structure,
intricate transactions, and connections to labor made its public im-
age somewhat mysterious.3 Because of its commitment to long-
term development, TELACU could not meet the demands for im-
mediate action. Despite launching several enterprises designed to
decolonize East LA, TELACU could not forestall the violence that
broke out in 1970, a rebellion that emphasized separation, rather
than integration. In the long run, however, TELACU would emerge
from the crisis as a model for recovery of the community and rap-
prochement with the nation as a whole.
The History of an Internal Colony
The complex history of Greater East Los Angeles, like that of
the
Southwest,
made it difficult for some observers to understand
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how Chicano activists could descibe the local area, let alone the re-
gion, as an "internal colony" of the United States. Were not Mexi-
cans simply one other immigrant group in the nation's melting pot?
How could they be native when they had not been born in the na-
tion, the region, let alone the local area? The local history of the
Eastside seemed to confirm such thought. Anglo-Americans had
first developed and occupied Boyle Heights; Russians, Jews, and
other immigrants from the Old World had first settled unincorpo-
rated East LA. It followed that Mexicans merely comprised the
most recent immigrant group in the area; they certainly could not
be a native group conquered and colonized by "newcomers."4
Spanish Colonization
Despite this perspective, the analogy of the internal colony had a
basis in historical fact. El Pueblo de la Reina de Los Angeles began
in 1781 adjacent to Yabit, a Yang-na rancheria, with local Indian
converts as the nucleus of settlement. The first "Spanish" settlers
included only two people claiming pure Spanish ancestry, the rest
being a mixture of Hispanicized mulattos, mestizos, and Indians, a
mixture later collectively described as "Mexican." The settlers
came largely from Sonora and Sinaloa, south of the present border
between the United States and Mexico. Thus, while the founding
of Los Angeles resulted from Spanish colonialism, paradoxically the
colonists on arrival had much Indian ancestry and soon intermixed
with the local Indian population.5
The colonists had set out in staggered groups from San Gabriel
Mission about nine miles to the east of the new pueblo site.
Though founded in 1771, the mission had been relocated from its
original site near present Whittier Narrows about ten miles south-
east of the later pueblo. At the mission the process of mestizaje
that produced Mexicans had already begun to incorporate the local
Indian population before the founding of Los Angeles. Though the
earliest legal union of this sort did not occur until later, sexualrela-
tions between local Indians and settlers occurred even at the mis-
sion's original site. These events would substantiate later Chicano
claims to native status.6
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In its imperial expansion Spain of course acquired Indians and
their lands in both Sonora and California by force. Although Spain
planned the mission system to incorporate the natives and their
lands into the empirepeacefully, troops always backed up the mis-
sionaries. Ideally, the missionaries would convert the Indians to
Christianity and transform them into loyal subjects of the Spanish
king. When acculturation had sufficiently progressed, the authori-
ties would secularize the missions —divide them into regular His-
panicized communitiesserved by diocesan priests. Though the sys-
tem worked imperfectly, by the 1 770s it had worked in Sonora to
the point where the assimilated population supplied new colonists
for expansion in California. Paradoxically, Spain used colonized
people as agents for further colonization.7
On the way to the future site of Los Angeles, the settlers
probably followed present Mission Road, cutting through today's
Lincoln Heights on the northern fringe ofthe Eastside. The areabe-
tween the pueblo and the mission, as well as much of the land to
the south that would eventually form the Eastside, initially formed
parts of the grants made to the mission and then to the pueblo un-
der Spanish rule. In establishing the Spanish missions in California,
the Franciscans temporarily claimed purview over the Indians and
lands around the first buildings to the point where that territory
overlapped the claims of a neighboring mission. In the case of San
Gabriel Mission, this claim originally included all of the modern
Los Angeles metropolitan area and beyond. Over time the civil
authorities cut away large chunks of the original, vaguely defined
mission claim. Usually, Spain rewarded retired soldiers with use of
such partitioned lands. However, the first arearemoved from the
mission was the grant made to the pueblo of Los Angeles, four
square leagues or about 17,000 square miles. This square-shaped
land grant would eventually include downtown Los Angeles and
such Eastside communities as Boyle Heights and Lincoln Heights.
Much of the modern Eastside and unincorporated East LA re-
mained grazing land outside the pueblo and part of the mission
throughout the Spanish colonial era.8
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The Mexican Period
In 1821 Mexico gained its independence from Spain and re-
tained California as part of its national territory. Despite this, the
new nation continued many of the colonial policies of its predeces-
sor in developing the far northern frontier. Indeed, Mexico thus in-
stituted its own form ofcolonialism, internally. During the Mexican
era, the governmentbuilt on Spanish precedent by granting land to
settlers who offered to improve theproperty. Ultimately, local and
national authorities in the 1830s issued the orders secularizing the
missions in California, freeing the Indians and virtually all their
lands from the control of the missionaries. Unfortunately, the Indi-
ans thereby lost their lands as the authorities, following colonial
practice, granted most of the mission property to settlers, contrary
to the ideals of secularization. In 1831 Juan Ballesteros received
Rancho Rosa de Castilla, a vast tract of the former Mission San
Gabriel that would later include El Sereno and sections of adjacent
communities, including unincorporated East LA. This vast grant be-
came a bone of contention after the United States conquered Cali-
fornia in the Mexican War of 1846-48.9
The United States Marines landed at the harbor of San Pedro in
August 1846. They advanced the ten miles to Los Angeles and after
a skirmish occupied the pueblo. Further resistance from the Mexi-
can population arose a month later partly because of a perceived
threat to property. The rebellion, led by the Mexican officer Juan
Maria Flores, spread throughout southern California, driving the
American troops from the region and delaying the final conquest
for four months. However, U.S. military and naval reinforcements,
from occupied northern California and San Diego, subsequently de-
feated the Mexican troops, leading to their surrender at Cahuenga
Pass on January 13, 1847. On February 2, 1848, near Mexico City,
the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo confirmed the con-
quest ofCalifornia. 10
The American Colonial Cycle
This conquest launched a new cycle of colonialism in California.
In the aftermath of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that trans-
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ferred far northern Mexico to the United States, Mexican owners
lost land throughout what had become the Southwest. The com-
plex process of dispossession resulted from the introduction of a
new legal and socioeconomic system that benefited newcomers
from the East who understood all its subtleties. In southern Cali-
fornia the new economic system proved a greaterproblem than the
legal system. Many ranchers lost land in forced sales brought about
by insufficient experience with the new market economy of the
United States. Initially prospering in the boom resulting from the
demand for beef in the gold fields, ranchers by the early 1860s
faced a drastic drop in prices and high taxes, in addition to drought,
flood, and diseased cattle. Finding it necessary to cover their losses,
Mexican landowners lacking cash turned to Anglo-American inves-
tors for loans at exorbitant rates with predictable consequences. In
the infamous case of Julio Verdugo, a loan of $3,445 in eight years
became a debt of $58,000, causing the rancher to sell out to an
Anglo-American, leaving the former destitute. The property was
Rancho San Rafael, 36,403 acres now largely occupied by the city
of Glendale, just north ofthe Los Angeles pueblo grant. 11
While Mexican problems with the new legal system occurred
more frequently in northern California, such problems also affected
the south. At the request ofAnglo-American squatters, the United
States Congress passed the Land Law of 1851 compelling all land
grantees in the state to validate their titles, placing the burden of
proof on the owners. This created costly problems, such as the re-
tentionof lawyers, the surveying of lands, or eventhe forced sale of
unconfirmed property. 12 On the Eastside the case of Rancho Rosa
de Castilla revealed the legal mechanics of internal colonialism in
detail.
The Rosa de Castilla grant, including much of present East LA
and nearby communities, failed to receive confirmation. First, the
Board of Land Commissioners rejected the claim because of its
unclear boundaries. Second, the commissioners held that the origi-
nal grantee, Juan Ballesteros, and his family had not occupied the
land continuously as required. Maria Figueroa de Ballesteros, the
grantee's widow, testified that she had been forced to leave the
rancho after her eldest son died in battle against the United States.
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Subsequently, U.S. troops had camped on the vacant property and
left it in ruins. Despite the widow's testimony, the commissioners
rejected the claim, leaving Rosa de Castilla public land. Thereafter,
newcomers with outside sources of capital purchased the grant in
sections, leading to further subdivision in the early twentieth cen-
tury. 13
The erosion of the land base undermined Mexican culture
throughout the Southwest, California, and the Los Angeles area.
The U.S. conquest of the region had taken military control from
Mexicans. The Gold Rush, the influx of foreigners into California,
transformed Mexicans from a majority into a minority no longer in
control of its political destiny. Their economic interests immedi-
ately suffered as passage of the Land Law of 1851 attested. As the
Mexican elite lost property, it lost social prestige as well. Increas-
ingly, Mexican culture was confined to the lower classes as the
whole ethnic group experienced downward mobility. Even those
who had been poor before 1846 experienced greater difficulties as
their employers and governors now belonged to a different cultural
group. Generallyby the end of the nineteenth century, Mexicans in
California had become a small landless group of often transient la-
borers, rarely identified with the "Spanish" history ofthe state they
had earlier settled. When immigration from Mexico surged at the
beginning of the twentieth century, the newcomers would inherit
the colonized status imposed on their compatriots in the previous
century. 14
These macrocosmic events naturally affected the development
of Mexican-American Los Angeles. In the 1850s within the city,
Anglo-American merchants, lawyers, and speculators with outside
sources of capital quickly bought up land at low prices. Interest-
ingly, recent arrivals from Mexico also purchased land to the extent
that by 1880 some recovery of landholding by Mexicans occurred.
Nevertheless, according to Richard Griswold del Castillo, "In terms
of the total Spanish-speaking population, fewer and fewer indi-
viduals were able to enter the landowning class and stay there."
Mexicans remained in the old deteriorating sections of town near
the plaza, where Los Angeles began, while Anglo-Americans grad-
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ually developed the surrounding land and populated it with their
15own.
Significant change to the landscape of southern California did
not occur until the coming of the railroads in the 1870s. Then a
population and real estate boom transformed the landscape from
cow pastures to budding Anglo-American towns surrounded by or-
chards. Even then urbanization on the Eastside did not come all at
once. Development proceeded from the plaza to Boyle Heights on
the eastern side of the Los Angeles River. Boyle Heights, today
clearly within the Eastside, initially developed as a relatively
wealthy suburb established in the 1870s within the original pueblo
grant. By the turn of the century the area had declined and become
more affordable for the growing number of immigrants of various
nationalities who by then lived in the county. 16
Mexican-American Demographic Recovery
Mexican Americans continued beyond the city limits of Los Ange-
les into unincorporated East LA after 1910. Joining them were in-
creasing numbers of newcomers from Mexico drawn largely by the
industrialization of thecity. At first the Spanish-speaking made up a
minority amongthe various European groups that initially occupied
the area's housing. However, by the 1920s when East Los Angeles
had largely developedits presentphysical layout, the Spanish-speak-
ing population hadrapidly grown, and it would become the majority
by the 19305. By then, at least in terms of numbers, people of Mexi-
can descent hadretaken a large portion of Rancho Rosa de Castilla.
However, the Eastside had become increasingly blighted, and it
continued to deteriorate through the 1960s.17
Though Mexican Americans gradually became the majority on
the Eastside, they did not control the area in any meaningful way.
By 1960 control ofthe Eastside's government, business, education,
and even religion continued in the hands of outsiders; Mexican
Americans remained a laboring class, though some by then owned
the homes they occupied. In this sense then the situation of Chica-
nos on the Eastside was analogous to that of peoples in the Third
World. People of Mexican descent were native to the area through
their Indian and Spanish predecessors who once controlled this
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former part of Mexico. Once Anglo-Americans occupied the land,
Mexicans had declined and reached a low point in 1885, when they
comprised only 21 percent of the population of Los Angeles. With
renewed immigration, however, the possibility of their recovery
evolved. As the population of Chicanos increased, demands for cor-
rection of historical wrongs would rise. 18 This process became evi-
dent in the 19605, andTELACU evolved in this process.
The history of the Eastside sustains the image of the area as an
internal colony if we perceive the residents as groupsrather than as
individuals, if we consider the history of Mexican Americans as a
people rather than as individuals. In tracing the genealogies of local
families, we find most are second- or third-generation residents of
the United States, but in tracing the history of their culture in the
region, their heritage gains great depth. Moreover, in studying their
political and socioeconomic condition, we find it directly attribut-
able to the conquest of their Mexican predecessors and to the
colonization of the region by Anglo-Americans. 19 The turmoil that
East Los Angeles faced in the 1960s had its roots in the 1840s; rec-
ognition of this fact would give TELACU its full historical signifi-
cance.
Chicano Resistance on the Eastside
A major reaction to the decades of second-class citizenship ex-
perienced by Mexican Americans began in September 1965 when
Cesar Chavez and the farm workers struck against the grape grow-
ers in California's Central Valley. The ethnic appeals made by the
farm workers' union roused Mexican nationalism throughout the
Southwest, in urban as well as rural areas. This resurgence led to an
increasing interest in Mexican-American history and to a revision of
the simplistic depiction of Mexican-origin people as immigrants in
the region. Before long, irredentist sentiments developed in what
came to be called the Chicano movement; the view of Chicanos as
native to the Southwest gained currency. Chicano activists called
the region Aztlan, in reference to the ancient Aztec homeland said
to be in the pre-Columbian Southwest. This myth, though inaccu-
rate in detail, served to highlight the fact that Chicanos did have
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Indian ancestry, Aztec or other—ancestry that tied them to the re-
gion. The myth encouraged historians to examine the real ties of
Chicanos to the land they claimed, a search that publicized the fact
that people of Mexican origin were predominantly Indian and had
intermingled with native Indians throughout the Southwest.20
By the founding of TELACU in 1968, these ideas had circulated
in seminal form through leaders such as Rodolfo Gonzales of Colo-
rado and Reies Lopez Tijerina of New Mexico. In addition, rising
black nationalism with its emphasis on internal colonialism and
black power encouraged Chicano militants to view their own com-
munities from the new perspective. Activists increasingly spoke of
self-determination,of regainingcontrol ofminoritycommunities for
theirresidents. The question of tactics arose, with many new groups
favoring confrontation; many considered demonstrations, boycotts,
and even violence in hopes of bringing about change. Interestingly,
despite having thecountry's largest concentration of MexicanAmer-
icans, Eastside residents commenced their front of the Chicano
movementrelatively late. The front opened in East LA in full force
only in March of 1968, just as TELACU beganoperations.21
TELACU'sContext—Changing Visions and
New Organizations
The high school walkouts of March 1968 were the first major
event of the Chicano movement on the Eastside. The process
leading to the dramatic walkouts parallels the changing ideology of
the Mexican-American leadership at that time and helps explain
TELACU's ideological position in the community. During the year
or so preceding the East LA "blowouts," a number of organizations
came intobeing that would provide the context for much of TELA-
CU's early activities. Among these groups were the Brown Berets,
the United Mexican-American Students, and the Congress of
Mexican-American Unity. These groups all advocated the better-
ment of the Mexican-American community though they differed in
tactics and rhetoric, from radical to left-of-center. Those differ-
ences seemed unimportant in 1966-67 when the groups first
formed. 22
While the original issue concerning all these organizations was
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the poor education of Mexican-American youth, behind that issue
lay the question of historical identity. This question eventually led
students from several East LA high schools to found what later be-
came the Brown Berets. In April 1966 these students had attended
a summer camp sponsored by several liberal Jewish organizations
and the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, but
run by Mexican-American adults. The camp had focused on the is-
sue of Mexican-American identity and naturally dealt with ques-
tions of culture and history. Subsequently, students who had at-
tended the camp formed Young Citizens for Community Action, a
moderate civic-minded group that initially surveyed student needs,
met with school officials, and became involved in the Los Angeles
school board race. In the fall of 1967, however, the group rapidly
evolved into a radical organization; its activities went from discus-
sions of Chicano culture and history to public confrontations with
the police. This evolution echoed in its changing name—first to
Young Chicanos for Community Action, then to the Brown Berets.
In imitation of the Black Panthers, the radical Brown Berets now
described Chicanos as a colonized people and justified violence in
defense of the community.23
A parallel development was the establishment of the United
Mexican-American Students (UMAS). As some of the original
members of the Young Citizens for Community Action went on to
college, they left the latter group to youth in the barrio and sought
to develop their ideas on campus. Again the students initially had
narrow educational goals and non-confrontational tactics, but as
with the Brown Berets, this changedrapidly. In May 1967 at a con-
ference at Loyola University in West Los Angeles, students laid the
groundwork for UMAS chapters throughout the metropolitan area.
By September 1967 the central body had begun operations as had
the two most influential chapters, one at the University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles, the other at California State College, Los Angeles.
These chapters at first sought to raise scholarship money and to
provide mutual social supportfor Mexican-American students. 24
However, a series of catalytic events radicalized UMAS. First,
Governor Ronald Reagan threatened to charge tuition, which en-
couraged the group to demonstrate. Secondly, a conference at the
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University of Southern California exposed the local members to
the ideas of the New Left through contact with students from
northern California. Finally, at a conference at UCLA, UMAS
members heard radical leaders Tijerina of New Mexico and Gon-
zales of Colorado espouse nationalism and call for Chicano self-
determination in the Southwest. Though avoiding the self-defense
tactics advocated by the Brown Berets, UMAS entered the arena of
radical protestpolitics. 25
Another influential group, the Congress of Mexican-American
Unity, directly tied to TELACU, began and remained in the main-
stream because of its broad base in the community. This organiza-
tion initially gathered representatives of thirty smaller groups to
nominate a consensus candidate for the Board of Education of the
Los Angeles Unified School District. The representatives first met
on January 15, 1967, as the Council of Mexican-American Organi-
zations and nominated Julian Nava as their unity candidate. Signifi-
cantly, this action led to the election in June of the first Mexican-
American member of the board in the twentieth century. Because
of this success, the congress in February 1968 held another conven-
tion to nominate Mexican-American candidates for other local
elections. Members of both the Brown Berets and UMAS became
involved in Nava's campaign and also participated in the February
convention. TELACU members, especially Esteban Torres, took
leading roles in the congress. The latter two groups would share
more conciliatory tactics and goals than those advanced by the
youth in the Brown Berets or UMAS. Nevertheless, the cooperation
with regard to electoral politics indicated that all the groups within
the congress sought political self-determination. 26
The High School Walkouts
Since the Brown Berets, UMAS, arid the congress had all started
with educational concerns, naturally the first dramatic event of the
Chicano movementon the Eastside involved the schools. On March
1, 1968, thousands of students at Roosevelt, Lincoln, Garfield, and
Wilson high schools walked out of the classrooms to protest prob-
lems ranging from poor cafeteria food to the absence of Mexican-
American history in the curriculum. Before the actual walkout, a
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few parents, teachers, UMAS members, and high school students
had planned to present a list of proposals to the board of education
with the threat of walkouts if the board did not cooperate. Appar-
ently in preparation, La raza, a newly established underground
newspaper, began publishing articles on general and specific educa-
tional problems in the local area. Before formal demands reached
the board, however, Wilson students walked out because their prin-
cipal banned a play due to objections to its language. While the trig-
ger had little to do with the major issues, explosions followed on
other campuses.27
The walkouts took place the first week of March 1968, involved
thousands of students, and drew the attention of the entire metro-
politan area. Officials called in the police as the students marched
around the schools, under the protection of the Brown Berets and
UMAS members. A number of bottle-throwing incidents and some
arrests occurred, but on the whole the demonstrations remained
peaceful. The school board immediately called a meeting at Lincoln
High School to deal with the students' demands, over thirty in all.
Many of the demands dealt with mundane matters of school policy,
but several went to the heart of the conflict between the dominant
society and the Mexican-American minority.28
The students demanded more Mexican-American teachers and
bilingual-bicultural education. In advancing these demands the stu-
dents rejected the assimilationist ideology dominant in the schools
and insisted on appreciation of their ethnicity. Obviously, the stu-
dents had stepped towardthe separatist ideology increasingly advo-
cated in black communities. The discussions that went on at the
board meetings, in the newspapers, at local conferences, both dur-
ing and immediately following the walkouts indicated a move away
from the integrationist ideology ofthe early sixties. About this time
Chicano as a label for Mexican Americans gained currency because,
among other things, the term connoted native as opposed to immi-
" " 29grant origins.
During the weeks preceding and following the walkouts, Chavez,
Tijerina, and Gonzales, the most prominent Chicano activists, con-
tinued speaking at various rallies and conferences on local college
campuses. These activists set the present oppressionof Chicanos in
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the rural and urban Southwest against the historical background of
Anglo-American conquest. Local activists argued that this key his-
torical event needed elaboration in the school curricula. Indeed, in
the midst of the controversy, a supportive Anglo teacher wrote in
the faculty bulletin that because Anglos had imposed their culture
on Mexicans through conquest, the schools needed to counteract
that imposition. With this historical background emphasized, the
colonial analogy soon gained support among activists.30
Understandably, after the walkouts ended, the educational con-
troversy persisted. The board of education continued to have well-
attendedand often bitter meetings to discuss the various demands.
Major issues to be settled involved the participants in the walkouts.
While the board had absolved students, it had suspended Sal Cas-
tro, the leading teacher in support of the movement; the commu-
nity demanded his reinstatement. In addition, the police had ar-
rested twelve off-campus individuals for disrupting the schools.
Though the courts had to decide this issue, it directly influenced
discussion before the board. These matters kept the community in
turmoil throughout the first year of TELACU's existence.31
Through most of 1968 and 1969, TELACU as an organization
kept a low profile. On the other hand, members of the community
union became deeply involved in the tumultuous events on the
Eastside, especially TELACUpersonnel who joined the Congress of
Mexican-American Unity. In the congress labor formed a powerful
bloc, particularly the representatives of the United Auto Workers,
TELACU's union parent. This bloc of labor votes would eventually
catapult Esteban Torres to the presidency ofthe congress in 1970,
the critical year when mass violence broke out on the Eastside.
Until then, however, TELACU remained in the background, estab-
lishing its operations. 2
Esteban Torres's Constructive Vision
In keeping with his pragmatic approach to community issues,
Esteban Torres busily set up TELACU in the midst of the turmoil
surrounding the East LA blowouts. Nominated by Paul Schrade's
labor advisory committee and appointed executive director by the
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community union's board, Torres proceeded to staff the new or-
ganization. To assist him the UAW, through the Citizens' Crusade
Against Poverty, sent out Walter Reuther's own nephew, Eric V.
Reuther. Holding a master's degree in Latin American studies, the
younger Reuther had acquired three years' seniority with the UAW
in Fremont, California. He had been in Venezuela with the Peace
Corps and had worked for Interstate Research Associates, a Mexi-
can-American consulting firm in Washington, D.C. In addition to a
social consciousness, he had the technical expertise Torres needed
to develop the economy of East Los Angeles. Reuther would train
the staff and handle communications while Torres temporarily
filled the office of comptroller in addition to his role as executive
director.33
TELACU's Holistic Approach and Complex Structure
Behind Torres and Reuther stood the four directors of the five
original divisions of TELACU. These divisions and their names
would change repeatedly over time in response to new circum-
stances, but their original labels revealed the scope of the organiza-
tion's activities throughout its history. From most to least impor-
tant, the divisions were Economic Development, Housing-Physical
Development, Manpower-Job Development, Community Issues
Action, and Youth-Education Affairs. Though based on economic
development, the divisions revealed a holistic approach to the
problems of the community. This approach would eventually em-
brace a combination of for-profit enterprises and social services, the
former designed eventually to support the latter.34
Joseph Avila, Economic Development
In early November 1968 Torres named Joseph S. Avila director
of the most important division, Economic Development. Avila had
solid qualifications for the job. A graduate of Garfield High, East
Los Angeles Junior College, and Los Angeles State College, Avila
had recently obtained a law degree from Southwestern University
Law School (future LA Mayor Tom Bradley's alma mater). Avila, a
self-employed businessman for eight years, had worked for the Of-
fice of Economic Opportunity and subsequently for the Depart-
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ment of Labor managing federal employment and small business
projects. He had the technical expertise Torres sought to develop
East LA economically.35
Reporting on the hiring of Avila, the East Los Angeles Gazette
described Torres's hopes for East LA: "the projected goal will be
community development through entreperenurial [sic] self-determi-
nation [emphasis added] from within the community." In speaking
of self-determination at this early stage in the building of TELACU,
Torres doubtless had radical colonial theory in mind. He believed
that the community suffered from economic dependence on the
surrounding metropolis. However, the use of entrepreneurial as a
modifier clearly indicated he sought independence through accom-
modation with the capitalist system and the larger society. He
sought practical business solutions to community problems even if
these resulted from macrocosmic events, such as a historic con-
quest. Though Torres envisioned economic self-sufficiency for his
Chicano community, he did not call for the extreme separatism or
socialism advocated in some quarters.36
The Gazette also quoted Avila regarding his division's more spe-
cific plans: "initial efforts will be towards the development of a vi-
able program to strengthen and expand existing concerns located
within the community." Avila went on to discuss the community
union's role in attracting loans and investment capital to help de-
velop larger business concerns. In this endeavor technical assistance
would come from local businessmen, educational institutions, and
labor unions (ironically, labor unions would help set up busi-
nesses).37 Supporting businesses in the community certainly did not
seem a radical, let alone socialist plan of action, but such support
could help East LA gain economic independence. Indeed, economic
development would remain TELACU's major contribution to the
self-determination of East LA and the general Mexican-American
community.
Carlos J. Garcia, Housing-Physical Development
The Economic Development Division, aimed at long-term self-
sufficiency for the community, would take a while to get its busi-
ness projects under way. On the other hand, the Housing-Physical
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Development Division by August 1968 had already embarked on its
first low-cost housing project for East LA. In charge of this division,
Torres placed Carlos J. Garcia, a man who would stay with TELA-
CU for many years. Born and raised in East LA, Garcia had re-
ceived degrees from East Los Angeles College, the University of
Southern California, and the University of San Fernando Valley
Law School. He joined the community union after holding a num-
ber of positions involving social work with the county of Los Ange-
les and the state of California. As an attorney, he specialized in
housing and consequently real estate.38 The connection between
housing and real estate in the long run would be important. For
though housing formed a non-profit branch of the community un-
ion's operations, the division would eventually provide experience
in real estate development. This experience would benefit TELA-
CU's profit-making arms—to the point where real estate would be-
come the most significanteconomic development activity.
Garcia embarked on an $80,000 project when the Housing Divi-
sion took overan effort launched three years earlier by residents of
Hubbard Street in East LA. Despite the support of several other
local organizations, the project had not received the approval of the
Federal Housing Administration when the community union en-
tered the picture. Though the pilot project comprised only six
units, the FHA had stalled the effort because of its experimental
nature. The units, condominiums, were to be purchased at low in-
terestrates with low monthly payments by the families that resided
in them. Furthermore, the buyers themselves would do the un-
skilled work on the project, thus cutting their mortgage payments
through "sweat equity." Garcia's division had to design the project,
secure funding through the FHA, and hire the builder. In addition
the division had to guaranteeemployees and subcontractors would
be representative of the community.39 Thus, Garcia and Torres
hoped to make the residents independent homeowners while pro-
viding business and jobs to help make the overall community more
self-sufficient. Paradoxically, the federal governmenthad to invest
the capital for this experiment in self-sufficiency, a paradox that
would haunt TELACU's operations.
According to Torres, the Hubbard Street project marked the in-
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ception of a combined assault by labor and the community on
blight in the cities. This complex undertaking required the techni-
cal expertise Torres expected of the community union. Though the
nonprofit project taxed the community union's resources to the
limit, the experience gained in real estate development and urban
renewal proved invaluable. Henceforth, TELACU impacted the
landscape of East LA dramatically. By the end of 1969, TELACU
was considering involvement in three other low-income housing
projects: the Monterey Hills, Cleland House, and El Hoyo proj-
ects. 40 Though TELACU ultimately limited its participation in
these, a pattern of housing development had formed, a pattern that
would eventually lead to for-profit real estate ventures. Gradually,
TELACU would pursue economic self-sufficiency for the commu-
nity, primarily through real estate development.
Roy Escarcega, Manpower-Job Development
From its inception TELACU aimed to provide jobsfor the com-
munity. Torres charged Roy Escarcega with this task as head of the
Manpower-Job Development Division. A native of East LA, Escar-
cega had graduatedfrom California State College, Los Angeles, with
a degree in industrial education. After teaching for nine years, most
recently at the East Los Angeles Skills Center, he joined the new
communiy union. As manpower director, he arranged an on-the-job
training program in cooperation with the United Auto Workers,
"placing 123 local workers (100% of all those completing the train-
ing) in good steady jobs." Later his division would also arrange job
training for local residents in connection with the Department of
Labor. In addition to the community union itself, the Kaiser Foun-
dation, Arrow Truck Body Company, Hollytex Carpet Mills, and
McDonnell-Douglas were potential employers. 41 The community
could only claim self-sufficiencyif its residents had good jobs.
Luana Eppert, Community Issues and Education Affairs
Torres hired Luana Eppert to direct the divisions of Community
Issues Action and Youth-Education Affairs. Another graduate of
Cal State, Los Angeles, Eppert had majored in drama and English;
prior to joiningTorres's staff, she had worked as an office manager
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and teacher. In general she applied her skills to "youth employ-
ment, tutoring, adult education, individual casework, and commu-
nity organizing." A specific social service she established for East
LA was a branch of the national Reading Is Fun-damental Program.
This program allowed children to acquire books they liked without
cost, in hopes that personal ownership would stimulate reading. 42
While Glenn O'Loane had launched the community union with so-
cial services, Torres quickly deemphasized them. Such projects
smacked too much of dependency. While they remained necessary
and eventually became beneficiaries of TELACU's for-profit enter-
prises, social services alone could not gain independence for the
community.
Despite this, TELACU could never quite escape its image as a
social service agency. Thecomplex structure of the comunity union
made it difficult to define; consequently, the public often miscon-
strued the organization's mission. Through their publicity Torres
and his staff continually attempted to explain:
what it all leads to is not just greateraffluence, but greaterability to in-
fluence the political and social institutions that control the community.
It leads, in other words, to union among free and independent people... a community union ... a true Community Union for the East Los
Angelesbarrio. 43
Throughout, TELACU's founders had designed the complex struc-
ture of the organization to end internal colonialism in the barrios
through social and economic development, with emphasis on the
latter.
Pragmatic Action to End Colonialism
Influential in TELACU's initial structure and program of action
was UCLA's Institute of Industrial Relations. Affiliated with labor,
this academic institute had already cooperated with the UAW in
founding the new community union. In the fall of 1968, it assisted
Esteban Torres's efforts by funding a nine-week training seminar
"addressing itself to an examination of the major social, educa-
tional, economic, and political issues currently confronting the pre-
dominantly Mexican-American community of East Los Angeles."
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Twenty-two leaders oforganizationsin the areareceived invitations
to participate. "Resource personnel" discussed the following topics:
"a. the status and future of education; b. housing and ELA; c. the
zoningand incorporationissues and their impactuponELA; d. rural
technology and its urban impact; c. politics and the Barrio, and
economic development in ELA." 44 Except for rural technology, the
other topics reflected the community union's very structure; they
had already been analyzed within the organization. Torres now
hoped to disseminate information regarding these matters to other
key figures in the community. To carry out its program, TELACU
needed to communicate its vision, something it would not always
succeed in doing.
In 1969 Carlos J. Garcia's Housing Division received a unique
opportunity to build TELACU's reputation in the community. The
city ofLos Angeles threatened to demolish unused boating facilities
at a lake in Lincoln Park, a popular Eastside recreation area. A coa-
lition of citizens' groups gathered to oppose unilateral demolition of
the site by the city's parks department. Because TELACU in its
first year ofexistence had already gained a reputation for technical
expertise in development, the citizens' groups called on it for assis-
tance. They asked Torres to develop plans to convert the unused
buildings along the lake into a cultural center. Torres and Garcia
enthusiastically embarked on this project, which came to be known
as Plaza de la Raza. Although the city funded the entire project,
Garcia successfully converted the citizens' wishes into a plan ac-
ceptable to the municipal authorities. The buildings of the reno-
vated complex reflected the area's Mexican heritage as would its
collections. Eventually, exhibitions of such prominent artists as
Frida Kahlo would appear in the new facility.45 This project estab-
lished Plaza de la Raza as one of the major arts centers on the East-
side. As such, the project demonstrated Torres's holistic approach
to community development. Through its growing expertise in real
estate development, TELACU had contributed to the cultural self-
determination ofthe Eastside.
In addition to participating in Plaza de la Raza, Torres and his
staff rapidly became involved in other projects requiring expertise
in real estate development. Carlos J. Garcia became a representa-
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tive and a consultant to the federal Model Cities redevelopment
program on the Eastside. His Housing Division administered the
Community Advisory Committee to the H.O.M.E. Program, de-
signed to assure building code enforcement. The Congress of Mexi-
can-American Unity asked Garcia to head its housing committee.
Moreover, Joseph Avila's Economic Development Division was in-
strumental in setting up the Greater Eastside Builders Association,
a nonprofit corporation designed to help Mexican-American build-
ing contractors compete more effectivelyfor jobs.46 Clearly, real es-
tate developmentearly became the community union's forte.
Despite this, Esteban Torres wished to promote manufacturing
through the Economic Development Division. The community un-
ion's first foray into manufacturing, and its first for-profit subsidi-
ary, was the TELACU Mattress Company. The company in order
of priority would provide: (1) profits for the community union as a
whole, (2) employment for East LA residents, (3) training for
Mexican Americans in industrial management, (4) a model of suc-
cessful enterprise, and (5) quality bedding at good prices for local
residents. The company opened on May 2, 1969, only days before
the Mexican celebration of Cinco de Mayo. At the opening Esteban
Torres informed the press that the new company represented "the
first cooperativebusiness enterprise owned by a non-profit corpo-
ration in the entire East Los Angeles area."47 Nonetheless, the para-
dox of a nonprofit corporation making profits contributed to the
enigmatic image of TELACU.
Unfortunately, the newenterprise failed within threeyears basi-
cally because the company could not absorb the high cost of the
mattresses' fine materials. In addition the area's generally low-
income customers often fell in arrears on their payments. The en-
terprise employed only two people, who turned out a high-quality
product, but the lack of custodians left the premises a poor show-
place. A companionfirm TELACU Headboard Company produced
Spanish-style furnishings and headboards, obviously designed for
their cultural appeal. These products sold well in the showroom
shared by the companies, but the slow sale of the relatively expen-
sive mattresses doomed both businesses.48 It became evident to
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
The Chicano Movement on the Eastside 67
Torres that manufacturing would be a hard road to self-sufficiency
for the community.
Despite the failure of the Mattress Company, in 1968-69 TELA-
CU attempted activities that no other organization in East Los An-
geles had dared on such a broad front. In addition to the bedding
companies, Torres and his staff in the first few years also planned a
printing company, a demolition firm, and a maintenance and home
repair company. The last ultimately succeeded due to its close re-
lationship to real estate. Besides setting up companies, TELACU's
staff also helped many other local businesses obtain loans from
variouspublic and private sources.49 Indeed, despite their mistakes,
Torres and his officers had become the technocracy ofthe Eastside.
Clearly, to gain self-determination, the community needed a group
of such trained leaders.
Insurrection inEast Los Angeles
However, TELACU's efforts, successful or not, were overshad-
owed by increasingly ominous political events in East Los Angeles.
The tensions resulting from the high school walkouts of March
1968 continued in East Los Angeles at least through mid- 1970
when a state appellate court finally dropped the charges ofconspir-
acy against Sal Castro and twelve other activists. During the early
part of this period, the Educational Issues Coordinating Commit-
tee, formed as a result of the walkouts, served as a broad-based or-
ganization unifying the community in its dealings with the school
board. The core of this organizationincluded members of the Uni-
ted Mexican-American Students, parents from advisory commit-
tees to the local schools, and professionals, many of whom had
worked for Julian Nava's election. The Brown Berets and several
underground newspapers also sent representatives. The loosely
structured coordinating committee stressed participation, rather
than formal membership. Thus informally, various individuals
linked to TELACU became involved in the school conflict by virtue
of their personal interest.50
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Increasing Tensions
In 1968 the tensions escalated. Prior to the walkouts and his
presidential campaign, Robert Kennedy had quietly discussed com-
munity issues with student activists on the Eastside; in May he vis-
ited again only two weeks before his disillusioning death. Mean-
while, the coordinating committeeorganized numerous demonstra-
tions usually concerning education but also became involved in
other community issues, such as police brutality, the grape boycott,
and welfare rights. On June 3 committee members picketed the
administration building of the Los Angeles Police Department; they
then marched to the plaza, the cornerstone of the city, for a rally
protesting the indictments of the thirteen activists involved in the
walkouts. In September the situation became more heated. After
repeated picketing at Lincoln High School, the coordinating com-
mittee staged a sit-in at theboard of education in an attempt to get
Sal Castro reinstated to his classroom. The police then arrested
about thirty-five student members who refused to leave the board
room. The committee provided bail even though few of its own
members were among those detained. This action demonstrated
that the insurrection against the school system had support across
various sectors ofthe community.51
The sit-in finally convinced the Los Angeles school board to rein-
state Castro by October 1968; consequently, tensions over educa-
tional issues lessened somewhat. Indeed, by June of 1969, the
school board agreed to accept what amounted to the transforma-
tion ofthe Educational Issues Coordinating Committee into an of-
ficial advisory body, the Mexican-American Education Commis-
sion. The new commission would do research and recommend pro-
grams to alleviate the drop-out problem and send more Chicanos to
college. Vahac Mardirosian, chairman of the old committee, be-
came chairman of the new commission. Thus, the coordinating
committeeand the school board began to movefrom confrontation
to accommodation.52
One prominent individual from TELACU involved in the educa-
tional controversy was Gordon Moreno. On TELACU's board of di-
rectors, Moreno joined the Mexican-American Education Commis-
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sion after serving on the old coordinating committee. Politically
conservative relative to TELACU and the community as a whole, to
the extent that he carried a weapon for fear of radical reprisals,
Moreno exemplified the broad base of the early Chicano move-
ment on the Eastside. 53 While the students in UMAS and the barrio
youth in the Brown Berets gave the movement an increasingly radi-
cal perspective, parents and community people such as Moreno an-
chored the movement in practical concerns. Though influenced by
radical ideas, people connected with TELACU generally sought
rapprochement, rather than conflict with the larger society.
Justafter the Los Angeles school board agreed to reform educa-
tionin the colonia, the Chicano movementchallenged the hierarchy
ofthe Roman Catholic Church. In late 1969 Catolicos por la Raza,
composed of activist priests, nuns, and lay people, formed to pres-
sure the archdiocese of Los Angeles to assist the Chicano commu-
nity. The hierarchy, led by James Francis Cardinal Mclntyre, was
extremely conservative even by the standards of the American
church at the time. Catolicos argued that the archdiocese ignored
the spiritual, cultural, and economic needs of its rapidly increasing
Mexican-American parishioners. The complaints initially involved
the closing, for alleged lack of funds, of Our Lady Queen ofAngels,
a predominantly Mexican-American girls' high school. When
Catolicos sought a meeting with the cardinal regarding this matter,
he rebuffed them. Beyond the educational issue, Catolicos sought
general assistance for Chicanos, especially for housing. 54
The issue of housing evolved from the fact that the archdiocese
had just completed St. Basil's Cathedral, a huge edifice on Wilshire
Boulevard, LA's major thoroughfare on the wealthy Westside.
Catolicos argued that if the church could afford such a rich build-
ing, it could certainly provide funding to house the poor on the
Eastside. The cardinal's refusal to discuss the issue ledto a dramat-
ic protest at St. Basil's on Christmas Eve 1969. Catolicos picketed
in front of the church in an orderly fashion. However, when Mass
began and demonstrators attempted to enter the church, armed
policemen acting as ushers expelled them. Once outside, additional
police met the demonstrators and arrested about twenty. Of those
who stood trial for disrupting a religious gathering, only the leader
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was finally convicted of a misdemeanor in 1972.55 Needless to say,
in the interim the publicity surrounding the case aggravated ten-
sions and caused some divisiveness in East Los Angeles.
Despite the housing issue, neither TELACU nor its members be-
came directly involved in the church demonstrations. Given the
overwhelmingly Catholic Mexican-American community, the pro-
test at St. Basil's led to much controversy on the Eastside. Never-
theless, organized community support for Catolicos was almost as
strong as support for the East LA walkouts had been. On February
14, 1970, the Congress of Mexican-American Unity unanimously
passed a resolution in support of Catolicos. Obviously, Torres and
the other TELACU personnel in the congress voted for the resolu-
tion. All groups in East LA had found it increasingly difficult to dis-
tance themselves from controversial positions as social unrest broke
out repeatedly in the colonia during 1970.56
The East LA Riots
Violence flared immediately on January 1, 1970, as about five
thousand New Year's revelers stormed along Whittier Boulevard in
East LA, breaking windows and looting a few stores. It took police
about two hours to quell the disturbance. While the immediate
causes of this disturbance seemed apolitical at the time, the pattern
of tension preceding and following this event indicated that it re-
sulted from more than an excess of New Year's spirits. 57 The colo-
nial analogy suggested thatrebellion was imminent.
Early in 1970 TELACU stepped directly into the turmoil through
the participation of its personnel in the Congress of Mexican-
American Unity. Supported by the large contingent of TELACU
and union members in the congress, Esteban Torres was elected
president of the organization on March 12, 1970. During his presi-
dency, the congress included over three hundred organizations of
various types from throughout the Los Angeles area, but especially
the Eastside. It represented groups as radical as the Brown Berets
and as conservative as the Eastmont Parent-Teacher Association.58
As president of the single most representative organization on the
Eastside, Esteban Torres would be a key community leader in that
turbulent year.
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That same March hundreds of Mexican Americans from
throughout the United States met in Denver for the Second An-
nual Chicano Youth Liberation Conference. The first conference
the previous year had promulgated "The Spiritual Plan of Aztlan,"
uniting the Chicano movement under one historic vision—the de-
sire to recover the conquered Southwest. The second conference
stressed specific approaches to current issues, especially the Viet-
nam War. From December 1967 to March 1969, Mexican Ameri-
cans numbered 19 percent of all casualties from the Southwest
while comprising only 12 percent of the region's population. Be-
cause Chicanos suffered such disproportionate casualties, the war
had become an ethnic as well as a national issue. Activists began to
argue that Chicanos were fighting for imperialism abroad, even as
colonialism victimized them at home. Consequently, the delegates
at the second conference planned hundreds of local antiwar demon-
strations for communities throughout the Southwest and else-
where. At the planning sessions in Denver, the Brown Berets most
vociferously promoted the nationwide demonstrations. Unsurpris-
ingly, the delegates set the climactic protest for August 29, 1970, in
East Los Angeles.59
Even before the second Denver conference, the Brown Berets
had formed the National Chicano Moratorium Committee and had
held their first antiwar protest on December 20, 1969. Over two
thousand people participated. At this point Rosalio Mufioz, a for-
mer UCLA student-body president who resisted the draft, became
co-chair of the moratorium committee. On February 28, 1970,
again prior to the second Denver conference, the new committee
staged another march, this time involving over six thousandpartici-
pants who showed the intensity of their commitment by marching
in the pouring rain.60 All of this naturally created greater tension
with the police, who resented such "subversive"activities.
In addition to the tension created by the war, the police them-
selves frayed nerves on the Eastside. Increasingly, activists saw the
police as part of the same imperialistic system that waged war in
Vietnam and oppressed Chicanos at home. Police brutality became
a major concern in the community. For example, on July 4, 1970,
residents demonstrated against the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
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Department. They protested the deaths of six Mexican-American
inmates over the previous five months at the East LA substation.
Only the night before twenty-two people had been arrested, and
one youth injured, in a spontaneous protest overthe same issue on
Whittier Boulevard. In this outbreak the street suffered more bro-
ken windows as 250 sheriff's deputies and California Highway Pa-
trol officers tried to quell the disturbance.61 Seemingly, the police
contributed to the spread of insurrection.
Given the pressures building in the community throughout 1970,
the planned August 29 demonstration seemed sure to turn violent.
To avoid this, the Chicano Moratorium Committee led by Rosalio
Murioz sought and received wide support in the community for a
peaceful march and rally. When asked for assistance, Torres and
the Congress of Mexican-American Unity agreed to cooperate. The
congress applied for the parade permit in July, and Torres offered
the offices ofTELACU on Atlantic Boulevard as a meeting place for
marchers. As part of the congress, a contingent of TELACU staff
would march in the parade. 62
The moratorium committee arranged for its own monitors to
watch the march and requested that sheriffs deputies keep a low
profile to avoid provoking the crowd. On the morning ofAugust 29,
from Belvedere Park the march proceeded east on Third and Bev-
erly, then south on Atlantic Boulevard near the TELACU offices,
and turned west onto YvHiittier Boulevard. Along the way, a number
of minor incidents occurred that might have led to rioting had not
cooperation between police and monitors held. Monitors quickly
restrained a marcher who threw a bottle at a police car. Apparent
opponents of the march threw bottles onto the participants from
the Long Beach Freeway overpass, but trouble subsided despite a
few cuts. A potentially serious problem developed when marchers
took over both sides of the boulevard. Although the permit only
allowed use of half the street, the police wisely refrained from in-
sisting on the letter of the law. 63 Calm persisted until the end of
the march at Laguna Park, about a block east of Indiana Street—
the boundary of the old pueblo land grant.
At Laguna Park the marchers seated themselves on the grass in
front of a stage set for musicians and speakers. The crowd included
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not only youths, but whole families; children played on the grass as
their parents enjoyed picnics and listened to those on stage. How-
ever, about 3 p.m. a disturbance outside the park triggered a wider
outbreak of violence. Apparently, teenagers in a crowded liquor
store had pilfered some soft drinks. Police later claimed the owner
called for their assistance, a claim denied by the owner. On the ar-
rival of numerous squad cars, bottles flew at the police. Rather than
isolating the problem on the street, the police decided to break up
the entire demonstration at the park. Ignoring the pleas of the
monitors, the police advanced into the park and met increasingre-
sistance. They began firing tear gas into the crowd though many
demonstrators heard no order to disperse and were unaware of the
danger. Panic ensued when most of the crowd tried to escape
through narrow exits away from the police advance. On the other
hand, angered youths counterattacked with whatever weapons they
could find. Rather than successfully breaking up the demonstration,
the police action led to more open violence. The disturbance spread
from the park down Whittier Boulevard. Stores were looted,
buildings set afire, and police cars attacked.64 Insurrection reached
its peak in the colonia.
The violence continued for several hours during which three
Chicanos died, including the most prominent Mexican-American
journalist in Los Angeles. Ruben Salazar, a reporter for the Los An-
geles Times as well as Spanish-language KMEX-TV, was killed by a
tear-gas projectile fired indiscriminately into the Silver Dollar bar
where he sat. The circumstances surrounding his death created
controversy for weeks thereafter. The county coroner's office held
an inquest into the death, a proceeding monitored by the Congress
of Mexican-American Unity, including Esteban Torres and other
prominent community leaders. Televised for days throughout the
metropolitan area, the inquest became a forum for debate concern-
ing the events of August 29. Though the hearing officer favored the
authorities, enough information surfaced, especially on film, to lay
significant blame on the police. 65
Tensions in East Los Angeles and wherever Chicanos resided in
southern California continued for months. Immediately following
the August 29 riot, disturbances occurred in the barrios of Wil-
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after riot ofAugust 29, 1970. Courtesy oi Los Angeles TimesPhotographic
Archive,Department of Special Collections, UniversityResearch Library,
UCLA.
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mington and Riverside. Another broke out in East LA on Septem-
ber 16 after a Mexican Independence Day parade. To avoid a street
confrontation, Esteban Torres had asked for a permit to celebrate
the sixteenth at a local stadium, but the authorities denied the re-
quest.66 Subsequently, police harassment of community groups, es-
pecially the Chicano Moratorium Committee, intensified.
In response the Congress of Mexican-American Unity issued an
open letter in the Eastside Sun "urgently appealing to the Anglo
community throughout Southern California to come to the assis-
tance ofthe Chicano people." In the letter Esteban Torres, Rosalio
Mufioz, and other prominent local leaders charged "that the police
department is deliberately attempting to foment rebellion as an ex-
cuse to enter the community on a 'shoot-out basis.'" Shockingly,
this radical interpretation of events came from a broadly based
community group. The letter clearly revealed the colonia's desper-
ate feelings of persecution at the hands of authorities and isolation
from the surrounding metropolis. On the other hand, the appeal to
the Anglo majority's sense of fairness expressed the Mexican-
American community's desire for reconciliation. Further alienation
could only lead to more repression and more civil disorder.67
The period of insurrection ended in 1971 with two final out-
breaks on January 9 and 31, again on Whittier Boulevard. The last
of these fit the description of purposeful rebellion predicted by
some observers because the rioters struck intentionally at police,
rather than at private property. Prior to the latter incident, Rosalio
Mufioz representing the Chicano Moratorium Committee had pub-
lished another open letter, this one in the Los Angeles Times. In this
letter he argued that the contemporaryconflict between the police
and Chicanos had "its roots in the mid 1800's when another police
government body—the U.S. Army—forcibly took the land away
from the Mexicans in this area."68 Mufioz had interpreted current
events historically, according to internal colonialism and "The Spiri-
tual Plan of Aztlan." The current violence was not the aimless
criminality of immigrant neighborhoods, but the purposeful revolt
of a native people.
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But revolt could not lead to independence in the way such con-
flicts had secured freedom from empire for formal colonies. An in-
ternal colony, such as the Eastside, existed in a larger society from
which it was neither possible nor desirable to secede. As Chicano
columnist Tony Castro once commented, an accommodation had to
be reached.69 TELACU's seemingly contradictory position, as an
advocate of self-determination as well as reconciliation, mirrored
the situation of the community itself. The Chicano community
sought to control its own political and socioeconomic destiny; it
sought recovery of the place its culture had once enjoyed in Cali-
fornia; but it sought these goals as an integral part of the United
States. TELACU had the potential to deal with these paradoxical
goals and to offer solutions once the violence had ended. Eventu-
ally, the East Los Angeles Community Union would leave its im-
print on the recovering community, through economic and espe-
cially real estate development.
TELACU, Recovery, and Reconciliation
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Nueva Maravilla and East LA
Self-Government
Recovery Through Political Participation
Days after the major riot of August 29, 1970, the colonial anal-
ogy never seemed more appropriate as hundreds of police officers
in helmets patrolled the barrios of East Los Angeles in a show of
force resembling an occupying army. Windows and doors shattered
in the outbreak were boarded up along Whittier Boulevard. Iron
grates proliferated on storefronts all along the commercial strip.
Several lots contained only rubble and ashes, evidence of the fires
that had destroyed several buildings. Anglo commuters passed
quickly through the neighborhood fearful that they might become
the targets of further violence. The distance between the colonia
and the surroundingmetropolis rarely seemed greater.1
After the East LA riots of 1970, both governmentand the colo-
nia desperately needed leadership that could end the violence and
reconstruct social relations. That leadership would need to maneu-
ver delicately between the conservative establishment, radical activ-
ists, and the general public caught between them. Key participation
in recent events, especially through the Congress of Mexican-
American Unity, placed the East Los Angeles Community Union in
a position to serve as the intermediary for all sides at this critical
juncture. Beyond political credibility, the community union had the
technical expertise to act as broker for the community. As in
Watts, the riots in East Los Angeles led governmentat various lev-
els to place increased attention on the troubled area, and TELACU
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more than any other local organization could focus that attention.2
For above all, TELACU could offer solutions from an ideological
position that mirrored the needs of the community.
During the period of the riots, Esteban Torres, as head of the
Congress of Mexican-American Unity, had followed a policy
strongly in defense of community militants and critical of local au-
thorities, especially the police. On the other hand, as TELACU's
executive director, Torres had mapped out a course of community
development in the mainstream, one that sought improvements
through the system. The latter made him and TELACU more ac-
ceptable to government officials, more acceptable than militant
groups, such as La Raza Unida Party soon to become a force on the
Eastside. 3 Despite Torres's accommodating tactics, the radical ide-
ology based on the internal colonial thesis continued to influence
the actions ofTELACU. After the violence of 1970, more than ever
before, it seemed necessary for "self-determination" to move be-
yond mere rhetoric toward reality. Consequently, the struggle for
political self-determination remained central to TELACU's opera-
tions and central to the life of East Los Angeles.
From early 1971 through 1974, the community's drive for politi-
cal self-determination would transform the structure of the East
Los Angeles Community Union, focus its economic activities in-
creasingly in real estate, involve its members in a campaign to in-
corporate East LA as a city, and further complicate its public im-
age. Over these four years TELACU would become a federally
funded community development corporation, thereby securing its
survival and expanding its power. It would also undertake its first
major real estate development, the successful renewal of the
Maravilla housing project. And though the campaign to incorporate
East LA would fail, the result would make TELACU the provider
of many of the community services otherwise absent for lack of a
municipal government. The experience gained in electoral politics
would also draw TELACU, especially Torres, into the concentric
circles of political power.4 This was of course an integrative proc-
ess, for as Mexican Americans sought self-determination for East
Los Angeles, they also sought greaterpower within the social sys-
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tem of the region and the nation. Though not always successful in
its endeavors, TELACU would come to represent socioeconomic
recovery through sophisticated participation in democratic politics.
Failed Experiments inFree Enterprise
The first half of 1971 began inauspiciously for both East LA and
TELACU. Riots broke out again on January 9 and 31, as if auguring
another year of violence for the community. The general disorder
seemed to affect the operation of TELACU itself as its internal af-
fairs became disorganized. The community union in attempting a
comprehensive approach to East LA's critical problems found itself
overextendedand ill-focused. A sign of this was a loss of funds that
the Ford Foundation had provided earlier for a home repair pro-
gram. Another sign was the poor performance of the mattress
manufacturing firm begun in early 1969. Moreover, a gasoline sta-
tion launched as a retailing venture in December 1970 showed little
promise almost from its inception. These small, long-term projects
seemed futile given the crisis in the community.5 Although eco-
nomic development remained TELACU's hope for the future of
East LA, political involvement offered more solutions to the most
immediate problems. As a result, TELACU would seek for several
years to achieve both its short- and long-term goals through gov-
ernment and politics in general.
The TELACU Mobil Service Center exemplified the difficulties
Torres and his staff experienced with their privately financed long-
term projects. The "mission" of the gasoline station located on
Telegraph Boulevard in Commerce, followed the guidelines set for
TELACU's Economic Development Division in general. The mis-
sion included providing revenue for TELACU and its limited part-
ner the Mexican-American Community Programs Foundation, later
called the Euclid Foundation. Providing East LA residents with
employment, management training, and an example of a successful
enterprise were other goals of the venture. The Euclid Foundation
had invested $4,000 in the gasoline station while TELACU had in-
vested $5,000 borrowed from Pan American Bank, a local Mexican-
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American lender.6 The project involved neither governmentfunds
nor government contracts as TELACU had yet to develop its later
extensive political network.
By mid-September 1971 the service station closed. In its first
seven months the station had lost over $8,000 and owed over
$8,000. Torres and his staff closed and sold the property to mini-
mize their losses by reclaiming the equity. The conditions that had
made the station initially promising had deteriorated, making fur-
ther investment unwise. Across the street a large motel planned by
another company never came about; instead, two competing sta-
tions appeared. Newer and more accessible to traffic, these cut into
TELACU Service Center's receipts dramatically. Management and
employees became demoralized, and consequently maintained the
premises poorly. Clearly, the staffhad not achieved the goals of the
venture. Given that Mobil Oil Corporation and subsequent owners
had failed to turn a profit at that location prior to TELACU's in-
volvement, profitable investment at the location had hinged on the
proposed motel. The discontinuation of that development doomed
TELACU's retail venture. This experience, together with that of
the failed mattress company, had its lessons. Thenceforth, Torres
and his staff would steer away from privately financed mom-and-
pop ventures in retailing and manufacturing.7
The movement in the direction of real estate development
seemed more promising in 1971. By then Carlos J. Garcia's Hous-
ing Division had already participated in the Hubbard Street, Plaza
de la Raza, and several other land development projects generally
linked to government. In addition Joseph Avila's Economic Devel-
opment Division had established relations with Mexican-American
building contractors and launched a small building-maintenance
firm with another loan from the Pan American Bank. In 1970 Tor-
res and his officers had scored a major coup when they won grants
of $323,000 from the Ford Foundation and the Southwest Council
of La Raza for housing rehabilitation. To administer the funds, they
founded TELACU Home Repair Corporation in August of that year
as a subsidiary of the community union. This corporation also proc-
essed the sale of prefabricated houses and handled promotions in
connection with home repairs. Another subsidiary, TELACU Con-
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struction Development Corporation, carried out the actual home
improvements and repairs. After theseactivities had got under way,
however, the Ford Foundation withdrew its funding because of a
disagreement over ultimate goals. Short of capital, the community
union, established to promote self-sufficiency, ironically found it-
self dependent on philanthropic sources. And TELACU's officers
discovered that private financing evenfrom nonprofit foundations
could be unreliable. 8
Though blaming the Ford Foundation for some of the misunder-
standing overgoals, Esteban Torres, his staff, and TELACU's board
ofdirectors reexamined their own managementand concluded that
it needed improvement. Turning to government, they won a small
grant from the federal Economic Development Administration, a
grant Torres used to secure the services of Llewelyn-Davies Associ-
ates to reorganize his operations. Llewelyn-Davies was a New York
community planning organization recommended by the Center for
Community Change (the latter, headed by Jack Conway, had
merged with the Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty). A planning
team formed, including top TELACU staff, representatives of
Llewelyn-Davies and the center, and other associates of Torres in
East LA. Pleased with TELACU's willingness to undertake self-
criticism, the Ford Foundation in 1972 provided $25,000 for the
"Barrio Housing Plan." This document, resulting from three months
of self-criticism, ultimately oriented TELACU's future activities
toward real estate development.9 Torres and his officers had suc-
cessfully combined government and private funding sources in this
new endeavor, a success that suggested the staff's increasing so-
phistication.
Maravilla and Participatory Democracy
The planning team urged that the community union complete its
present housing projects, but that it soon target a single area in East
Los Angeles with a comprehensive approach to the environment.
The team recommended Maravilla "on the grounds that it was
within the 'hard-core' area with one of the highest proportions of
Mexican-American population, a high percentage of deteriorated
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and dilapidated housing, few proposals for the area and high visibil-
ity to the Chicano community." At the heart of Maravilla stood an
old project partly built during the thirties as housing for the poor
andpartly during the forties as temporary housing for World War II
veterans. The substandard project, owned and managed by the
county, included sixty acres occupied by 480 families. "Abandoned
buildings, houses beyond repair, and housing requiring either major
rehabilitation or assistance" surrounded the project. 10 Of course,
the physical environment reflected the area's social problems,
problems poorly addressed by government and the private sector
for decades.
Poverty and powerlessness had left Maravilla's inhabitants sus-
picious of change. Urban renewal programs of the recent past had
removed whole barrios in the name of progress. The most notorious
example had been the bulldozing ofChavez Ravine to make way for
Dodger Stadium in the late fifties. A major part of the Maravilla ef-
fort would involve winning over the residents by organizing them
for meaningful participation. TELACU's first job would be to
"identifyor build a neighborhood organization . . . able to enlist the
support of the diverse elements in the community, to begin to es-
tablish and achieve specific goals, and eventually build its capacity
as a powerful force for attracting and controlling the substantial
public and private investment necessary for major redevelopment."
Torres understood the negative history of urban renewal. It had
simply reconstucted physical areas without regard for the needs of
residents, who often found themselves unable to afford the higher
rents charged for new or reconstructed housing. Since the Nueva
Maravilla redevelopment would involve clearance and replacement
of old housing, resistance would certainly arise from the current
residents unless they participated in the process. 11 TELACU thus
faced a problem requiring an essentially political solution.
To overcomethe apprehensions of the barrio, Torres and his of-
ficers essentially planned a political campaign to win over the resi-
dents of Maravilla. They laid out a comprehensive approach to the
area, in keeping with their holistic philosophy toward community
recovery. In the "Barrio Housing Plan" the planning team recom-
mended an inventory and analysis of all Maravilla's existing organi-
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zations and their leadership. The political backing of such promi-
nent groups as Cleland House, a Presbyterian settlement house
serving the community for over fifty years, would be critical for
success. After soliciting the support of these groups, a preliminary
effort to organize these groups into a coalition would follow. This
effort would involve identifying more leaders, community concerns,
issues, and attractive projects. The preliminary effort would also
determine the need for staff, its training, support, and supervi-
sion. 12 All of this involved organizing skills that Torres's officers
were fast developing, skills useful in the later acquisition of formal
political power.
With the political spadework complete, the next step would be
to focus the coalition's activity on housing, economic development,
and job training to attract even greater support. The final step
would be steering that support toward TELACU's goals of "Beau-
tification, rehabilitation, and new construction in the three block
actionarea." The "Barrio Housing Plan" indicated that while Torres
and his officers sought input from the neighborhood democrati-
cally, they expected to set the agenda and direct the barrio toward
redevelopment. 13 In doing so, TELACU would experience a recur-
ring political problem faced by all community organizations: How
to bring the goals of the organizationand the wishes of the com-
munity together. By taking a comprehensive approach and doing
their political spadework, TELACU's officers increased their chan-
ces for success in this endeavor.
TELACU in President Nixon's New Federalism
While the planning team formulated the "Barrio Housing Plan,"
TELACU's major endeavor involving government was coming to
fruition. In 1969 Torres's staff had applied to the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity (OEO) for a planning grant to transform the
community union into a federally funded community development
corporation. Curiously, the Special Impact Program had survived
Robert Kennedy's death partly because Richard M. Nixon favored
the idea ofcommunity development corporations. Perceiving them
as capitalist vehicles for the revival of poor areas, Nixon liked their
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emphasis on self-sufficiency. During his 1968 presidential cam-
paign, he had actually supported the unsuccessful Community Self-
Determination Act sponsored by the Congress of Racial Equality.
Consequently, the Nixon adminstration, after some bureaucratic
infighting, permitted CDCs to increase by allotting them most of
the Special Impact Program's funds. Though Nixon did not support
CDCs as strongly as Kennedy had, they survived the change to a
Republican administration with the aid of administrators linked to
liberal Republican Senator Jacob Javits, co-founder of the program.
As an organizationwith ties to the labor movement and the Demo-
cratic party, TELACU needed such political connections to win full
funding from a Republican administration. 14
Fortunately for TELACU, the Nixon administration saw the
Special Impact Program and CDCs as ideologically acceptable
means of appealing to minorities. Hoping to make inroads into a
traditionally Democratic constituency, Nixon had placed several
Mexican Americans in his administration. In October 1969 one of
his appointees, Martin Castillo, chairman of the cabinet-level Inter-
Agency Commission on Mexican-American Affairs, visited TELA-
CU's offices in East LA on a trip to review local self-help organiza-
tions. In discussions with Castillo, Esteban Torres pointed out that
when he requested federal assistance, agencies usually responded,
"Don't call us; we'll call you." Despite Torres's animosity, Castillo
replied, "with greater local support we can help you get what you
need out of Washington. We've got to work together and try to
overlook our areas of disagreement." Castillo's visit encouraged
Torres to apply for a planning grant under the Special Impact Pro-
gram.15
Despite Castillo's assurances, funding shortages at OEO left the
application in the air for over a year. The Special Impact Program
had become involved in complex bureaucratic changes in Washing-
ton as the Nixon administration rearranged the programs ofLyndon
B. Johnson's Great Society. National concern over the war in Viet-
nam also made it difficult for the domestic agenda to gain a proper
hearing in Congress. Finally, solid support for CDCs, including re-
search by the Senate staffs of Javits and Edward Kennedy and a
personal appearance at the hearings by Ethel Kennedy, won contin-
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ued funding, further secured in legislation during 1972. Fortunately,
in June 1971 at the close of the fiscal year, the OEO found enough
extra dollars to fund Torres's planning proposal for $123,825, just
in timefor the community union to benefit from the recent legisla-
tive advances for CDCs in general. By late 1971 the OEO planning
grant and the "Barrio Housing Plan" wereproviding Torres and his
officers with the much-needed reevaluation that would help them
overcome many of the problems they faced early that year.16 Sig-
nificantly, as TELACU made stronger political connections, its reli-
ance on government increased, leaving the community union with
the recurrent question ofhow to maintain its independence.
Self-Determinationfor Nueva Maravilla
By late 1971 Esteban Torres was ready to put the "Barrio Hous-
ing Plan" into effect. During his term as president of the Congress
of Mexican-American Unity, Torres had developed the contacts
with local organizations and leaders necessary to gain political sup-
port for the redevelopment now called Nueva Maravilla. For ex-
ample, his connections with David Lizarraga, head of Casa Mara-
villa, helped resolve one ofthe critical problems the project faced—
the area's youth gangs. Torres's staff held many contentious meet-
ings with gang members and the various social service agencies that
worked with them. Above all, Torres wanted the gangs to refrain
from violence in the renovated housing project. In addition, be-
cause of TELACU's concern with image the gangs had to refrain
from vandalism and graffiti. Of course, Lizarraga and the social ser-
vice agencies agreed with this, but they and the gangs themselves
wanted to know how youth might benefit directly from the rede-
velopment. 17
Ultimately, Torres and Lizarraga agreed to find jobs for the
youth in various phases of the demolition and construction of the
Maravilla project. With the details worked out, the development
gained the full support ofthe gangs and agencies. Indeed, as a result
of the meetings, the local gangs formed the Federation of Barrios
Unidos de Maravilla to maintainpeace among themselves. By mid-
-1972, in a letter to Torres, the gangs showed how strong their ap-
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preciationfor the development had become:
As vatos de los barrios de La Rock, La Lomita, and La Arizona, we feel
that the new homes we will be living in will do alot to bring dignity and
beauty back to our barrio. ... It is hard to be proud of housing that is
deteriorating. It is hard not to 'plaquiar' and deface something that you
cannot be proud of. . . . We sincerely hope that this new Pueblo de
Maravilla may help to build pride ... to stop the fighting ... to pull to-
getherour peoplefor thebenefit of all La Raza.
Significantly, the land development and its buildings began taking
on some of the identification that the gangs felt for their "turfs."
Because of TELACU'spolitical negotiations, Nueva Maravilla would
remain generally free of the graffiti covering the landscape of East
LA.
In late 1971 with the gangnegotiationsunder way, TELACU also
organized theresidents ofthe old project into the Tenants Advisory
Board. This group through a series of meetings conducted by TELA-
CU had input into both the planning and decision making. The
residents had become interested in every detail that affected them
personally, from the design of the bathrooms to management of the
completed project. TELACU advised the residents on the technical
aspects, from consulting architects to seeking funding. But the
community union's most important role was encouraging the resi-
dents' democratic participation in their immediate community. In-
deed, grass-roots leaders such as Pilar Hernandez came out of this
effort; a monolingual Spanish-speaking homemaker, she became a
vocal community representativewho later sat on TELACU's board.
Clearly, the community union had some success in promoting the
political self-determination of Maravilla. 19
By January of 1972 TELACU had stimulated formation of the
consortium of government agencies and private companies neces-
sary to redevelop Maravilla. The major financial sponsor of the
project would naturally be the Los Angeles County Housing
Authority, the owner and manager of the old housing project; the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
would also contribute funds. Lacking capital, not to mention engi-
neering and architectural resources of its own, TELACU neverthe-
less served as the catalyst in the redevelopment of Maravilla. In
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1971 TELACU had pressured the housing authority and HUD to
consider the redevelopment. As we have seen, TELACU had also
won over the residents and organized their direct participation in
the project. Interestingly, the Magnolia Land Company, a business
with connections to President Nixon, became the developer. Mag-
nolia soon negotiated a contract directly with Esteban Torres offer-
ing TELACU about $30,000 for six months of assistance in the
planning phase of the project, especially to maintain the political
support ofthe residents. 20
Magnolia, as the land developer, assigned various parts of the
Maravilla project to subcontractors. For example, VTN Los Ange-
les, an engineeringand architectural firm, would draw up the plans
for the site. Leon Glucksman A.1.A., Architect and Associates,
would design the buildings. Ultimately, TELACU's job fit along
the lines of social service. First of all, the community union helped
"achieve maximum feasible minority participation" in the con-
struction of the project and in the relocation of the residents. Sec-
ond, TELACU recruited and trained minority construction work-
ers and subcontractors. Third, it monitored construction bids to in-
sure "entrepreneurial and employment opportunites for local resi-
dents." Fourth, it encouraged building trade unions to follow af-
firmative action. Fifth, the community union assisted minority con-
tractors in meeting financial qualifications for participation. Sixth,
TELACU developed grant proposals to meet the costs of the af-
firmative action program. Seventh, it coordinated relations with
tenants and the community to meet their needs, as well as
"minimize opposition." And finally, TELACU provided employ-
ees to assure fulfillment of its own mission.21 Clearly, these services
consisted of the human rather than the material sort. With regard
to Nueva Maravilla, the community union would continue to func-
tion as a catalyst, politically influential despite its minimal financial
weight.
TELACU, Community Development Corporation
The rest of 1972 as regards Nueva Maravilla involved planning,
with demolition of the old housing project not beginning until Janu-
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ary of the following year. However, the internal reevaluation in
1971, which led to TELACU's catalytic role in the redevelopment
of Maravilla, continued and eventually led to structural changes
within the organizationthat assured its survival and growth before
the end of 1972. Critical to this continuing internal reevaluation
was OEO, the government agency that provided the planning grant
for TELACU's restructuring. The principles behind the "Barrio
Housing Plan" that had so successfully focused TELACU's activities
on real estate also served as a foundation for the organization's suc-
cessful bid to become a federally funded community development
corporation.22 Of course, the governmentregulations of OEO came
along with the funding.
OEO's planning grant led TELACU to sharpen its mission and
restructure itself to meet the guidelines for major funding from the
federal government. That mission, as finally stated in TELACU's
proposal for funding through the Special Impact Program, was "the
maximum possible improvement of the quality of life, as defined
by income level, living conditions and self-image, for the Mexican-
American community of East Los Angeles." Several other goals
supported this general mission. TELACU would evolve into "the or-
ganization with which all public and private institutions must deal
when making decisions affecting the future of East Los Angeles."
TELACU would create, strengthen, or manage businesses contribut-
ing to at least two of what follows: the community's "physical im-
provement," acquisition of resources or skills, the supplying of ne-
cessities and services, and the creation of employment. Finally, the
CDC would naturally do all this for thebenefit of the Eastside. 2
Municipal Image
Ofcourse, these principles lay behind the "Barrio Housing Plan"
and the Maravilla redevelopment, but several points now stood out
more clearly for the community union as a whole. As part of its
mission, TELACU made the community's "self-image" a matter of
high priority. To Torres and his staff it mattered what things and
people "looked like" and what impression they left both inside and
outside the community. Physical appearance could symbolize pros-
perity or decline and affect attitudes toward the landscape and
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people of East LA. Such attitudes Could affect investment and em-
ployment decisions. As we have seen, TELACU's concern with the
"physical improvement" of East LA manifested itself in the com-
munity union's involvement in housing redevelopments, such as
Nueva Maravilla. But even more significant in the mission state-
ment was TELACU's goal of becoming the central institution in
East LA. Indeed, that goal amounted to claiming powers usually re-
served for a municipal government, which of course East LA
lacked. 24 Clearly, TELACU aimed to become the chief vehicle for
achieving the political self-determination of East Los Angeles.
Nevertheless, one of the ironies of this drive for self-
determination was the need to appeal to Washington for funding.
Such funding naturally came with strings attached, a situation obvi-
ously not in keeping with the ideal of self-determination. The
strings became tighter as TELACU struggled to restructure under
the guidelines of the OEO planning grant. The major change re-
quired involved the board of directors. Up to that point seven un-
ion representatives, most holding seats from the beginning of the
community union, had comprised the board. OEO demanded that
TELACU expand the board by at least eight seats and give control
to new members representing other organizations in the commu-
nity. Naturally, TELACU resisted this move, arguing that the union
members as community residents already represented East LA.
However, OEO apparently believed the unions, rather than the lo-
cal community, would dominate the organization if the board re-
mained as originally established. Government funding promised TE-
LACU prosperity, but clearly threatened the community union's
independence.25
The disagreement was resolved, but not without a great deal of
reflection on TELACU's part. TELACU's roots ran deep in the un-
ion movement, as its very name indicated. TELACU naturally
feared that major government funding would undermine that spe-
cial relationship. More importantly, if that relationship deteriorated
and governmentfunding disappeared, TELACU might lose its life.
Up to this point, the community union had undertaken its projects
with grants from labor, private foundations, and some government
agencies. Loans from banks had also been secured for business en-
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terprises. However, the United Auto Workers, TELACU's parent
organization, had subsidized the daily operating budget. OEO of-
fered to provide a much fuller operatingbudget in exchange for TE-
LACU's restructuring. The OEO's Special Impact Program would
allow TELACU to engage in much fuller activities, subject to review
every two years on application for renewal. OEO could renew the
grant indefinitely as long as the CDC showed progress toward even-
tual financial independence. The opportunity to invest government
funds directly in private enterprises seemed a major advantage be-
cause it offered the CDC self-sufficiency. Finally, the community
union decided that the promise of eventual self-determination
outweighed the burden of immediate dependency. TELACU ac-
cepted the federal government's stipulations. 26
The government's requirement that TELACU restructure turned
out well. Since the seven union delegates still remained at-large
members of the board of directors, labor retained a voice, a signifi-
cant one at that. Moreover, the new members came from commu-
nity groups already closely associated with TELACU. The new
membership, now the majority, would vary in number over time,
but would consistently represent the following or similar commu-
nity groups: Plaza de la Raza, Casa Maravilla, Federation of Barrios
Unidos, Arizona Mothers Association, El Hoyo Association, Mara-
villa Tenants Association, Maravilla Service Center, Cleland House,
Senior Citizens, and the Lote Association. These groups in turn
represented artists, gang members, settlement houses, parents,
renters, specific neighborhoods, social workers, and senior citizens.
As we can see, the Maravilla barrio had a strong contingent on the
new board. Despite restricting TELACU's independence, the fed-
eral government had forced the community union to become
somewhat more democratic though the CDC never carried out its
original plan to includerank-and-file members or stockholders.27
Corporate Image
Finally, on November 14, 1972, the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity designated the East Los Angeles Community Union a fed-
erally funded community development corporation. In practical
terms this meant TELACU would receive $1 million over two years
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from October 1, 1972, to September 30, 1974. This funding came
from appropriations arising from important amendments to the
Economic Opportunity Act in 1972. Congress had placed the Spe-
cial Impact Program and its funds under Title VII, labeled
"Community Economic Development." Title VII stipulated that
OEO support the fullest possible economic programs of the local
organizations known as "community development corporations."
Under Title I-D of earlier versions of the Economic Opportunity
Act, community development corporations had only appeared as
experimental entities. Under the amendments of 1972, CDCs be-
came regular parts of the federal budget, consequently gaining a
measure of longevity. (Despite this, with funding resting on period-
ic appropriations, CDCs needed to become independent quickly.)
Title VII clearly outlined the activities of CDCs as economic; these
activities marked CDCs unequivocally as business corporations,
though cooperative in nature. In fact, the federal government had
granted public funds for TELACU to set up businesses in the pri-
-28vate sector.
According to Title VII of the Economic Opportunity Act, the
key purpose of CDCs was to establish or assist businesses. These
businesses in turn should engage in housing development to in-
crease employment and entrepreneurial opportunities for local
residents. In addition to direct OEO grants, Title VII allowed
CDCs to apply for funds from other government agencies under
different programs. Various provisions ofthe 1972title coordinated
this process. Curiously, while Title VII allowed TELACU to be-
come morebusiness oriented than ever, obviously governmentfund-
ing and government contracts would pave the way to success. 29
Thecomplexity of community development corporations, not to
mention their government funding, would not permit their simplis-
tic classification as business corporations. Despite orienting itself
more toward business, the East Los Angeles Community Union
continued to claim powers usually reserved for local governments.
Actually, the history of American business corporations provides
many precedents for such claims. As early as 1629, a joint-stock
company chartered for commercial purposes became the de facto
governmentof Massachusetts Bay when the board and stockholders
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agreed to move their meetings from Britain to New England. By
1631 the board had extended the franchise to at least 40 percent of
the colony's adult males, thus expanding the democratic nature of
the enterprise. In terms of providing government services, the his-
tory of the United States is replete with corporations that estab-
lished company towns providing every service imaginable, especially
the housing and boarding of workers.30 Thus, TELACU's claims to
governmental powers paradoxically rested on a certain business
tradition.
Limited Representation
Most of TELACU's founders had hoped to create an organization
similar to a democratic labor union with the residents of the com-
munity forming a mass membership that would elect the board of
directors. Esteban Torres, however, opposed the idea on the
grounds of voter apathy and the danger offactionalism. In the mid-
sixties OEO's community action programs, attempting to operate
on a mass basis, had experienced turnouts of less than 5 percent in
elections. In these groups factionalism, often fomented by militants
wielding disproportionate power due to voter apathy, had rendered
many organizationsineffective. Torres had consequently pushed for
limited representation of the community, with board members ap-
pointed on the basis of residency by the officers of broadly based
labor unions. As we have seen, OEO had made TELACU more
democratic by insisting on greater representation of various com-
munity groups on the board, groups that themselves had broad
memberships. Though close allies ultimately filled the board, the
CDC nevertheless represented East LA to a good degree. TELACU
deserved consideration as the central institution of the area, an in-
stitution steadily acquiringgovernment functions. 31
Self-Government for East Los Angeles
Despite this, TELACU in late 1972 did not have the strength to
take on all the functions of municipal government. Aware of this,
TELACU's leaders took a more traditional route toward political
self-determination for East Los Angeles. Esteban Torres launched a
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major campaign to incorporate the area as a city. Significantly, in
this drive he would argue that the long-established community's
lack of municipal government clearly illustrated East LA's colonial
status 32
History of Municipal Incorporation Efforts
Considering that surrounding communities—Alhambra, Mon-
terey Park, and Montebello—had become cities in 1915, 1916, and
1 920 respectively, the failure to incorporate East LA seemed espe-
cially unjust. That failure had not come for lack of effort. Indeed,
the first attempts had arisen as far back as 1925-26 when "senti-
ment against the fragmenting ofthe 'Great Eastside'" unfortunately
carried the day. In 1931 the Los Angeles County Board of Supervi-
sors squelched two efforts with the argument that taxes would be
too high. In 1933 industrial firms that preferred the lower taxes of
unincorporated territory succeeded in defeating a proposal taken to
the voters—8,439 to 462. That resounding defeat for incorporation
left the issue dead for the next thirty years.33 East LA remained a
colony of county government as community after community in the
metropolitan area gained homerule.
In the 1960s the issue of incorporation rose again in various
forms. A serious blow to East LA's chances for cityhood occurred
in 1960 with the establishment of the city of Commerce. This case
remains one of the most notorious in southern California history
because of the way the incorporation served business interests. The
southern, heavily industrialized section of the unincorporated East-
side became a municipality despite the fact that it had virtually no
residential areas. Large companies pushed through the incorpora-
tion to forestall inclusion of their firms in any new East LA city
embracing the poor, heavily populated areas just to the north.
Creation of Commerce meant that the new city had an enormous
tax base and vitually no residents to supply with local services. In
this way Commerce businesses avoided much higher assessments.
As it happened, Commerce became an enclave controlled by busi-
ness with little input from residents, an undemocratic situation that
eventually led to municipal corruption. Henceforth, the remainder
of the unincorporated area, stripped of an enormous tax base, had
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to struggle with the charge that East LA could not support munici-
pal government.34
To avoid further erosion of the tax base, the Citizens' Commit-
tee to Incorporate East Los Angeles once more brought the issue to
the ballot on April 25, 1961. Despite support from the area's
county supervisor, the fire department, and a prominent local cler-
gymen, this effort also failed. Arrayed against the citizens' commit-
tee composed largely of Mexican Americans were the Property
Owners Association and the Whittier Boulevard Businessmen
backed by the Eastside Sun, a coalition largely representative of
Anglo absentee owners. The citizens' committee did not have the
resources to combat the property owners, who narrowly won by
againraising the specter of higher taxes. This confrontation would
give credibility to the colonial analogy. In 1965 what remained of
the committeecould not even return the issue to the ballot. 35
Incorporation would not revive as a campaign issue for another
five or six years. Of course, Chicano activists during the late sixties
heatedly discussed the issue, especially at the meetings of the Con-
gress of Mexican-American Unity. With the rhetoric of self-
determination filling the air, East LA's lack of political autonomy
naturally became a topic of debate. The riots of 1970 and the sub-
sequent doubts concerning county government,especially the sher-
iff's department, resurrected incorporation as a campaign issue. In
November of 1970, the Congress of Mexican-American Unity un-
der Esteban Torres formed an ad hoc committee to examine the
possibilities of East LA becoming a city.36
What finally pushed the issue beyond the talking stage, however,
was Monterey Park's attempt to annex the northeastern corner of
East Los Angeles. This section included significant numbers of
middle-class Anglo- and Asian-Americans who felt more comfort-
able in middle-class, multiethnic Monterey Park than in lower-class,
Mexican-American East LA. Indeed, residents of the northeastern
section itself had petitioned to join Monterey Park. Annexation
would of course deprive any future East LA municipality of reve-
nue; more significantly, annexation would move the campus of East
Los Angeles College to Monterey Park. Such a move would clearly
be a blow to the prestige of Mexican-American East LA. A major
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reason for placing the attractive, modern, two-year college on the
Eastside had been to serve the Mexican-American community. In-
deed, though Chicanos suffered underrepresentation even at this
institution, it remained one of the few colleges in California with
numerous students of this ethnic background. The loss of the cam-
pus would deprive East LA of one of its most important architec-
tural symbols. It would also deprive East LA of one of its most at-
tractive landscapes, further damaging the community's image.37
The Ad Hoc Committee to Incorporate East Los Angeles
To avert Monterey Park's annexation attempt, the leaders of the
East Los Angeles Community Union started a new incorporation
drive. In late 1972 Esteban Torres formally established the Ad Hoc
Committee to Incorporate East Los Angeles (ACTIELA) as an en-
tity separate from the Congress of Mexican-American Unity.
Though officiallyindependent, ACTIELA was clearly a satellite of
TELACU, which provided virtually all the leadership, staff, and of-
fices for the new organization. Once again TELACU took on the
role of catalyst. Though the CDC as an institution lacked the power
and legitimacy to governEast LA, it could nevertheless instigate the
process leading to self-government for the area. Torres and his staff
saw immense opportunities for the rebuilding of East LA if TELA-
CU and the newmunicipality could form a partnership. The former
could provide the advantages of the private sector while the latter
provided public services. A strong municipal government could re-
lieve TELACU of some its social services so it could push ahead
with economic development.38
Esteban Torres and the Colonial Analogy
Interestingly, TELACU's leadership perceived these practical
considerations in the context of the colonial analogy. In an inter-
view concerning the philosophical underpinnings of the latest in-
corporation campaign, Esteban Torres clearly manifested the influ-
ence of such Third World thinkers as Albert Memmi and Frantz
Fanon. In the interview Torres responded in the following way to a
question suggesting that perhaps county governmentwas adequate
for East LA:
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I would say analogousto that [county government] is a form ofcolonial-
ism. It's a form of French power over some desert or African state
whereby, really, the French run it to their pleasure or whatever with
little interest in the well-being and welfare of that community. But use
the "colony," so to speak, as a source of manpower,revenue, as a source
of control overpeople without really allowing those people the ability
for self-determination. So I think that's one of the moving forces why I
feel incorporationis necessary.
Memmi and Fanon had interpreted colonialism from their experi-
ences in the French empire, especially in North Africa; Torres, ob-
viously familiar with their works, interpreted the situation of East
LA in a similar light. The residents of East LA provided labor and
taxes to the rest of the county, but lacked an equal voice in govern-
ance. Consequently, county government paid little attention and
provided few resources to these residents; in short, that govern-
ment treated the area like a colony. The solution, to extend the
analogy, was independence or incorporation of East LA as a sepa-
rate city.39
Partially due to the colonial analogy, Torres's opponents charged
that radicals were driving the cityhood movement. Torres re-
sponded that communities regularly incorporated throughout the
United States, and East LA deservedto do the same. But given the
colonial analogy he had just used, his response seemed disingenu-
ous. When asked whether incorporationactually resembled a drive
toward "separation," Torres answered:
separatism exists now. It is now that E.L.A. is a segregated "city.". . .
Again it is a colony whereby surrounding jurisdictions draw from it in
terms of a labor pool; in terms of selling to those people. ... As an in-
dependent foree—what really would happen by incorporation is that
those barriers would be knocked down. E.L.A. . . . would be able to in-
tegrate into . . . the mainstream ... in terms of dealing with its own
economy; dealingwith its own governmentalprocess. . . .
Torres thus reconciled the principle of self-determination with the
need for accommodation with the larger society, the seemingly
contradictory stance taken by TELACU from its inception. Basi-
cally, Torres argued that incorporation would allow East LA to
make laws, regulations, and policies putting it on an equal political
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and economic footing with surrounding cities. East LA could not
negotiate such matters if it remained a mere dependency of large,
distant, and impersonal county government. In effect, rather than a
colony gaining national independence, East LA winning incorpora-
tionwould be similar to a territory enteringthe Union.40
However, incorporation of East LA was a cultural as well as a
political issue, and in that sense differed from the situation ofmost
territories admitted to the United States. Given the violence asso-
ciated with the Chicano movement, opponents feared a politically
militant Chicano municipality would arise on the Eastside, "with all
the [cultural] trappings of Mexico." Because of their overwhelming
majority, clearly Mexican Americans would control the new city
though Torres expectedsome Asian- and Anglo-American represen-
tationon the city council. Despite this, if we compare East LA to a
territory, New Mexico and Puerto Rico best illustrate the role of
culture in attempts at integration with the larger society. In effect
colonial possessions of the United States, both territories were
predominantly Hispanic, a situation that delayed their admission to
the Union. New Mexico finally achieved statehood when its popu-
lation became sufficiently Anglo to satisfy Congress. Puerto Rico
remains a Spanish-speaking commonwealth, neither independent
nor politically integrated into the United States. While other fac-
tors affected these cases, clearly the dominant society would not
readily integrate politically with communities that threatened to
remain culturally distinct.41 Needless to say, East LA remained
such a community.
Commenting more frankly on the cultural issue in an article for
La Luz, Torres admitted that the desire for incorporation of East
LA involved the desire to reassert the place of Mexican-American
culture in public life:
Finally, incorporation will give an added dignity to an area alreadyrich
in cultural and historical heritage. The dream of standing in the great
cultural and business center of East Los Angeles, the Zocalo, is worth
translating such community objectives as social advancement, planned
economic development, equitable taxation, improved land use, and re-
sponsiveeducation into visible realities.
Even as Torres argued for incorporation, he visualized this political
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goal in concrete cultural terms, clearly revealing TELACU's concern
with imagery. Even as ACTIELA campaigned for incorporation, TE-
LACU officials dreamed of a revived downtown. They imagined a
cultural, commercial, and civic center reflecting the heritage of
Mexican-American East LA in the way Mexico City's great plaza
reflected the heritage of the Mexican nation. At this point TELA-
CU's zocalo remained a conversation piece, but before long it
would actually move to the drawing board. 42 In any event incorpo-
ration for East LA obviously meant much more than simply self-
government.
In February of 1973, ACTIELA prepared to submit the applica-
tion for East LA incorporation to the Local Agency Formation
Commission (LAFCO) . A unit ofcounty governmentestablished by
the state, LAFCO had the responsiblity of assuring that the area
could survive as a city. The proposed city needed some homogene-
ity, an adequate economic base, and sufficient community support.
By April Esteban Torres and ACTIELA, which had already com-
missioned an economic feasibility study, received the results and
submitted the formal application for cityhood to LAFCO. This
agency's technical staff reviewed the application over the next few
months; finding the application sound, the staff sent it to the
commission's board for public hearings. On August 8, after hearing
arguments for and against the proposed city, LAFCO permitted the
process to proceed.43
By this time the issue had moved from the political back rooms
to the public forum. LAFCO 's public hearings had, of course,
warned potential opponents of the new incorporation movement.
Art Montoya, president of the E.L.A., Maravilla, and Belvedere
Park Property Owners Association, led the opposition. As a col-
umnist for the Eastside Sun and a large property owner, Montoya
had helped defeat the incorporationattempts of the 1 9605; again he
galvanized the opposition with the old charge that East LA could
not support city government without higher taxes. Though the op-
position had failed to convince LAFCO of this, the argument
moved to the people. In October 1973 ACTIELAbegan the process
of circulating petitions. Within the next few months supporters of
incorporation had to obtain the signatures of 25 percent of the
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area's registered voters to put the issue on the ballot. This naturally
meant the larger community, both individuals and organizations,
had to become involved. ACTIELA, at that point still comprised
basically of TELACU and its affiliates, had to reach out to the rest
of East Los Angeles. This political effort would consume much of
TELACU's energy over the nextyear.44
TELACU's Constructive Operations
Meanwhile, Nueva Maravilla had moved off the drawing board
toward reality. In January of 1973 Shapell Government Housing
and Goldrich & Kest commenced demolition of the old units.
"High visibility" of minorities was maintained as the job got under
way since TELACU had earlier stressed employment opportunities
in convincingthe locals to support the project. To keep that prom-
ise some featherbedding occurred during demolition, but once ac-
tual construction began in February, the practice stopped to keep
the project within budget. Nevertheless, local residents and
"Spanish-American" subcontractors found work. Once construction
began minority subcontractors carried out a number of operations:
on-site engineering by Kemmerer, painting by A&A Camacho,
metal work by Service Sheet Metal, landscaping by Reliable Land-
scaping, rough carpentry by Albert A. Hernandez, ceramic tile by
Dan Tiscareno, and plastering by Rafael Corral. Though Anglo firms
still received most of the major contracts, this resulted from the
general shortage of Mexican-American construction firms large
enough to handle projects of this scale. Construction of the first
section of Nueva Maravilla took the rest of 1973, with the remain-
ing sections scheduled for completion in 1974. As the buildings
went up, TELACU's reputation rose as well, for though government
financed the project, the community recognized the CDCs role as
catalyst.45
As Nueva Maravilla moved ahead, TELACU's managers em-
barked on ventures more closely tied to government contracts, ven-
tures more likely to succeed on a large scale than the earlier mom-
and-pop operations. Food Stamp Outreach was one such venture,
designed aroundbetter distribution centers than private banks. An-
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
4. Nueva Maravilla. Low-incomehousingredevelopment overtwenty
years after completion. Photographby author, 1997.
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
NuevaMaravilla and East LA Self-Government 101
other venture, Community Planning and Development Corporation,
evolved from housing rehabilitation under governmentcontracts to-
ward pure development research. This subsidiary would eventually
become one of TELACU's most creative companies. Another eco-
nomic development strategy also gained ground in TELACU as a re-
sult of the Maravilla project. Having experienced the advantages of
a catalytic role, TELACU's managers increasingly looked to "lever-
aging" in both business and social service. They had learned they
could greatly influence activities even with minimal investments of
TELACU's resources. TELACU's experience in making government
more responsive in Maravilla had proven that. Beyond these larger
strategies and ventures, day-to-day through 1973 the CDC "contin-
ued to promote and administer its programs in business loan pack-
aging, contract procurement for minority businesses, housing, and
on-goingsocial programs in jobtraining and for senior citizens." 46
David Lizarraga, Interim Director
After two successful years of expansion and consolidation, a
number of important developments occurred during 1974 that
would strengthen the East Los Angeles Community Union in the
long run. This period nevertheless evinced all the characteristics of
a yearof transition.By January, with the first phase complete, Nueva
Maravilla rapidly moved ahead. However, with this first major suc-
cess securing TELACU, Esteban Torres increasingly turned his eyes
toward a political career. In early 1974 he resigned as executive di-
rector of the CDC to run for Congress. Expecting his return if he
lost the election, TELACU operated under interim director David
Lizarraga. Not until the fall, when Torres declined to return, did
the board make Lizarraga's appointmentpermanent. During the in-
terlude of uncertainty, TELACU at mid-year successfully applied
for a two-year renewal of its OEO operational grant, thus assuring
the CDC financial stability through September of 1976. Despite
this, the exact role of TELACU in the future of East Los Angeles
remained unclear as long as incorporation seemed possible. Since
cooperationwith the new city would be critical for any new proj-
ects, TELACU awaited the outcome of the election before proceed-
ing with any more major efforts. Given that TELACU's own man-
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agers were running ACTIELA, the incorporation campaign of 1974
consumed much of the CDCs energy anyway.47
Independence Denied
By early 1974 the incorporation campaign had become more
complex as other East LA groups became involved:
This broadening of the base of support was necessary because AC-
TIELA was for all practical purposes the political arm of The East Los
Angeles CommunityUnion. . . . This umbrella organization was seenby
many to be a warmed over, smaller scale version of the old Congress of
Mexican American Unity [indeed, ACTIELA not only derived from,
but essentiallyreplacedthe congress] .
To counter this perception, ACTIELA sought the support of the
United Farm Workers, an ally of TELACU since its founding. The
UFW gave its endorsement to the effort, a valuable contribution
because of the labor union's visibility in the community. However,
because the issue did not affect farm workers directly, the UFW
never became very active in the campaign. More significant was the
participation of La Raza Unida Party, a new political force on the
Eastside. 48
La Raza Unida Party
Launched successfully in Crystal City, Texas, La Raza Unida
Party had shortly thereafter organized in California. La Raza Unida
followed the "The Spiritual Plan of Aztlan" proclaimed in Denver
at the first Chicano Youth Liberation Conference of 1969. The plan
promoted an image of the Southwest as the Chicano homeland,
framed the image within the ancientAztec myth ofAztlan, and set
the goals of the Chicano movement within that concept. Because of
its ethnic nationalism and socialistic tendencies, the party had a
radical reputation that opponents of incorporation used to frighten
voters. However, La Raza Unida had enjoyed success, especially in
Texas, by appealing to ethnic pride. Given the overwhelmingly
Mexican-American population of East LA, that appeal gained a
hearing. In any case, La Raza Unida's involvement in the campaign
meant that the issue of self-determination was advanced in rhetoric
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more radical than that generally used by TELACU, a circumstance
that made the latter seem increasingly accommodating toward the
larger society.49
While ACTIELA had sought the support of La Raza Unida, the
two organizations remained separate backers of incorporation. Even
before Esteban Torres hadrequested La Raza Unida's participation,
the party had begun circulating petitions to put incorporation on
theballot. Indeed, the party eventually put forward its own slate of
candidates for city council (the seats were included on the ballot in
case incorporation should pass) . La Raza Unida derived its support-
ers primarily from college campuses, a circumstance that gave it ac-
cess to many students willing to campaign door-to-door. Raul Ruiz,
a professor of Chicano studies at California State University,
Northridge, led the party's effort and its slate of candidates. Rich-
ard Santillan, chair of the Department of Chicano Studies at Cali-
fornia State University, Los Angeles, served as an important publi-
cist for the party.50
By contrastwith La Raza Unida, ACTIELA acquired a reputation
as the less radical component of the incorporation coalition. This
organization, reflecting TELACU's image consciousness, promoted
itself as a group of professionals volunteering their time for a wor-
thy political goal. During the petition phase of the campaign, Tor-
res projected this accommodating image by appointing prominent
activists over age fifty as captains of the drive. These "elder states-
men" each directed the effort in one of the areas into which Torres
had divided East LA. In April 1974 this phase ofthe campaign suc-
ceeded when the county certified that the required number of reg-
istered East LA voters had signed the petition. The issue then went
to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. 51
Opposition, Torres's Departure, andFactionalism
For the next two months, the incorporation of East LA awaited
the board of supervisors, which held hearings regarding the exact
boundaries of the proposed city. Opponents of incorporation had
followed a strategy of circulating counter-petitions in areas on the
fringes of East LA, petitions to exclude those areas from the new
city. Since such areas might expect eventual annexation to sur-
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rounding suburbs, opponents hoped to encourage their withdrawal
from the proposed city, a move that would deprive it of more valu-
able taxable property. However, the counter-petitionsfailed, and
on June 13 the board decided to set the boundaries as originally re-
quested and to set the election for November 5, 1974. Thus began
the five final months of intensive political campaigning.52
Unfortunately, the campaign encountered insurmountable ob-
stacles. Esteban Torres's decision to run for Congress created a
major problem. Since his campaign overlapped the incorporation
effort until June, his performance as head of ACTIELA suffered.
Although he hadresigned as executive director of TELACU in early
1974, his energies were still divided. Because Mexican Americans in
California had only one representative in Congress, Torres hoped to
increase that number through his own candidacy. Running against
an incumbent, however, doomed his effort to failure; he was elimi-
nated from the contest during the June primary election. Though
TELACU had expectedhis return, he chose his former jobwith the
United Auto Workers in Washington, D.C. Unfortunately, before
the incorporation campaign ended, he left his position with AC-
TIELA as well.53
Before Torres's departure, however, serious problems had sur-
faced for the proponents of incorporation. ACTIELA and La Raza
Unida began to position themselves for control of the proposed city
council. Since about forty candidates had filed for city council, La
Raza Unida advanced a slate of five for special support. Fearing that
the party would control the new city, Torres and ACTIELA put to-
gether their own slate of five. Needless to say, cooperationbetween
the two organizations foundered. Moreover, ACTIELA had gath-
ered less than a quarter of the $40,000 believed necessary to wage
an effective campaign. ACTIELA's failure in this regard left the
closing battle to La Raza Unida, which brought in 250 volunteers to
get out the vote just before the November 5 election. 54
Despite the high turnout triggered by a gubernatorial election,
the measure lost. Although 66 percent of the registered voterswent
to the polls, 29.2 percent voted against incorporation, 21.33 voted
for it, and 16.12 failed to vote on the proposition. The core of East
LA, the Belvedere precincts, voted solidly for the measure, but the
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more affluent, less Mexican-American areas on the borders with
surrounding cities voted against the new city. Ultimately, oppo-
nents of incorporation succeeded in convincing the electorate that
higher taxes would result from the proposition. More significantly,
the opponents apparently convinced the voters that ACTIELA and
La Raza Unida were simply making emotional appeals to Mexican
pride. Proponents had failed to convince voters of the concrete ad-
vantages of cityhood. Thus, East Los Angeles remained the most
populous community in the inner county dependent on the board
of supervisors. East LA's colonial status seemedconfirmed. 55
Recovery and Integration Delayed
The defeat of incorporation forced TELACU once again to re-
evaluate its goals. Since East LA would not have a municipal gov-
ernment after all, the partnership envisioned between the CDC and
the newcity disappeared. The task of settingthe newagenda fell to
David Lizarraga, an unlikely candidate in some ways. A product of
the colonia himself, he had worked primarily with gangs through
Casa Maravilla; thus, he came to TELACU with a background
mainly in social service. The question remained whether he could
successfully lead TELACU in economic development, the CDCs
primary mission. Since the political course taken in 1974 had
caused TELACU to founder, the institution's officers looked ahead
uncertainly as the year ended. 6
Despite this, in only six years Esteban Torres had made the East
Los Angeles Community Union the leading intermediary between
the colonia and government, between the community and the larger
society. While the failure of incorporationhad shown that TELACU
had neither completely won over the community nor mastered the
political system, the success of Nueva Maravilla demonstrated the
institution's increasing technical skill in dealing with government,as
well as business. YvHiile TELACU had failed to win political self-
determination for East Los Angeles, the institution had shown ways
to make government more responsive to the community's socio-
economic needs. As a federally funded community development
corporation,TELACU had become somewhat more democratic and
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more capable of functioning successfully in the capitalist system.
Although dependence on federal funding had further clouded TE-
LACU's image as a symbol of self-determination, TELACU had
suggested ways Mexican Americans could recover their autonomy
as well as their place in society by skillfullyaccommodating the sys-
tem.57
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The Master Plan and TELACU
Industrial Park
Recovery Through Economic Development
On December 4, 1974, public ceremonies, held at the site itself,
marked completion of the Nueva Maravilla redevelopment. The
504-unit complex was comprised of modern two-story buildings
laid out among landscaped areas, giving the redevelopment the ap-
pearance of a middle-class condominium complex, rather than a
low-income housing project. The adobe-yellow plaster walls and
plain reddish roofs subtly reflected the ethnicity of the buildings'
occupants. Here and there vigas and murals highlighted the His-
panic presence. At the ceremonies Los Angeles County Supervisor
Ernest E. Debs commented that "The community had a strong
voice in the design decisions, and this is one reason why Maravilla is
considered the finest housing development of its kind in the United
States," a statement supported by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development. He then added, "It is a place where per-
sons of modest means can live in comfort and dignity, and with
pride in their heritage." Since TELACU's surveys and meetings had
amplified the voice of the people, the East Los Angeles Community
Union could justifiably claim a good deal of responsibility for re-
covery of the Maravilla barrio and the rekindling of its ethnic
pride. 1
Nueva Maravilla was concrete evidence thatby the end of 1974,
TELACU had become a major force for empowerment of the East-
side. On the other hand, TELACU had clearly experienced political
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defeat with East LA's failed incorporation effort in November.
Also, the goal of Chicano self-determination seemed as distant as
ever given Esteban Torres's unsuccessful campaign for Congress
earlier that year. As a result, despite the shining image of Nueva
Maravilla, TELACU found its future cloudy as 1975 began. Its po-
litical ambitions temporarily contained, the institution reempha-
sized its economic activities. Over the next five years, TELACU
would seek to implement a master plan of economic develop-
ment—the most successful financial component ofwhich would be
Community Thrift & Loan, an institution explicitly designed to
help East LA recover from colonial dependency on the larger econ-
omy. However, even more significant than the thrift would be the
community development corporation's major real estate venture—
TELACU Industrial Park. 2
Constructive Leadership
As interim executive director, then as permanent president,
David C. Lizarraga had guided TELACU for over six months by
1975. In time his title would lengthen with the addition of "chief
executive officer." This addition would be more than cosmetic; in-
deed, it would signal that under Lizarraga's management TELACU
would more than ever resemble a business corporation rather than
a labor union or social service agency. Although Lizarraga had pre-
viously directed TELACU's Social Services Division, he decided to
follow the path ofbusiness evenfarther than had his predecessor, a
leader more inclined toward government and politics. A business
orientation was naturally more accommodating to the larger capital-
ist society and consequently more integrative on the whole, though
such an orientationcould lead to a controversial image in a work-
ing-class community.3
David Lizarraga, President
The new architect of TELACU's fortunes, David Lizarraga was
born and raised in East LA. Like many of the community's other
leaders, he attended East Los Angeles College and California State
University, Los Angeles. In 1963 Lizarraga had started out as the
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youth programdirector for Cleland House, a settlement house later
affiliated with TELACU. "We came from a very activist and mili-
tant period in the late 60s and early 705," he recalled in a later in-
terview. "We did a lot of arguing over the many problems facing
our society"; finally, "We began to see that we neededto deal with
solutions to the problems and not just argue the fact that there was
a problem." In 1969 he sought to alleviate East LA's gang problem
by founding Casa Maravilla, the social service center subsequently
involved in the construction of Nueva Maravilla. He then moved to
TELACU's Social Services Division. Though none of this back-
ground involved business, Lizarraga's association with TELACU's
managers brought out his latent business aptitude. Though he re-
called that Torres's staff organized "around political and economic
issues," Lizarraga found himself more inclined to the latter than the
former.
Fortunately, Lizarraga inherited an experienced board of direc-
tors and a seasoned corps ofexecutives. George Solis, one of TELA-
CU's founders, became chair ofthe board in 1975; such veterans as
Glenn O'Loane and Gordon Moreno continued on the board, as did
Esteban Torres, despite his self-imposed exile in Washington. Now
legal counsel, Carlos J. Garcia, another charter member of TELA-
CU, headed the list of highly qualified managers. Among the more
experienced of the other ten or so executives was Magdalena
Aparicio. Like most other corporations, TELACU had a predomi-
nantly male board and management. And as in many other corpo-
rations, women comprised the majority of TELACU's personnel
because clerical positions made up most of the jobs directly with
the CDC.5 Although TELACU had had female representation on
the board from its inception, Maggie Aparicio's presence in man-
agement led the CDC to become more conscious of the value of
women to the organizationand the community. Moreover, her ex-
perience and leadership proved critical to TELACU's renewed drive
into business.
Magdalena Aparicio, Business Executive
Aparicio was easily the most powerful woman in TELACU as
Torres's era gave way to Lizarraga's. Prior to joining TELACU in
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
The MasterPlan and TELACU Industrial Park110
1971 Aparicio had spent seventeen years in banking. According to
the Belvedere Citizen, she had "gained a knowledge of business
economics by working her way up through a banking system that
was not always encouraging to women." She started out in person-
nel, where she eventually trained staff for variousbanking positions;
from there she climbed rung by rung "to supervisor of credit and
collection, operations officer and loan interviewer, and assistant
manager of a bank branch." At TELACU Aparicio became a busi-
ness finance specialist; in that capacity she assisted minority busi-
ness people in starting or expanding enterprises. With Aparicio's
technical expertise TELACU put together about $5 million in loan
packages for this purpose. Her success in this endeavor led to her
promotion to director of TELACU's Business Development and
Assistance Division. In that capacity, she supervised six people who
provided technical assistance, loan packages, and contract procure-
ment services to entrepreneurs. By the end of 1974, Aparicio's
business division had "surpassed its projected goals" significantly.6
A Master Plan to End a Colonial Economy
The success of Aparicio's division encouraged Lizarraga and his
experienced team to set a more expansive economic agenda in
1975. They incorporated that agenda into TELACU's master plan
for financial, business, real estate, and overall economic develop-
ment. Overall community economic development could only pro-
ceed if financing became available, and TELACU proposed estab-
lishing financial institutions that could meet the need. This required
complex institutions because East LA lacked financing of all sorts.
Entrepreneurs needed seed capital to start businesses, equity capi-
tal to expand them, and long-term loans for construction. Consum-
ers needed loans. In addition to financial services, business people
required administrative, technical, and professional assistance.7 Be-
cause Aparicio's division already successfully provided some of
these services, TELACU devised an even more ambitious plan to fill
the overwhelming economic needs of the community.
Surprisingly, radical colonial theory underlay this capitalist mas-
ter plan. Lizarraga and his planners reasoned that East LA, like a
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colony, had experienced "a net outflow of capital, or disinvest-
ment." Traditional savings-and-loan associations, as well as banks,
had taken deposits from the inner city and invested them in the
suburbs to earn higher returns. The colonia had thus lost money re-
quired for its own improvement. Lizarraga and his staff hoped to
reverse this pattern, to keep resources in the colony and bring in-
vestment from the metropolis. Only thus could economic devel-
opment and possibly political self-determination be achieved. As if
directing the economy of a small dependent country struggling to
raise its Gross National Product, TELACU's executives spoke of
raising the "Gross Community Product" in hopes of gaining self-
sufficiency and independence. Their strategy relied on venture
capital, ironically provided largely by government, to establish fi-
nancial institutions that would lend or invest money to create em-
ployment for theresidents of East LA. Of course, employment was
the benefit the colonia would appreciate most from TELACU's
economic planning, and its managers fully expected that benefit to
reach ordinary residents. 8 TELACU did not expect to end the co-
lonial status of the community without promoting self-determina-
tionof the individual.
Colonial theory thus supplied the underpinnings of TELACU's
master plan—the strategy of building financial institutions to free
East LA from economic dependency. However, TELACU's manag-
ers had to develop the tactics to implement their full strategy. With
the new financial institutions in place, management had to develop
a practical approach to investing to gain the most benefit from the
capital of the new institutions. Since most of TELACU's limited
funds initially came from the federal Special Impact Program, man-
agement had to "leverage" thesefunds to achieve as much influence
as possible for the CDC. By lending money and buying stock in
firms throughout the area, TELACU's managers could gain influ-
ence if not control over a good deal of the local economy. For ex-
ample, they could fund labor-intensive manufacturing concerns to
promote employment. However, rather than seeking to capture con-
trol of existingbusinesses, which could be costly and alienating, TE-
LACU's officers preferred to create new enterprises that would in-
crease permanent employment moresurely in the longrun, if not in
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the short. The CDC could retain control of these subsidiaries by
owning decisive amounts of equity in them and by placing TELACU
directors on the boards of the new companies. These varied lever-
aging tactics might permit the CDC to guide the overall develop-
ment of East LA.9 Such tactics might permit TELACU to achieve
its goal of economic self-sufficiencyfor East LA.
Building Financial Institutions
Four institutions would form the key financial components of
TELACU's master plan to develop the economy of East LA: The
Business Development Office (Aparicio's office renamed), TELA-
CU Investment Company, Community Thrift & Loan, and the
Bank of East Los Angeles. TELACU's Economic Development Di-
vision would carry out the master plan through TELACU Indus-
tries, a for-profit corporation established solely "to hold the stock
of its subsidiaries and investments." Additional subsidiaries as
needed would be linked by function to the key components. 10 As
we can see, TELACU was moving toward banking, one of the most
basic capitalist activities. Despite the CDCs cooperative goals,
radical theoretical base, and government funding, socialism hardly
permeated the corporation. Indeed, the CDC sought to draw East
LA into the capitalist system of the United States on an equitable
basis.
Of the financial components of TELACU's economic plan, only
Aparicio's office existed in January 1975. As wehave seen, business
loan packaging, contract procurement, and technical assistance
were the three main functions of Aparicio's Business Development
Office, which received $150,000 annually for administrative costs
from the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, an agency of the
U.S. Department of Commerce. As part of the master plan, the
Business Development Office would collect data on the many local
businesses that Aparicio had helped to obtain seed capital. This
data could then go to the proposed TELACU Investment Company
to help it decide whether a particular business merited an invest-
ment. Through such teamwork among its own subsidiaries, TELA-
CU could make investments safely and wisely. 11 As the first finan-
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cial component of the economic plan actually in operation, Apari-
cio's office set the path for the new institutions to follow.
David Lizarraga hoped to establish TELACU Investment Com-
pany as the second financial component of the master plan. This in-
stitution would be a licensed Minority Enterprise Small Business
Investment Company, known in community-development circles as
a MESBIC. Congress instituted MESBICs to funnel money into the
hands of small entrepreneurs in minority areas not well served by
private investors. A MESBIC, compared with TELACU's Business
Development Office, had the power to provide long-term or per-
manent capital to established companies; Aparicio's office, on the
other hand, could usually only assist entrepreneurs starting busi-
nesses, generally with funds from the Small Business Administra-
tion. By offering long-term investment the CDC also expected TE-
LACU Investment Company to lure proven businesses to relocate
in East Los Angeles. Since a MESBICs capital initially came en-
tirely in federal dollars, licensees effectively had the privilege of in-
vesting public funds in the private sector. In setting up TELACU
Investment Company, Lizarraga and his executives again demon-
strated technical expertise in bridging the public and private sectors
to improve the economy of East LA. 12
The third and ultimately most important financial component of
the master plan was the Community Credit Corporation, especially
its subsidiary Community Thrift & Loan. The thrift would handle
accounts receivable and provide financing for equipment and inven-
tory for seasoned businesses recommended by the Business Devel-
opment Office. Unlike the typical savings-and-loan association that
specialized in long-term home mortgages, Community Thrift &
Loan would provide short-term real estate, business, personal, and
collateral loans of no more than $25,000. These medium-sized loans
would be at competitive rates for three years, turnoverbeing desir-
able to reach more needy borrowers, large and small. Unlike fed-
erally chartered savings-and-loan companies, TELACU's state-char-
tered thrift could pay higher interest rates on savings, making this
institution more attractive to depositors. The thrift would tempo-
rarily house several other operationsand agents of the Community
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Credit Corporation. Among these were a personal property broker,
an insurance agency, an underwriter of credit life insurance, an es-
crow service, and a mortgage banker. 13 The complexity of these
business activities and the ultimate success of Community Thrift &
Loan attested to the growingsophistication of Lizarraga and TELA-
CU's other executives.
The CDCs management planned the variously titled East Los
Angeles Bank or Community Bank of California as the final finan-
cial component of the master plan. TELACU's managers believed
they had already invested enough in the Banco de San Jose (appar-
ently located in San Jose, California) to have a branch opened in
East LA. A bank would be beneficial because it could offer the
widest range of services, including checking, to a larger group of
residents, businesses, and institutions. At that time East LA had
only one bank owned by Mexican Americans; tellingly, Pan Ameri-
can Bank alone provided full bilingual services. At other banks po-
tential borrowers in East LA encountered redlining; bankers often
refused loans to customers based on their place of residence, rather
than on their individual credit rating. TELACU's proposed bank
would be a neighborhood operation that would share with residents
the risks of location in the inner city. To establish the bank, as well
as implement the complete master plan, TELACU required the ap-
proval of the Community Services Administration, the successor to
the Office of Economic Opportunity. In fact, TELACU launched
the first phase of what later became the master plan with OEO's
grant for 1974-76; the plan itself appeared as part of TELACU's re-
funding proposal for 1976-78. Despite the goal of economic self-
sufficiency, TELACU was becoming more dependent than ever on
federal funding. 14
Framing a Corporate Image
As we have seen, Maggie Aparicio's excellent performance as di-
rector of the Business Development and Assistance Division moti-
vated TELACU to develop other financial institutions. During the
key years of 1974 and 1975, 75 percent of loan packages submitted
by Aparicio's division,mostly to the Small Business Administration,
received approval. Over $7 million in loans went to over a hundred
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businesses. Through her efforts local businesses also received
thirty-two contracts for a total of nearly $3 million. On the whole
during the two years, over a thousand businesses secured aid
through the Business Development and Assistance Division. 15 This
track record left a strong impression on southern California busi-
nesses as well as national funding agencies. Ultimately, TELACU
won approval from the Community Services Administration for
most features of the master plan, in no small part due to the suc-
cessful performance ofAparicio's division.
The Business Development and Assistance Division not only
succeeded in its basic operations, but also succeeded in promoting
the pro-business image of TELACU. That impression partially re-
sulted from a long publicity campaignwaged by Maggie Aparicio. In
the early 1970s Aparicio inaugurated an award for best local busi-
ness person of the month. With files that included many of the
Eastside's business people, of various ethnic groups, her office had
enough information regarding their activities to judge their merits
well. As a result, local businesses—such as the Pasta House restau-
rant and Synterra, Inc., a chemical firm—received positive press
coverage when their owners won the award. By boosting business
people on a monthly basis, Aparicio also promoted TELACU's en-
trepreneurial image in local newspapers for several years. Of
course, this image did not particularly appeal to all elements in the
blue-collar community.16
By 1975 the fact that several women had received TELACU's
monthly business prize inspired Aparicio to sponsor an annual
women's achievement award, also in the CDCs name. She herself
hadwon similar awards in August 1974 at a dinner sponsored in her
honor at the Montebello Country Club by the West Coast Busi-
nesswomen's Association. For her general work assisting women
and minorities, she was commended by Congressman Edward Roy-
bal, state Senator Al Song, Assemblyman Richard Alatorre, and Los
Angeles Councilman John Ferraro, to name the most notable politi-
cal dignitaries present. In addition, she received recognition for her
activism in the West Coast and Southwest regional conferences of
the Businesswomen's Association. Beginning in October of 1975,
Aparicio and TELACU honored thirty women of various ethnicities
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and occupations for general achievements, with emphasis on those
who had gone unheralded. Nonetheless, prominent women also re-
ceived accolades; for example, in 1977 the achievement award
went to Romana Bariuelos, owner of Romana's Foods, trustee of
the Pan American Bank, and former Treasurer of the United
States.17 Based more on community service than business, the
women's achievement award served to enhance the public-spirited
image of TELACU, as well as everyone else involved.
Although preoccupied with economic planning in 1975, the East
Los Angeles Community Union remained influential in local politi-
cal affairs. Although the CDC had withdrawn from the thinly
veiled activism of the East LA incorporation campaign, members of
TELACU continued to participate in a variety of organizations that
insured the CDCs political influence throughout the area. In 1975
two key community issues reverberated from the Nueva Maravilla
project and the East LA incorporation drive—redevelopment and
annexation. As both involved the larger principle of self-
determination, it should be no surprise that TELACU remained at
least marginally involved.
Plans for Nueva Maravilla had been under way for two years
when the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors decided to ex-
pand the redevelopment area to the west of TELACU's project. Ex-
tending west of Mednick Avenue to Ford Boulevard, between Flo-
ral on the north and Third on the south, were 218 deteriorating
acres of central East LA targeted for improvement. Adopted on
January 30, 1973, the redevelopment plan resulted from over sev-
enty neighborhood and fifteen town hall meetings open to the gen-
eral public. At these well-attended gatherings, residents voiced
their concerns and participated in decisions about the project. In-
deed, the Maravilla Neighborhood Development Project had been
initiated by residents themselves inspired by TELACU's earlier
grass-roots gatherings for the development of Nueva Maravilla. 18
TELACU had taught the residents to organize politically in their
own socioeconomicself-interest, and they had learned well.
Maravilla, Expanding Redevelopment
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TELACU did not become directly involved in this project as the
county's Community Redevelopment Agency stayed in charge.
However, key TELACU people joined the Maravilla Project Area
Committee, a democratic advisory group established to monitor, as
well as work with the redevelopment agency. The committee con-
sisted of 23 members: 14 elected from owners or tenants in the
community, 3 appointed by local business people, 3 selected by ab-
sentee landowners, and 3 chosen from social service agencies. All
23 also sat on the board of directors of the Community Redevel-
opment Agency, which meant they hadreal decision-makingpower.
Significantly, the advisory committee included Roy Escarcega,
George Murillo, and Joe Elizondo, the first a manager and the latter
two board members of TELACU. Since Elizondo chaired the com-
mittee, the CDC clearly exerted considerable influence over the
new redevelopment. 19 However, TELACU did so through leverag-
ing—though lacking majority control of the committee, the CDC
placed knowledgeable individuals in positions to encourage deci-
sions in keeping with its views. Thus, though preoccupied with its
economic master plan, TELACU retained some local political pow-
er.
By 1975 the Neighborhood Development Project was moving
along. Unlike most urban renewal programs, this project eliminated
only those homes that the redevelopment agency could not reha-
bilitate economically. Restored structures hauled in from other lo-
cations replaced the irreparable houses. The agency then offered
therestored houses for sale to local residents or owners only; in ac-
cordance with rules establishedby local owners, no one outside the
area could purchase property in the redevelopment. Various gov-
ernments cooperated in rebuilding the area: the California state
government donated some move-on housing, the Los Angeles Uni-
fied School District agreed to construct a new elementary school,
and the state and county agreed to undertake necessary road work.
Relocation services appeared for all residents required to move
from deteriorated housing; fortunately, the redevelopment agency
found it unnecessary to evict anyone or condemn any property. By
early 1975over 141 families had successfully relocated to renovated
housing that met their needs. Local youth had also been employed,
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during the previous summer, repairing structures that needed min-
imal work. Clearly, the Neighborhood Development Project fol-
lowed TELACU's successful experiments in resident participation
pioneered in the Nueva Maravilla housing project.20 The CDCs
earlier efforts had obviously instigated the renewal of surrounding
property, both public and private. By exercising influence over the
Neighborhood Development Project, TELACU continued its criti-
cal role in the revival of East LA.
East LA's Territorial Losses
Though TELACU had thus successfully influenced the course of
redevelopment in East Los Angeles, the CDCs hopes for political
self-determination of the area declined after the failure of incorpo-
ration. As incorporation proponents had predicted, neighboring
Monterey Park in June 1975 began annexationproceedings for East
LA's Bella Vista neighborhood, its residents having circulated a pe-
tition for that purpose. Initially, Monterey Park did not include
East LA College in the Bella Vista boundaries sought from the Lo-
cal Agency Formation Commission. Annexation quickly drew op-
position, including Assemblyman Art Torres and his administrative
assistant Gloria Molina, a former TELACU employee and later
prominent politician. Interestingly, Art Montoya of the property
owners who had helped defeat incorporation joined his former ad-
versaries in opposing annexation. To forestall such piecemeal an-
nexations, Los Angeles Deputy Mayor Manuel Aragon and Coun-
cilman Art Snyder suggested East LA simply merge with the city, a
suggestion that proved economically unfeasible because of incom-
patible energy suppliers. 21
For those wishing to preserve the integrity of East Los Angeles,
the political situation only worsened. In August, following Bella
Vista's lead, East LA's Montebello Park petitioned for annexation
to a neighboring city, in this case naturally Montebello. To make
matters even worse, in October the Local Agency Formation Com-
mission encouraged Monterey Park to include East LA College in
its Bella Vista annexation and by December had approved the pro-
posal. That virtually guaranteedvictory for the city. Despite a brief
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suit against the commission, in June 1976 residents of Bella Vista
voted 394-260 for annexation to Monterey Park. The courts con-
firmed East LA's loss of the area and the college campus when they
ruled in favor of annexation the following month. East Los Angeles
nevertheless succeeded in retaining Montebello Park. Although TE-
LACU kept a low profile throughout this struggle, Pilar Hernandez,
homemaker turned board member, joined the thick of the fight as
one of the plaintiffs in the suit.22 Through her presence the CDC
exerted its political influence even though annexation lacked the
priority incorporationonce received.
Implementation of the Master Plan
Stress on the master plan for economic development had drawn
TELACU away from such explicitly political issues as annexation.
Though fully aware of the importance of politics, Lizarraga believed
that the future of the CDC and East LA hinged more on econom-
ics. He sought to implement the master plan immediately to estab-
lish a track record of success in time for the Community Services
Administration's reviewof TELACU'srefunding proposal for 1976-
-78. While the Business Development Office had existed for several
years, Lizarraga's staff had to build the other financial components
of the plan from scratch. The second basic component, TELACU
Investment Company, received its license in October 1975. As a
subsidiary completely owned by TELACU Industries, the MESBIC
was initially capitalized with $500,000 of the 1974-76 grant from
the Community Services Administration and a $200,000 loan from
Commonwealth Bank, a commercial lender. In 1976 the Small
Business Administration invested $700,000 in preferred stock,
adding $2,100,000 thereafter. This large infusion of federal funds
gave TELACU Investment Company the opportunity to have a sig-
nificant impact on the economy of East LA; unfortunately, mis-
management of the company would later seriously damage the
CDCs reputation.23
Interestingly, although founded to bolster East LA's economy,
the new company invested in many other parts of the United
States. Understandably, TELACU Investment Company put
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$160,000 into Atlas Aquarium Engineering Company, a firm that
planned to move into East LA in 1977 with the expectationof cre-
ating seventy-five new jobs in the area. Since Atlas Aquarium had
registered $2.5 million in sales already, it promised to bring divi-
dends to TELACU and employment to East LA. But investments
made in distant regions of the country would cause controversy. In
Montana TELACU bought stock in the Blackfeet Indian Writing
Company, an American Indian manufacturer of markers, pens, and
pencils. In New York City TELACU invested in a slick new Latino
magazine called Nuestro. In the Midwest funds went to the black
Illinois Neighborhood Development Corporation, the holding com-
pany of South Shore National Bank of Chicago. As the pattern sug-
gests, the investment strategy was to provide promising minority
enterprises in other parts of the country with capital that would re-
turn long-term dividends to East Los Angeles. Since greateroppor-
tunities for profit often existed beyond the Eastside, TELACU be-
lieved its portfolio would suffer if it strictly confined investment to
the local area. Eventually, critics would berate TELACU for invest-
ing any of its funds outside the local area.24
Community Thrift &Loan
Unlike TELACU Investment Company, Community Thrift &
Loan, basically the third financial component of the master plan,
worked as expected. In mid-1975 TELACU began planning the
thrift, receiving its state charter in June 1976. The enterprise was
capitalized at $1,250,000 through a public offering of stock within
the state. TELACU Industries initially purchased 80 percent of the
stock with a $750,000 grantfrom the Community Services Admini-
stration and a $250,000 loan from a local commercial bank. Indi-
viduals, including TELACU executives, invested most of the re-
maining $250,000. As such, this enterprise had more individual
stockholders than most of TELACU's other companies ever would.
To assure complete control of this critical subsidiary, members of
TELACU's own board and management filled all the seats of the
thrift's board of directors. Through the services of Edward Carpen-
ter and Associates, a banking consultant, TELACU found an experi-
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enced Mexican-American executive willing to serve as president of
the promisingnew local institution.25
Emil Avellar, Manager
Emil S. Avellar successfully launched Community Thrift & Loan
and soon it became one of TELACU's most profitable enterprises.
Holding a degree in business administration from Pasadena City
College, Avellar had worked in the thrift industry since 1959, first
at Beneficial Finance, then at Amfac Thrift and Loan, a national
company, where he had become a regional vice president in 1970.
In that capacity he supervised nine branches with a total of fifty
employees who monthly generated a loan volume of $850,000. In
1968 he had been named "Manager of the Year" in his division by
that company. Avellar had the kind of technical qualifications and
leadership skills that TELACU sought to promote.26 Since political
and economic development of the community could not occur
without leadership, one of TELACU's major achievements was
providing trainingand opportunityfor Mexican-American leaders in
business and politics.
Community Thrift & Loan enjoyed immediate success because
of high local demand for relatively small auto and furniture loans.
This success showed that East LA borrowers could be reliable, con-
trary to the beliefs of an industry that had long redlined the area.
The thrift's first office, with only a staff of five, opened in middle-
class Monterey Park, just outside of East Los Angeles. The branch
could thus draw deposits from nearby middle-class residents and
still make loans to local East LA borrowers. This reflected colonial
theory in that deposits were taken from the surrounding more af-
fluent metropolis and invested in East Los Angeles, thus reversing
the traditional flow of capital. Unlike TELACU Investment Com-
pany, the thrift had a better chance of keeping dividends and in-
vestments on the Eastside. Within five years branch offices opened
in Carlsbad, Costa Mesa, Woodland Hills, and the Simi Valley—all
affluent southern California communities whose deposits flowed
toward development of East LA. Between 1978 and 1980 deposits
more than tripled, and loan volume per month averaged $1.5 mil-
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lion by 1980. In that year Community Thrift & Loan posted "the
second highest earnings in the industry."27 The success of the thrift
made the last financial component of the economic plan, a full-
service bank, unnecessary, and the latter never appeared.
UrbanPlanning and Other Activities
As TELACU set up the financial institutionsof its master plan in
1975, the Economic Development Division successfully operated
other subsidiaries. For example, the former food stamp company
founded in October 1971 expanded its operations and changed its
name to TELACU Currency Exchange (partly to avoid the stigma
attached to food stamps). TELACU had originally established the
company because recipients had found distribution of food stamps
through banks inadequate, especially the long lines and condescend-
ing monolingual service. Statistics revealed the success of this com-
pany. By the end of 1975 customers had jumped from 76 to 25,000
per month, and offices had sprung up in Montebello, La Puente, El
Monte, and Santa Fe Springs, in addition to East LA. During the
same year the Currency Exchange had earned over $264,000 in fees
from $30 million worth of food-stamp transactions; it had also
taken in an additional $23,000 from new check-cashing services.
Besides offering a convenient service to residents, the Currency
Exchange employed thirty-two people in its offices, all from East
LA. By the end of 1975 TELACU Currency Exchange had become
the largest company of its type in California and obviously contrib-
uted to the local economy.28
In January 1976 the Economic Development Division launched
the Eastland Leasing Company to take advantage of the vehicle
needs of TELACU and its subsidiaries. Rather than TELACU pur-
chasing or leasing cars from an outside dealer, the new subsidiary
acquired them directly from manufacturers and financed the leases
of the other TELACU companies. By placing the new company in
the role of middleman, TELACU kept the profits generated by the
needs of its own affiliates. Eastland Leasing began with $30,000
from a local commercial bank and would remain an in-house opera-
tion until large enough to compete for outside business. The pos-
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sibilities were good since TELACU's other companies could refer
customers to Eastland through daily business contacts. While auto
leasing had potential as a profit-making venture, Eastland remained
marginal to the overall economic development plans of the CDC.
Rather, in keeping with TELACU's philosophy, Eastland Leasing
exemplified the entrepreneurial attitude of taking advantage of the
opportunities presented by circumstances. In 1976 other ventures
spun off from the key components of the economic plan; for ex-
ample, the minor firms TELACU Yen Cap and First Southwest
Capital derivedfrom TELACU Investment Company.29
A company not directly part of the master plan, yet intimately
involved with it, Community Planning and Development Corpora-
tion evolved into a highly creative urban planning think tank. CPDC
incorporated in 1973 and by 1976 had received $400,000 from the
Community Services Administration. Initially, CPDC purchased re-
possessed houses from the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment for renovation and removal to sites such as those of the
Maravilla Neighborhood Development Project. When HUD with-
drew from this activity, however, CPDC lost $250,000 in attempt-
ing to continue the purchases on its own. This disaster discouraged
CPDC's further direct involvement in construction. Although
CPDC, with Majestic Realty, continued construction on a Com-
munity Thrift & Loan building, emphasis shifted to urban plan-
" ~ 30rung.
CPDC's urban planning division emerged as a consultant on de-
signing and implementing development projects with community
participation. As such, the division grew directly from TELACU's
involvement in Nueva Maravilla. From 1974 through 1979, CPDC
undertook a number of major studies for local governments that
significantly affected East Los Angeles because of the empirical
data provided, data that helped anchor future development in the
reality of local residents. Among the studies undertaken were a
housing study, the already-mentioned Zocalo project, a transit
needs study, and most importantly "The Unincorporated East Los
Angeles Environmental Assessment Program." To carry out these
plans TELACU assembled a staff of technocrats—engineers, urban
planners, and architects led by Dr. Xavier Mendoza—professionals
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who would repeatedly win awards for their designs and surveys.31
CPDC's activities significantly contributed to the real estate focus
of TELACU's thinking about the economy.
CPDC's plans led to some real changes in East LA. The transit
needs study, for example, empirically demonstrated that residents
of East LA depended on public transportation more than did other
county residents. In the LA area this meant dependency on a slow
and inefficient bus system, curiously named the Southern Califor-
nia Rapid Transit District. Especially vulnerable were senior citi-
zens. In addition to encouraging morebus routes, the study allowed
TELACU to establish a nonprofit dial-a-ride service for seniors in
the local area. Though the state financed the study, the county
funded the service finally initiated and operatedby TELACU.32 Be-
cause the county, East LA's only local government, found CPDC's
work impressive, the board of supervisors funded several studies
and implemented all of them in one form or another.
For example, the housing study and the Zocalo project gave
CPDC the credibility necessary towin thecounty's contract for the
major "Unincorporated East Los Angeles Environmental Assess-
ment Program." In 1973 the Southern California Association of
Governments awarded $95,000 to CPDC to survey East LA resi-
dents regarding their housing preferences. Interestingly, in the
study completed in July 1974, most of those contacted expresseda
positive attitude toward East LA and a desire to remain in the area
if they could find desirable housing. Despite its poverty, the area's
culture appealed to the residents. In September 1974 the National
Endowment for the Arts awarded CPDC nearly $50,000 to study
thepossibilities of a renewed central business district for East LA, a
district CPDC named after Mexico City's great plaza. The award-
winning Zocalo study led to over $100,000 for further research on
ways to implement the plan. These successes brought CPDC to the
attention of the county's Regional Planning Commission and to a
collaborative effort in assessing the overall socioeconomic standing
ofEast LA.33
In October 1975 the Regional Planning Commission and CPDC
began "The Unincorporated East Los Angeles Environmental Pro-
gram." Over the next few years four volumes of data on various
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facets of life in the area were produced. These volumes quantified
and charted the area's demographics, its traffic flow, its industrial
base, its commercial potential, its residential zones, and more in the
most comprehensive land use study of the area ever undertaken.
Moreover, CPDC assured community participation through block
and town hall meetings, in the tradition of the Nueva Maravilla
project. When the final report came out, it received widespread
praise in the community although incorporation opponent Art
Montoya of the Eastside Sun criticized the assessment as an omen
of impending urbanrenewal. 34
The East LA assessment had a definite impact because the
county of Los Angeles considered the study's findings when au-
thorizing later development in the area. Since CPDC completed the
last three volumes without the Regional Planning Commission, TE-
LACU's ideas greatly affected future development. Through
CPDC, TELACU exercised influence normally reserved for com-
munity redevelopment agencies. Since Fast LA lacked the munici-
pal government to establish such an agency, the county had desig-
nated CPDC for the job. TELACU had acquired significant influ-
ence because redevelopment agencies often amount to "economic
government" in that they can direct entire local economies. The
power delegated to CPDC was only for planning, rather than fund-
ing or actual development, but TELACU could readily position it-
self to bid for the latter powers.35 Despite its current emphasis on
business, TELACU, through CPDC and other subsidiaries, contin-
ued to use government to promote economic development.
TELACU also used CPDC in the private sector to influence eco-
nomic development by leveraging the subsidiary's planning skills
and technical know-how. Through its contacts with local business-
es, TELACU encouraged and assisted the formation of local devel-
opment corporations for business associations on the Eastside. Lo-
cal businesses themselves then undertook revitalization projects
with plans drawn up in consultation with CPDC and its successor,
the Community Research Group. Out of the Zocalo project and
the East LA assessment, concluded in late 1977, grew one very im-
portant local development corporation. Comprised of the mer-
chants on East LA's major commercial strip, this group together
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with TELACU began the Whittier Boulevard Commercial Revitali-
zationProject in 1978. As a result, by the late eighties after years of
delay, East LA's major thoroughfare was widened and improved
with attractive new facades. The life of the shopping area revived
and the entire community got a facelift. The North Broadway
Commercial Revitalization Project in Lincoln Heights, begun at the
same timeand in the same manner, had similar success.36 Given the
importanceof retail sales, these projects did much to improve the
economy as well as the landscape of the Eastside.
Curiously, after David Lizarraga assumed the leadership of TE-
LACU in 1974, he deemphasized the Social Services Division and
increasingly integrated its activities with projects in other parts of
the CDC. Of the original social service groups, TELACU Senior
Citizensremained autonomous under Glenn O'Loane, having estab-
lished a food cooperative for its members. However, the old job-
training activities of the Social Services Division were subsumed
under new programs, funded by the federal Comprehensive Em-
ployment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973, that operated
throughout the CDC. (From 1968 through 1975, more than 3,500
people received jobs through the various programs of the Social
Services Division.) Under CETA TELACU contracted with the city
and county of Los Angeles to employ and train individuals in regu-
lar jobsin the various offices of the CDC. Plans for a health center,
the major new proposal in social services, remained on the back
burner until the late 19705. Social services generally received sup-
port through specific grants from foundations or governmentwith
very little coming from the Special Impact Program, the basic CDC
funding source, or profits from TELACU's businesses.37 Lizarraga
preferred this arrangement since he hoped to reinvest as much
money as possible in areas that would provide a profit. Social serv-
ices generally did not. Lizarraga and TELACU operated in the belief
that economic development would do more for the community
than any project traditionally considered charity.
Nevertheless, with TELACU's reemphasis on economics in
mind, the Social Services Division undertook several new creative
activities. One new program, part of the California Employment
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Development Project sponsored by CETA, involved renovation and
beautification activities. In 1975 Roy Escarcega, director ofthe So-
cial Services Division, contracted with the state to have teenagers
from eighteen high schools on the Greater Eastside paint murals,
generally on Chicano themes, at locations frequently covered with
graffiti. As part of the program, youths also converted an old jail in
Lincoln Heights into a gymnasium for their own use. In economic
terms the youth and the community benefited from the employ-
ment and renovation; moreover, in cultural terms they obviously
gained from the product. Carried out in conjunction with GOEZ,
an art studio affiliated with TELACU, the program's themes dem-
onstrated the CDCs interest in the imagery of self-determination.38
The program encouraged the youths to display their heritage in
public places, allowing Mexican Americans to recover that space for
their culture. That youth carried out these activitiesencouraged fu-
ture economic self-sufficiency and cultural self-determination for
the Mexican-American community.
A Landmark Industrial Park
In 1975 and 1976 while TELACU set up financial institutions
under its master plan for economic development, David Lizarraga
also sought the industrial and commercial opportunities that would
most profit the CDC and the community. TELACU's small manu-
facturing companies having failed in the past, Lizarraga sought more
sizable and stable undertakings. With the vision of a community
developer, he saw the perfect opportunity hidden in a local eco-
nomic disaster. In early 1975 B. F. Goodrich was closing its local
tire manufacturing plant, part of a pattern that ultimately led to the
demise of southern California's automobile industry. Approxi-
mately 2,000 jobs would disappear when the plant finally closed its
doors in the summer of 1976. Because of TELACU's connections
with the United Auto Workers, Lizarraga clearly understood the
critical situation. In August 1975 he wrote to Congressman Edward
Roybal to inquire about the availability of federal funds to help TE-
LACU purchase and develop the forty-acre site in an effort to miti-
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gate the loss of the tire plant.39 Obviously, TELACU's reemphasis
on business did not preclude the CDC from using its connections in
government and labor.
On the Goodrich site Lizarraga and the CDC envisioned TELA-
CU Industrial Park, a complex that would lease office and indus-
trial space to light manufacturing companies, warehouses, and sim-
ilar operations. Lizarraga obviously expected to attract tenants to
the park and jobs to the local area. While these jobs would not eas-
ily replace the high-paying positions lost at Goodrich, employment
opportunities would reappear. The asking price was unofficially $8
million—a price, as bidding later revealed, much higher than the
market value of about $4 million. As justice would have it, the Ford
Foundation, a philanthropic organizationestablished by the auto in-
dustry, became the lead lender for the purchase. Negotiating from
February until the closing on August 31, 1977, TELACU secured a
$5 million loan from Ford and Crocker National Bank to purchase
the site at a price substantially below that originally asked, but also
substantially above three other bids by private developers.40 The
lenders apparently believed TELACU's project would best servethe
community. Having secured financing for the purchase, Lizarraga
and the CDC still needed funds to cover demolition of the old
plant and the construction ofnew buildings.
Political and government contacts paid off when TELACU as-
sembled the financing for demolition and construction. Shortly af-
ter TELACU's purchase of the tire plant, the Economic Develop-
ment Administration granted $3.7 million for demolition of the old
buildings and for site improvement. The Community Services Ad-
ministration granted $1.2 million in working capital for construc-
tion. With federal funds committed, Lloyds Bank and a local com-
mercial lender offered up to $18 million of additional funds to
build on the site. Financing went so well that by July 1978 TELA-
CU repaid $993,000 ofthe land loan with additional funds received
in grants. The resulting equity in the park strengthened TELACU's
overall financial position.41 TELACU Industrial Park was indeed
shaping up as the CDCs most successful enterprise.
In August of 1978, only one year after TELACU acquired the
Goodrich property, the first tenant moved into the industrial park.
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That tenant was Aaron Brothers, a retailer ofart supplies and a sub-
sidiary of the Chromallay Company. Aaron Brothers moved into a
179,000-square-footbuilding and immediately issued a hiring call in
cooperation with TELACU's Social Services Division. Aaron Broth-
ers and subsequent tenants would eventually fill 1,000,000 square
feet of industrial space and 100,000 square feet of office space, the
total construction costing nearly $25 million. TELACU leased its
new buildings almost as quickly as it put them up. In subsequent
years other major tenants followed Aaron Brothers—Stationers
Corporation, Winkler-Flexible Corporation, and the Federated
Group—all of whom required more space than the initial tenant.
TELACU also constructed multitenant buildings for smaller com-
panies requiring less room. TELACU's own subsidiaries, such as
Aquapet Inc., occupied some of these smaller units along with af-
filiates, such as GOEZ Studios. Eventually, over fifty businesses
employing over two thousand people settled in the park. 42 To a
good extent, TELACU Industrial Park replaced the old Goodrich
plant in the local economy.
Imagery and Cultural Preservation
Nevertheless, the figures on space and employment did not
measure the full impact of the industrial park. The new complex
also gave the Eastside a landscape designedto instill greaterpride in
the community, for TELACU had envisioned the park as a monu-
ment to the Hispanic heritage. The architecture, an updated, utili-
tarian imitation of Spanish Colonial Revival, hardly merited critical
acclaim. Given the anticolonial ideology on which TELACU rested,
Spanish Colonial Revival did not carry the appropriate symbolism.
Just the same, the buildings' off-white stucco walls and red tile
roofs did somewhat reflect the identity of the local population. The
mission-inspired architecture, easily built in California, was com-
monly recognized as Hispanic—if not distinctively Mexican. Fur-
thermore, the wrought-iron gates and manicured lawns of the park
demonstrated TELACU's concern that its corporate image be one
of Hispanic efficiency. Interestingly, the crowning edifice of the
park, TELACU Resource Center, would incorporate a more con-
temporary style. Scheduled for completion in 1983, this office
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building would display The Pride of Our Heritage, the three-story
mural depicting Mexican-American history. As the headquarters of
the CDC, this building would become a landmark of the commu-
nity.43
TELACU's interest in preserving and promoting the heritage of
Mexican Americans found expression in entertainment programs as
well as in architecture and murals. One of the most popular of
these programs, "Domingos Alegres," consisted of a live series of
performances presented in East LA's Belvedere Park in conjunction
with the Los Angeles County Parks and Recreation Department.
Beginning in April 1976 twenty variety shows per year featuring
mariachis, ballet folklorico, magicians, and comedians—including
both local and international talent—were presented free for the
community. Crowds averaged ten thousand per event and filled the
small amphitheater to capacity. The performances achieved such
success that eventually TELACU formed the Inter-American Enter-
tainment Company to expand such programming into radio, televi-
sion, and film. 44 As part of the southern California economy, East
LAcould tap into theentertainment industry.
Overextension
In 1977 David Lizarraga and TELACU were still implementing
their master plan for economic development drawn up in 1975.
However, the Community Services Administration requested, as
part of the refunding proposal for 1978-80, a new five-year overall
development plan for the CDC, running to the fall of 1983.45 The
new plan, drawn up in the midst of rapid expansion, would propose
more projects, but in a less coherent fashion than in the master
plan of 1975. As plans for the future overlapped, chaos seemed to
engulf the CDC and would threaten its survival in the early eight-
ies.
Repeated Restructuring
The 1977 plan called for TELACU to reorganize its structure
even more along the lines of a business corporation. TELACU In-
dustries Division moved up the organization chart to replace the
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old Economic Development Division in a change designed to elimi-
nate an unnecessary administrative layer. The former Social Serv-
ices Division was renamed the Urban Development Division, a
change in nomenclature that further deemphasized TELACU's so-
cial service dimension. The new plan created the Community De-
velopment Division, a unit primarily including departments in-
volved in planning and development; the new division grew out of
the old CPDC, whose functions scattered among a number of new
departments and subsidiaries. The Communications Division be-
came a department directly attached to TELACU's administrative
office because the former's limited functions did not warrant divi-
sion status. The Finance Division, with TELACU's controller, also
shifted to central administration. Although TELACU's rapid ex-
pansion, especially in economic development, necessitated periodic
restructuring, the frequency with which these confusing changes
occurred suggested an underlying instability that would later be-
come evident. 46
The most important organizational change under TELACU In-
dustries Division was the creation of TELACU Development Cor-
poration from the old CPDC. Significantly, the new corporation
would develop and manage real estate. In partnership with Majestic
Realty, another local firm, TELACU Development would complete
the construction of Community Thrift & Loan's first building in
Monterey Park. Especially designed to manage the industrial park,
the new corporation would collect a fee based on rentals, eventu-
ally a lucrative business. In addition TELACU Development would
work with Majestic Realty to build the Eastland Center in Com-
merce. With a 50 percent interest in the center, TELACU Devel-
opment hoped to build a four-hundred-room hotel, a ten-story of-
fice building, and a ten-thousand-square-foot convention center.47
Though the Eastland Center later proved impractical, it demon-
strated the potential impact of TELACU's new subsidiary on the
local economy.
The new Community Development Division engaged in many of
the same operations as TELACU Development Corporation, but
the latter remained independent. Its management of the industrial
park made TELACU Development too large to be subsumed under
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the new division. The Community Development Division included
Maggie Aparicio's old business development office and two new
subdivisions derived from the old CPDC: the for-profit Community
Research Group and the nonprofit Urban Planning and Research
Department. Besides the subdivisions' differences with regard to
profits, the former could undertake projects beyond TELACU's
special impact area while the latter could not. Otherwise, the sub-
divisions engaged in similar activities.48 All of these complex units
allowed the local economy access to the expertise of highly trained
professionals, professionals who prior to TELACU's existence had
rarely found opportunitiesto invest their technical skills in East Los
Angeles.
The Community Research Group, TELACU's new for-profit
think tank, initially continued some of CPDC's projects. Among
these were the transit study and an assessment of East LA's health
needs, both funded by government agencies and thus profitable for
CRG. The Eastside especially benefited from the health study be-
cause it subsequently led the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare to designate the community a "health manpower shor-
tage area." This designation would allow funding for the TELACU
Family Health Center in Highland Park, a project that began to re-
vive TELACU's reputation for social service. CRG would eventually
impact areas far beyond the Eastside, a future predicted by its
promotion of community development through seminars sponsored
by various governmentagencies. Preparation of a community devel-
opment manual for nationwide distribution also predicted that the
innovative Community Research Group would spread its technical
expertisewell beyond the local economy.49
Real Estate Reemphasized
The new, highly technical Community Development Division
included the Urban Planning and Research Department as well as
the Community Research Group. The department continued the
old CPDC's North Broadway and Whittier Boulevard renewal pro-
grams. In addition, this department in conjunction with CRG pro-
duced "A Framework for Greater East Los Angeles Industrial De-
velopment," a study ofthe economic possibilities of unincorporated
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East LA and the parts of Los Angeles, Commerce, Montebello, and
Monterey Park within TELACU's special impact area. The study
thus necessitated the cooperation of a committee of local political
leaders under the chairmanship of David Lizarraga. Funded by the
Economic Development Administration, data collection and plan-
ning were carried out with the assistance of UCLA's Graduate
School of Management and the county's Department of Regional
Planning, in an effort obviously requiring much coordination.
Among its conclusions, the study stressed that the area lacked va-
cant land for firms hoping to open orexpand and consequently rec-
ommended a land banking system for Greater East Los Angeles.
Possibly under TELACU's direction, the system would permit pur-
chase and resale of parcels of land for the collective economic ben-
efit of the area.50
The 1977 plan restructured TELACU to reflect its ever increas-
ing interest in real estate. As we have seen, the activities of the old
Community Planning and Development Corporation had diversi-
fied and expanded to such an extent that several units appeared to
replace it. The major new entitywas the Community Development
Division, primarily concerned with real estate. The CDCs height-
ened interest in this field of business naturally grew with the con-
struction of TELACU Industrial Park.51 Since the major financial in-
stitutions designed under the masterplan of 1975 now existed, new
ventures in this direction slowed. Moreover, despite restructuring
for a more aggressive advance into real estate, movement in this
field would also slow by 1981.
In the short term according to the 1977 plan, Lizarraga and his
executives chiefly sought to strengthen Community Thrift & Loan
and TELACU Industrial Park, the most successful endeavors to
date. In the long term through 1983, TELACU's managers envi-
sioned more promising projects involving land. Most ambitious
among these was the already mentioned Eastland Center planned
for Commerce. But TELACU also hoped to acquire several blocks
on Atlantic Boulevard, left vacant by closed auto dealerships, for
development of an entertainment complex including restaurants
and theaters. Another long-term possibility for development as a
regional shopping center was the architecturally splendid Uniroyal
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tire plant, which had closed shortly after the Goodrich plant. TE-
LACU saw similar possibilities for Union Station in downtown Los
Angeles, a vestige of the railroad era.52 However, of the long-term
possibilities listed in the 1977 plan sent to the Community Services
Administration, only expansion of the industrial park and the Fam-
ily Health Center finally came about. The 1977 plan lacked the
practicality of the earlier master plan. The general failure of the
1977 plan and a further reorganization of TELACU in 1981 indi-
cated that its managers had overextendedthemselves.
A Historic Landmark to Recovery
and Integration
David Lizarraga's appointmentas executive director of TELACU
began the mature phase of the CDCs growth. The political activ-
ism of the organizationtemporarily declined with the defeat of in-
corporation in November 1974 and the end of the local Chicano
movement thereafter. Under Lizarraga TELACU's drive for the
self-determination of East Los Angeles inclined toward the eco-
nomic, rather than the political, as we have seen. Implementation
of TELACU's master plan for economic development of 1975 sig-
naled the renewed emphasis. The financial institutions established
under the plan, especially Community Thrift & Loan, offered East
LA more than a vision of self-determination; they actually reversed
the flow of at least some resources from the metropolis to the
community. The dynamic TELACU Industrial Park reinforced the
eroding economic base of the Eastside, showing the way to recov-
ery. In 1977 Lizarraga described the Eastside as an "underdevel-
oped nation," suggesting that the colonial analogy still underlay TE-
LACU's efforts. For despite some progress, the area and the CDC
remained dependent on the larger society.53 After all, TELACU's
dependence had led to the ill-conceived plan generated in 1977 at
therequest of the Community Services Administration.
Under David Lizarraga the East Los Angeles Community Union
had aggressively followed a business orientation. Finance compa-
nies, investment firms, and real estate ventures were the stuff of
capitalism. But in accommodating the system, TELACU had also
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grasped its tools. By acquiring and using this technical knowledge,
the community development corporationwas forcing the economic
system to open itself to Mexican Americans and integrate them.
The CDC had, nevertheless, retained its underlying philosophy—it
remained committed to self-determination for the Eastside, its peo-
ple, and their culture. Although TELACU had become a complex
business organization, it remained a cooperative institution, dedi-
cated to the social recovery of the community. Despite the inap-
propriate colonial architecture, the rising structures of TELACU In-
dustrial Park served as a landmark to the historic recovery of Mexi-
can Americans.





Despite revitalization plans, Whittier Boulevard, the central
commercial strip of East Los Angeles, remained run-down in 1977.
Although the boulevard continued to be popular among local resi-
dents, its stores, restaurants, and other small businesses barred
their doors and windows in the evening, a visual reminder of the
violence at the beginning of the decade. Despite the riots of 1970
and the electoral revolt of 1974, the colonia remained politically
and economically subordinate to the surrounding metropolis. On
the other hand, East LA had made some visible progress toward in-
dependence by 1977, especially in Maravilla. And as we have seen,
the East Los Angeles Community Union planned more visible im-
provements—TELACU Industrial Park in particular. 1
Although TELACU provided multifaceted services for the com-
munity, planning stood out among these. The community develop-
ment corporation had perforce taken on urban planning and many
of the other functions of municipal government because East LA
had failed to become a city. In spite of TELACU's renewed busi-
ness orientationunder David Lizarraga, the CDC exercised so many
municipal functions that it sometimes seemed a government agency
itself. However, lacking the taxingpower of municipal government,
TELACU had built its strength on grants from private and espe-
cially from public sources. This activity had made the institution's
staff expert at writing proposals and at planning in general. Even-
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tually, this expertisebecame the forte of the Community Research
Group (CRG) , an arm ofTELACU that would design plans having
an impact far beyond East Los Angeles.2
As we have seen, CRG was a successor to the planning division
of the old Community Planning and Development Corporation,
founded in 1973 and reorganized in 1977. As a result of this reor-
ganization, CRG became TELACU's for-profit think tank, shedding
direct responsibilities for development. In this capacity the Com-
munity Research Group became the subsidiary that generatedsome
ofthe most creative ideas for the entire conglomerate. In doing so,
CRG led TELACU to see the Eastside more clearly in regional, na-
tional, and eveninternational contexts. In this expanded vision, the
colonialism that affected the Eastside appeared more clearly as part
ofan international phenomenon that affected Latinos almost every-
where. This vision led TELACU to begin an ambitious program to
spread its ideas regarding economic development well beyond its
immediate community. The major vehicle for this program would
be the CRG's Hispanic American Coalition for Economic Revitali-
zation (HACER), one of the most visionaryendeavors ever under-
taken by the community development corporation.3
However, the broadening of TELACU's vision resulted from
changes in Washington, D.C. The inaugurationof President Jimmy
Carter began a heady period for the East Los Angeles Community
Union. From 1977 to 1981 the possibilities of community devel-
opment corporations seemed limitless and TELACU's evolution
seemed to support that impression. As we have seen, TELACU was
stabilizing its new financial institutions and laying the foundations
for its industrial park when it precipitously launched a new plan in
1977. Lizarraga and his staff took this step partly because they be-
lieved proposals for increased funding had a greater chance of suc-
cess under the new Democratic adminstration. Although the new
plan created confusion and controversyby overextending TELACU,
the plan's most innovative offspring—CRG and HACER—illustra-
ted the intriguing possibilities of a regional or national Mexican-
American CDC network.4 The dream of a network of self-sufficient
Mexican-American, or even Latino, communities guided by insti-
tutions like TELACU seemed possible. With initial federal funding
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and strong mutual support, these institutions could inspire the self-
determination of their communities and gradually guide them to
socioeconomicrecovery and integration into the nation on a equi-
table basis.
Influence in the Nation's Capital
TELACU's most important connection in the Democratic ad-
ministration would be none other than Esteban Torres, the CDCs
first executive director and a continuingmember of its board of di-
rectors. After the defeat of his congressional campaign and of East
LA incorporation in 1974, Torres had returned to Washington to
serve as assistant director of the International Affairs Department
of the United Auto Workers. 5 Continuing in that position for the
next two years, he became involved through labor in the Carter
campaign for president in 1976. During these two years, he re-
mained in close touch with TELACU and East LA since he realized
that a local base would be importantto his own political ambitions.
Finally, with Carter's victory in November 1976, Torres, TELACU,
and East LA looked to gain substantially from the new administra-
tion.
President Carter's Appointments
With Carter's election Mexican Americans hoped to increase
their numbers in appointive positions since the Democratic candi-
date had, as usual, received the overwhelming vote of the Spanish-
speaking. Among those seeking appointment, Esteban Torres hoped
to become assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs.
Given his many years of experience in Latin America with the
UAW, he had impressive qualifications. Over two months Cyrus
Vance, in charge of foreign affairs appointments for the Carter-
Mondale transitionteam,received strong letters of support for Tor-
res's candidacy from a distinguished array of Los Angeles's Spanish-
surnamed leaders. Among these were Assemblymen Joseph B.
Montoya and Art Torres, state Senator Alex P. Garcia, Congress-
man Edward R. Roybal, and Catholic Auxiliary Bishop JuanArzube.
Los Angeles's Mayor Tom Bradley also sent his support.6
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Despite Torres's impressive letters of recommendation, Terence
Todman, a career diplomat, received the post. This choice severely
disappointed, not only Torres's Los Angeles supporters, but others
as well. Sociologist Leonard Birns, director of the Council of Inter-
American Affairs, considered the failure to appoint Torres a blow
to the cause ofhuman rights in Latin America. The council, a think
tank of prominent scholars, congressmen, and former policymakers,
had officially supported Torres's nomination. In an interview with
El sol de Mexico, Birns argued that career diplomats had opposed
Torres because as an outsider he might drastically alter earlier poli-
cies. In Birns's opinion these policies had allowed repressive dicta-
torships to remain in power over the previous eight years, For
Mexican Americans even more troubling was Birns's claim that
"reliable sources within the State Department affirmed that part of
the campaign to eliminate Torres from the running involved con-
vincing . . . [the Department] that Latin American countries would
not negotiatewith a descendant of Hispanic Americans, considering
him socially inferior." 7 While some Latin Americans had such bi-
ases, Torres's supporters complained that he should have gotten the
opportunity to refute the stereotype by showing competence on
the job.
Carter's initial failure to appoint Torres or a significant number
of other Mexican Americans to his administration led to both pub-
lic and private criticism from important Spanish-speaking Demo-
crats. Ed Roybal, California's lone Mexican-American congressman,
rebuked the president concerning this matter only a week after the
failure to appoint Torres. In the Eastside Journal Roybal reminded
the administration of the traditional Mexican-American complaint
that the Democratic party only acknowledged the barrios at elec-
tion time. In a private letter to Andrew Young of the transition
team, David Lizarraga, whose political credentials were improving,
expressed the same general sentiments.8 Gradually, the Carter ad-
ministration succumbed to the pressure and made more Mexican-
American appointmentsas openings occurred.
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Lou Moret, Gloria Molina, Esteban Torres—Appointees
When the administration finally mended its ways, TELACU
gained substantial influence in Washington. After extensive lobby-
ing by David Lizarraga and George Pla of TELACU, Lou Moret, an
administrative assistant to Assemblyman Richard Alatorre, was
named deputy director of the Office of Minority Business Enter-
prise in the summer of 1977. According to TELACU Today, the
company newsletter, the CDC had achieved a major coup in plac-
ing one of its "closest friends" in such a pivotal position. The fol-
lowing November, former TELACU employee Gloria Molina, aide
to Assemblyman Art Torres since 1974, became assistant director
of personnel at the White House itself. As a committeemember of
Voter Organization through Education (VOTE), TELACU's politi-
cal arm during the 1976 presidential campaign, Molina had the
connections to serve the community well in her new post. But in
September President Carter had already made the most prestigious
appointment, from TELACU's point of view, when he finally
tapped Esteban Torres. The president selected Torres to represent
the United States in the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Torres thus received one of
the highest ranking federal appointments held by a MexicanAmeri-
can. In making the appointment, Carter also raised the position to
ambassadorial rank, clearly a concession to his Spanish-speaking
political supporters, but also in recognition of Torres's qualifica-
tions.9
In an editorial for TELACU Today, David Lizarraga made an in-
teresting comparison while commenting on the Torres's appoint-
ment:
In many respects UNESCO and TELACU . . . share many common
goals and objectives. Just as UNESCO represents the underdeveloped
nations and third world peoples of the globe, we, too, represent our
own underdevelopedcommunity and its third world people in ourpart
ofthe globe. We've seen what vast resources can be leveragedto help
assist underprivileged people of the world through organizations like
UNESCO, and that, for us, is a viable model for implementing local ac-
tion here at home.
Although in this case Lizarraga likened TELACU to an international
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body, rather than a government, his merging of the peoples of East
LA and the Third World once again suggested TELACU's continu-
ing acceptance of the colonial analogy. Since virtually the entire un-
derdeveloped world had experienced colonialism, East LA's under-
development resulted from the same historical process, a process
that institutions like TELACU and UNESCO hoped toreverse.
. Lizarraga extended the comparison of the institutions while de-
scribing the goals of UNESCO and the jobTorres had just accepted
there. UNESCO and TELACU both leveraged resources to funnel
them to communities in need. The organizations similarly estab-
lished training programs to help people help themselves and en-
couraged peace throughprograms of intercultural exchange. In gen-
eral both organizations sought to raise "the educational, economic
and social levels of underdeveloped nations and third world people
at home and abroad" (the reference to underdevelopment at home
again evoked the image of East LA as an internal colony) . Finally,
both sought the cause ofhuman rights to build a "lasting worldwide
community of man." 11 Torres's appointment expanded TELACU's
vision globally, and his new position in the Democratic administra-
tion would actually permit the CDC to act onthatvision.
No sooner had the administration appointed Torres than it called
Carlos J. Garcia, a vicepresident and general counsel for TELACU,
to Washington for a briefing on the ramifications of a new Panama
Canal treaty. Realizing that Carter had offended Spanish-speaking
leaders in the United States during the appointment process, the
administration sought to molify them by keeping them informed of
policy decisions regarding Latin America. Thebriefing ofabout fifty
such leaders was carried out by Vice President Walter Mondale and
members of the State Department's team of negotiators. Interest-
ingly, Garcia came away from the meeting with the following senti-
ment: "I am convinced, after listening to the complete history of
the canal from the experts, thatthe treaty is not a giveawayof land.
. . ." After hearing a summary of Theodore Roosevelt's machina-
tions in acquiring the Canal Zone, Garcia came to believe the zone
had never belonged to the United States. 12 The administration ob-
viously recognized the colonial relationship between the United
States and Latin America and even seemed willing to compensate
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Panama. To Spanish-speaking leaders such action in the interna-
tional arena suggested similar possibilities for their communities in
the United States.
David Lizarraga to the National Commission
on Neighborhoods
Similar action on the domestic front seemed very likely in De-
cember 1977 when President Carter named David Lizarraga to the
National Commission on Neighborhoods. Lizarraga qualified for the
position especially well since he had served a term as chair of the
National Congress for Community Economic Development, the
major association of community development corporations. The
only Mexican American and the only western representative on the
commission, Lizarraga had distinct perspectives to offer. The duties
of the commission involved examining neighborhoods throughout
the nation and making recommendations to Congress and the
president by the end of 1978. Lizarraga and the nineteen other
members of the commission had to travel throughout the nation to
formulate their report. Participation on the commission gave Lizar-
raga and TELACU a major opportunity to promote CDCs as mod-
els for national urban policy; as Lizarraga noted, "The successes we
[at TELACU] have had in revitalizing the residential, business and
industrial neighborhoods of our community are viable models to
use in planning programs for the rest of the country." Another op-
portunity to impact urban policy occurred in early 1978 when Car-
ter appointed Roy Escarcega, TELACU's vice president of urban
development, to the National Commission for Manpower Policy. 13
Hispanic Economic Revitalization
Increased contacts in Washington and nationwide during the
Carter administration made TELACU one of the leading CDCs in
the country and easily the major such Mexican-American institu-
tion. Indeed, David Lizarraga's participation in the National Com-
mission on Neighborhoods led directly to an important initiative
that extended TELACU's influence throughout the Southwest and
beyond. While many of the commission's recommendations were
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not enacted or were diluted by Congress, the Economic Develop-
ment Administration (EDA) received a mandate, flexibility,and re-
sources to try some new solutions to old urban problems. As a re-
sult, in 1978 Lizarraga delegated the Community Research Group
to draw up a proposal for funding from the EDA for a project that
incorporated some of the recommendations of the National Com-
mission on Neighborhoods. Lizarraga's think tank came up with the
Hispanic American Coalition for Economic Revitalization (HA-
CER), initially funded for a year beginning May 1979.14
An acronym meaning "to accomplish," HACER became a joint
effort on the part ofthe nation's six major Mexican-American com-
munity development corporations, most located in the Southwest,
the traditional Chicano homeland. In addition to TELACU, these
CDCs were: Chicanos por la Causa in Arizona, the MexicanAmeri-
can Unity Council in Texas, Siete del Norte in New Mexico, and
the Spanish Speaking Unity Council in northern California. (The
sixth organization, the Denver Community Development Corpora-
tion, had evolved beyond the traditional Mexican borderlands.) Be-
cause of their record of success, these CDCs through HACER
would provide technical assistance to other community-based or-
ganizations interested in economic development. HACER would
supply the latter organizations with some of the services that better
banks provided struggling businesses. Although HACER would in-
vest some capital, more importantly it offered the expertise neces-
sary to move new or marginal economic development organizations
to stability. 15 In the long run, HACER proponents sought to en-
courage these organizations to become full-fledged community de-
velopment corporations. Through HACER, TELACU and its allied
CDCs hoped to spread their creed of self-sufficiency throughout
the nation, but especially throughout the Southwest, where eco-
nomic self-sufficiencyremained essential to the historic recovery of
MexicanAmericans.
While TELACU had initiated HACER, it had not of course cre-
ated the other Mexican-American CDCs in the effort. These had
sprouted separately in their own areas; indeed, some predated TE-
LACU, though none could claim as much success. The events that
had created TELACU in East LA in the 1960s had also led to the
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founding of similar organizations in some of the other major colo-
nias in the Southwest. Although these organizationshad not initially
influenced one another, all learned from CDCs in the black com-
munities. Of course, once funding through the Special Impact Pro-
gram became more widely available, all came under the Office of
Economic Opportunity and its successor the Community Services
Administration. In the struggles of the early seventies to insure
continued federal funding, all CDCs under the Special Impact Pro-
gram formed the National Congress for Community Economic De-
velopment. This association became a permanent lobbying group
that kept its member organizations informed of legislation and
other matters impacting on CDC activities. As chairman of this or-
ganization in the mid-seventies, Lizarraga established contacts with
all CDCs and special ties with the Mexican-American organizations
most like TELACU.16 These contacts formed the network that be-
came HACER.
The Spanish Speaking Unity Council—
Northern California
The oldest of the "Mexican-American" community development
corporations was the Spanish Speaking Unity Council, founded in
1964. Established in Oakland, California, to servethat city and Ala-
meda County, the council began as a predominantly Mexican-
American organization, but following demographic changes in the
area, gradually came to serve other minorities as well. Indeed, by
the late eighties 39 percent of its constituencywould be black, with
only 43 percent remaining Hispanic, the last 18 percent consisting
of a variety of other ethnic groups. Moreover, the "Hispanics," re-
flecting the diversity of the Bay Area, would embrace many more
Central and South Americans than would be the case in East Los
Angeles or other parts ofthe Southwest. 17 Even at the founding of
HACER in 1979, the council's ethnic diversity stood out. Because
of this, the council served as a model for organizations in increas-
ingly diverse urban communities, including such areas as South-
Central Los Angeles. CDCs had to reflect their specific neighbor-
hoods. The Spanish Speaking Unity Council also served as a model
for communication between Latino communities in the United
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States, not to mentionLatin America. The last would be important
in TELACU's later international attempts at economic develop-
ment.
Although the Oakland CDC did not derive from the labor
movement,both the Spanish Speaking Unity Council and TELACU
received some of their initial funding from the Ford Foundation.
Both organizations also tapped various federal agencies for funds,
largely from the War on Poverty. The council began its activities in
social service, then increasingly became involved in economic de-
velopment, a pattern common to other CDCs. By 1976real estate
development had become an important part of the council's overall
program. For example, with assistance from the Ford Foundation
and the Economic Development Administration, the council con-
structed the Community Resource Center, a contemporary three-
story office building similar in function to the headquarters planned
for TELACU Industrial Park. Designed to house a dozen public and
private agencies, the Community Resource Center provided a cen-
tralized location for the social services required by the residents of
Oakland's Fruitvale District. The council attracted the agencies by
charging below-market rents for its modern facilities. Furthermore,
the attractive new facilities stimulated revitalization of nearby
neighborhoods. 18
As in the case of TELACU, construction for social services be-
came one of the Spanish Speaking Unity Council's key activities.
By 1979 the council was building an apartment complex called
Posadas de Colores Elderly Housing. Eight stories high with a hun-
dred units, the complex, supported by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, would serve low-income seniors. On the
other hand, the council would serve the very young through the In-
fant Care Center planned for construction in 1981, with funding
from the Community Services Administration. Geared to the needs
of teenage mothers and their babies, the center would provide pa-
rental training and counseling, as well as on-the-job training for a
staff drawn from welfare recipients. A subsidiary, Capital Devel-
opment Group, Inc., also became involved in a variety of real estate
ventures, including multifamily housingrehabilitation. 19
The Spanish Speaking Unity Council had a structure similar to
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TELACU's—a nonprofit holding company serving as an umbrella
for a variety of for-profit subsidiaries and nonprofit social service
agencies, with real estate development serving as a common eco-
nomic base. The range ofthe council's social services rivaled that of
TELACU, including employment training, alternative education for
youth, and health services. In the realm of economic development,
the council established the Small Business Clinic to provide techni-
cal assistance to local entrepreneurs and the Development Resour-
ces Consulting Group to provide similar assistance to private and
public organizations. 20 The latter two subsidiaries were clearly
equivalent to TELACU's Business Development Office and the
Community Research Group. Obviously, the Spanish Speaking Uni-
ty Council, like TELACU, had expertiseto share through a coali-
tionsuch as HACER.
The Mexican American Unity Council—Texas
Also older than the East Los Angeles Community Union, the
Mexican American Unity Council (MAUC) operated in San Anto-
nio, Texas. Founded in 1967 MAUC, like TELACU, had radical ori-
gins, a background the Spanish Speaking Unity Council did not
share. MAUC began as a confrontational advocacy group for the
Westside of San Antonio; it practiced advocacy along the militant
lines of Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation (lAF). Indeed,
one of MAUC's first directors was Ernesto Cortes, later founder of
Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), also of San
Antonio, and the United Neighborhoods Organization (UNO) of
Los Angeles, both lAF organizations. (COPS would later lead the
effort to enfranchise Mexican Americans in San Antonio and elect
Henry Cisneros mayor of the city.) Among the founders of MAUC
was Willie Velasquez, one of the original members of La Raza Uni-
da Party and later head of the Southwest Voter Registration Edu-
cation Project. Juan Patlan, who would direct MAUC for nearly
two decades, had also been one of the founders of La Raza Unida.
Although Cortes, Velasquez, and Patlan all began their careers in
the radical Chicano movement, MAUC like TELACU moved into
the mainstreamrather early in its existence.21
During its first two years MAUC operated "through means
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which were available at that time," meaning IAF confrontational
tactics. MAUCrepresented Westsideresidents in sometimesstormy
meetings with governmentand private agencies, especially regard-
ing educational issues. Despite this political advocacy, MAUC had
from its inception sought economic development as the long-term
solution to community problems. About mid- 1969 the Presbyteri-
an Economic Development Corporation granted MAUC a loan of
$100,000 to undertake a housing project on theWestside, a project
evidently similar to TELACU's Nueva Maravilla. The following year
MAUC committed some of its limited funds to training staff in
economic development and then began its first regular business en-
terprise—a McDonald's franchise. The successful restaurant ranked
second in citywide sales, at which point it was sold to a local res-
ident. MAUC thus succeeded in making a profit and more impor-
tantly launched a new Mexican-American business. Regarding such
experiences, Juan Patlan later commented, "Any investment on the
West Side, almost by definition, is highly risky. But if we act in
partnership with investors here, we can reduce their risk. That's
what our profit-making is all about."22 Clearly, if MAUC's radical
founders had ever advocated socialism, they had never abandoned
capitalism.
In 1971 MAUC followed its McDonald's with a string of varied
ventures. A building maintenance and janitorial service opened with
the help of a minority-business procurement contract from the
Small Business Administration. MAUC formed a construction firm
and a housing partnership that led to development of single and
multifamily units. A second McDonald's was launched. The pace of
business increased especially after the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity designated MAUC a federally funded community develop-
ment corporation in 1972. Once under the Special Impact Program,
funds for additional staff, technical training, and advice from con-
sultants rapidly expanded and improved the scope of MAUC's
business activities.23 By this time MAUC and TELACU had become
very similar institutions.
Despite its successful business activities, the Mexican American
Unity Council, like TELACU, continued to maintain its nonprofit
social service agencies. As early as August 1970, MAUC began pro-
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viding health services to its special impact area, well ahead of simi-
lar activities by TELACU. The Northwest Mental Health Program
offered a "growth grant" to MAUC for the establishment of a Field
Mental Health Program. The program became "a model Mexican
American human services delivery system," especially because of
the coordination developed with the Bexar County Hospital Dis-
trict and the Community Guidance Center. Also part of this coor-
dinated system was the Child Mental Health Program, initially
sponsored in 1971 by a grant from the National Institute for Mental
Health. Serving children between three and thirteen years of age,
Child Mental Health's Escuelita del Sol became its most notable
achievement. This "pre-therapeutic nursery" school for three- to
five-year-old children provided "high-risk families" with a compre-
hensive program to avoid child abuse. Another important social
agency founded by MAUC in October 1974 was Casa del Sol Alco-
holic Halfway House. Funded by the National Institute onAlcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism, Casa del Sol successfully implemented bi-
lingual-bicultural treatment addressing the specific needs of local
clients, both individuals and families. 24 Despite their focus on long-
term economic development, neither MAUC nor TELACU ignored
the immediate social needs of their communities.
Naturally, once MAUC had come under the Special Impact Pro-
gram, its structure became very similar to that of TELACU and the
Spanish Speaking Unity Council—a nonprofit holding company
with for-profit subsidiaries and nonprofit social service agencies.
Besides this structural similarity, moreover, lay the common em-
phasis on real estate and landscape. MAUC's early construction of
housing would lead this CDC toward the kinds of real estate proj-
ects emphasized by TELACU, including an industrial park in the
mid-eighties. But, as with TELACU, MAUC acquired real estate
and undertook construction with more than utilitarian considera-
tions in mind. Following a holistic approach, both CDCs expected
buildings to make cultural statements of value to their communi-
ties. For example, the MAUC Center on the Westside at 2300
West Commerce was a renovated Greco-Roman-style public school
that had been deteriorating for years. After acquiring the facility,
MAUC updated it for its own offices, leaving the lower floors as
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the Mexican AmericanUnity Council in San Antonio, Texas, 1986.
Courtesy of the Mexican American Unity Council.
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rental space partly occupied by a public library. While the MAUC
Center's style did not directly reflect the Mexican heritage of the
Westside, the building and its grounds became a model landscape.
Both MAUC and TELACU believed that beautiful, well-maintained
buildings helped to change the image of entire barrios. Moreover,
the impressive center displaying the name of the Mexican Ameri-
can Unity Council marked the organization as a powerful institu-
tion belonging to the local community, rather than the larger soci-
ety. Later buildings entirely constructed by MAUC would more di-
rectly reflect Mexican ethnic identity.25
Chicanos por la Causa—Arizona
Another key member of the Hispanic American Coalition for
Economic Revitalization was Chicanos por la Causa (CPLC), head-
quartered in Phoenix, Arizona. Founded in 1969 by students from
Arizona State University, CPLC like MAUC began as an advocacy
group. It received its original funding from the Southwest Council
of La Raza (itself supported by the Ford Foundation) and a local
Methodist church. In addition to $15,000 in grants from these do-
nors, CPLC received an abandoned church from the Methodists.
From this blighted bit of real estate, CPLC created offices and
meeting rooms for social services, including outreach.26 Through
this act CPLC began the typical pattern of the community devel-
opment corporation. To provide social services, the organization
found itself revitalizing physical space, an. act that almost naturally
led to economic and especially real estate development.
As with other CDCs, economic—especially physical—revitaliza-
tion became the main part of CPLC's agenda quite early. In 1970
the organizationbegan building twenty-two subsidized single-family
houses with moneys from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. A counseling program for homeowners and
renters followed. This counseling was naturally directed at low-
income Chicano residents of South Phoenix who needed advice re-
garding purchasing or renting homes, making home improvements,
conserving energy, or paying mortgages. As with TELACU and
other CDCs, housing showed the way to later, more sophisticated
real estate ventures. In 1972 CPLC began construction of an emer-
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gency medical clinic in a small town about an hour's drive outside
of Phoenix. Constructed with federal funds, the building was
clearly a project in health services, but it also suggested that
CPLC's future activities lay increasingly in real estate develop-
ment.27
Economic and particularly physical development received a dra-
matic boost at CPLC in the mid-seventies. By 1972 the Ford Foun-
dation had become the major supporter of the organization, which
by then had a staff of twelve full-time employees, evenly divided
among housing, health, education, and general community devel-
opment. But in 1975 CPLC joinedTELACU and MAUC under the
aegis of the U.S. Community Services Administration. After sub-
mitting its application, CPLC received approval of its comprehen-
sive economic development plan as well as official designation as a
community development corporation. Since CPLC's special impact
area was the entire state of Arizona, the new federally chartered
CDC initially acquired greater latitude of operation than even TE-
LACU. Since CPLC's purview included agricultural areas, it could
apply for funds covering both rural and urban projects.28 CPLC's
structure of course followed the guidelines set by the Community
Services Administration—a nonprofit holding company with for-
profit subsidiaries and nonprofit service agencies. Having already
functioned in a similar manner, CPLC found the new structure no
more burdensome to its operations that had TELACU. Indeed, the
new structure would lead to great success.
Pete Garcia, a future president of CPLC, later commented that
funding from the Community Services Administration initiated
a public-private-communitypartnership. . . . We began to feel that we,
as an organization, could become a part ofthe solution to our commu-
nity's problems. It didn't happen overnight, but you could say that we
went from wearing brown berets to dressing in suits and ties.
The changing physical image of the staff reflected the willingness to
move from confrontation to participation once the system provided
the opportunity. Once government and business recognized their
responsibilities to this particular minority community, cooperative
problem solving resulted. Even the name of the organization, "Chi-
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canos por la Causa" (Chicanos for the Cause), was later interpreted
in mainstreamterms by Garcia: "The cause is participation in this
country." 29 Though this statement no longer reflected the radical
separatist ideals of the 1 9605, neither did it acquiesce to permanent
dependency, let alone the subordination of the colonial relation-
ship. CPLC, and other CDCs, ultimately sought autonomouspar-
ticipationwithin the larger economy and society.
As at TELACU and MAUC, the imageofthe CPLC staff in coats
and ties went togetherwith the symbolism of landscaped buildings.
In 1979 the organization moved into a new complex, a 7,400-
-square-foot, three-building facility on Buckeye Road, a major thor-
oughfare through South Phoenix. According to Garcia, "This gave
the group and the community a sense of CPLC's permanence as an
enduring neighborhood institution." But the buildings had more
than symbolic value for the community; the complex functioned. It
made the institution's businesses and social services more accessible
to the public. Furthermore, in making the surrounding area more
attractive, the landscaped complex had the very real economic ef-
fect of raising local land values.30 Imagery could be profitable as
well as socially meaningful.
CPLC's concern with imagery was also evident in a housing re-
habilitation program begun in 1979. The city funneled money to the
program from a block grant for community development provided
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
With these funds CPLC renovated houses plagued by hazardous
conditions in a five-block area of South Phoenix. The program suc-
ceeded so well that another five-block area was subsequently in-
cluded, with landscaping as a component. The landscaping project
involved removing stumps and debris; planting trees, grass, and
shrubs; installing driveways; and repairing and painting fences. Da-
vid Yfiiquez, executive vice president of CPLC, reported a positive
local response: "When we implemented the landscaping portion of
our housing improvement project, it was gratifying to see many of
the nearby homeowners start to do their part in upgrading the
neighborhood."31 Like TELACU and MAUC, CPLC realized that
skillful landscaping could actually stimulate self-sufficiency, as well
as symbolize it. CPLC's housing rehabilitation project inspired
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homeowners on its periphery to improve their own homes, on their
own initiative, once they saw the neighborhood turning around.
While real estate focused CPLC's for-profit activities,economic
development took other forms as well. Once the CPLC complex
went up, new operations evolved. Critical among these, a federally
chartered credit union grew to five hundred members and $750,-
-000 in assets by the mid-eighties. Besides promoting savings, dis-
tributing quarterly dividends, and offering loans at reasonable rates,
it educatedresidents about the local economy. The credit union al-
so offered a discount telephone service, an eye-care plan, inexpen-
sive tickets for entertainment, and insurance of various kinds. An-
other of CPLC's financial operations, the Rural Development Loan
Fund, provided revolving credit from federal sources for areas with
populations of 25,000 or less. These loans could be used to reno-
vate buildings, or topurchase land, equipment, machinery, invento-
ry, or furnishings. Among the small businesses in Arizona assisted
by this program in the late seventies and early eighties were "An
electrical wholesaler in Casa Grande, a concrete contractor in Yu-
ma, a pest control business in Lake Havasu, Uncle John's Restau-
rant in Springerville, [and] an auto parts store in Sunsites. . . ."
These loans through the mid-eighties resulted "in hundreds of thou-
sands of square feet of new industrial and commercial space and
the creation and retention of hundreds of jobs."32 Clearly, even
through its financial programs, CPLC had an interest in developing
real estate, though always with an eye on the employment potential
of a particular project.
By the mid-eighties CPLC would achieve state-wide influence.
Though headquartered in Phoenix, the institution would come to
have fifteen offices around Arizona with a 140 full-time employees.
Through its subsidiary TIEMPO, Inc., CPLC would also prepare it-
self for a much more elaborate expansion in real estate. By the mid-
eighties the organization would be a 50-percent partner in develop-
ing a shopping center and office complex in downtown Phoenix,
called the Mercado. CPLC would undertake the project with fi-
nancing from a variety of sources, "including a $10-million loan
from a consortium of four banks, a $1-million grant from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, a $1.3 million grant
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from the city, plus special tax abatements and land lease arrange-
ments." The ultramodern complex would encourage barrio resi-
dents to relocate some of their businesses downtown. In addition,
the complex would contain "a Hispanic 'living museum' and cul-
tural center, which . . . [would] feature rotating exhibits of local art
and history, theatrical productions and other events."33 Obviously,
in terms of promoting the Mexican-American heritage, CPLC
worked as hard as TELACU. Given the similarities with TELACU
and MAUC, it should be no surprise that CPLC joined the Hispanic
American Coalition for Economic Revitalization in 1979.
Siete del Norte—New Mexico
Of the members of HACER, the most distinct was Siete del
Norte, headquartered in Embudo, New Mexico. Incorporated in
1973, later than most ofthe other Mexican-American CDCs, Siete
distinguished itself as the only exclusively rural of these community
development corporations. This CDC served "the six northcentral
New Mexico counties of Guadalupe, Mora, San Miguel, Santa Fe,
Rio Arriba, and Taos." Siete had a typical CDC structure—a non-
profit holding company with a for-profit business branch and a
nonprofit social service branch. Philosophically, Siete agreed with
the other CDCs in promoting self-determination by fostering, "local
ownership and control of resources." Moreover, Siete sought to
"preserve and build upon the unique culture, traditions, and physi-
cal environment of Northern New Mexico," thus reflecting the
concern of CDCs for the preservation of ethnic identity. A signifi-
cant difference between Siete and the primarily urban CDCs was
the natural landscape the rural CDC sought to "preserve and build
upon," an example being the 65.5-acre grounds of the former Em-
budo Presbyterian Hospital purchased in 1983. This parklike facil-
ity would come to house Siete's corporate offices, but would pri-
marily function as the Rio Grande Alcoholism Treatment Center,
an agency of the CDC exemplifying its strong social service
branch. 34 The center's natural setting typified the differences be-
tween Siete and the primarily urban CDCs.
Because of its rural surroundings, Siete had a more democratic
structure than did the urban CDCs. While TELACU and other
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CDCs had boards composed of representatives from other local
organizations,low-income residents directly elected the majority of
Siete's board of directors. This was possible in rural New Mexico
because of the existenceof smaller populations in moreclosely knit
communities. As we have seen, in the sixties community action
agencies had abandoned mass elections in urban areas because of
the low voter turnouts resulting from the anonymity of city life. At
Siete, once elected to the board, the twelve local directors forming
the majority asked seven professionals to join: four business people
and three from other fields. This arrangement assured control by
low-income residents even as they acquired necessary technical ex-
pertise. The administrative staff remained small, including the pres-
ident, the vice president, who doubled as controller, and a secre-
tary.35 In comparison with Siete, TELACU and other CDCs obvi-
ously lacked broad-based representation ofresidents.
Despite its smaller size, between 1973 and 1986 Siete del Nor-
te's activities spread out as much as those of any other CDC. With
federal funds, especially from the Community Services Admini-
stration, Siete invested nearly $3 million in agricultural coopera-
tives and other businesses in northern New Mexico. Among these
enterprises were Ojo Caliente Craftsmen, a successful sign supplier
for the United States Forest Service, and Southwest Cable Cor-
poration. Through the usual federal sources, Siete came up with
the start-up capital for Southwest Cable, a television system of-
fering twenty channels, including the Spanish International Net-
work, to over two thousand subscribers in the Espanola area. Siete
maintained 32-percent ownership until the successful venture was
sold so that the CDC could reinvest in other businesses.36 These
ventures reflected the cooperative, regional, and cultural character-
istics ofthe New Mexican CDC.
Interestingly, the most important of Siete's subsidiaries was As-
sociated Southwest Investors, a Minority Enterprise Small Business
Investment Corporation(MESßlC), similar to the unsuccessful TE-
LACU Investment Company. With authority to operate in Texas,
Arizona, Colorado, and California, as well as New Mexico, Associ-
ated Southwest nevertheless invested primarily at home, a pattern
TELACU Investment Company did not follow. In its six home
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counties between 1975 and 1985, Associated Southwest invested
over $1 million, "resulting in the direct creation of 130 jobs and in
the support of 90 additional jobs in other businesses assisted. . . ."
Associated Southwest claimed its investment in turn generated
$12-15 million in cash flow throughout its home counties. The im-
pact on residents went beyond jobs in that numerous individuals
acquired entrepreneurial skills through the operation of successful
businesses. 37 Apparently, both the short- and long-term benefits of
Associated Southwest Investors remained at home.
In addition to direct investment, Siete supplied grants and loans
to nonprofit groups and even small local governments for a variety
of "projects such as solar greenhouses, elderly housing, construction
of community centers, rural transportation, health clinics, [and]
day care services. ..." In Siete's estimation, the $200,000 thus
provided to forty-two projects "leveraged in excess of $3.4 mil-
lion." Other CDCs obviously shared the leveraging tactic so effec-
tively used by TELACU. Siete also funneled federal funds into low-
income housing, into both construction and rehabilitation. Con-
struction and Rehabilitation Enterprises, an independent corpora-
tion, was formed with Siete's assistance to carry out much of the
housing work that in turn provided training and employment for
many low-income youth. 38 As with TELACU and other CDCs,
Siete's varied social service projects tended to lead toward real es-
tate development.
Siete had extensive real estate holdings, though of less value
than the property ofurban CDCs, given the low cost of land in ru-
ral areas. On the 65.5 acres ofthe Embudo property lay the 17,480
square feet of the hospital, the 7,020 of the staff house, the 6,842
of five residences, and the 1,000 of four garages. In Espanola the
CDC owned 1.5 acres of land suitable for industry, including the
Siete Building, a prefabricated metal structure of over 32,000
square feet. In thecountryside the CDC also held some rather large
parcels of land. In San Miguel County, Siete owned the Ribera
Ranch, 927.5 acres, of which 160 were irrigated. The facilities in-
cluded "a ranch house, a commercial size solar greenhouse, an arte-
sian well, and feedlot facilities (mill elevator, scale house, branding
house, and corrals)," all used to improve the skills and attitudes of
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'high-risk' youth. In addition Siete possessed 18.5 acres of a Lu-
ceros property in Rio Arriba County and shares in the 87.6 acres of
a Rio del Norte property near Taos, both held for future develop-
ment.39 If land ownership symbolized self-determination, Siete had
certainly moved towardrecovery of the Southwest.
Of course, nowhere else in the Southwest had land remained
such a controversial issue as in New Mexico. As in California after
the Anglo-American occupation, Hispanos had lost land grants in a
variety of legal and illegal ways, but in New Mexico the issue had
constantly resurfaced because much of the local population of
Mexican descent had remained in place. Northern New Mexico
continued to be occupied by the direct descendants of the people
who were there centuries before the United States conquered the
region. The very name of the CDC, "Siete del Norte," referred to
the seven cities of silver that the Spanish had sought in the six-
teenth century when they encountered the Pueblo villages. Since
that time mestizo New Mexican farmers had eked out a living from
the mountainous region, their land base slowly eroding after the
U.S. occupation. Repeated outbreaks of violence over this issue had
occurred, with that of Reies Lopez Tijerina and the Alianza con-
tributing substantially to the ideology of the Chicano movement
that engulfed East Los Angeles in the late 1960s.40 Nowhere else in
the Southwest could activists more cogently argue that internal
colonialism continued. Siete del Norte's recovery of land in the
heart of the Chicano homeland held great symbolism for Mexican
Americans throughout the Southwest.
Promoting Latino Revitalization
In mid-1979 the members of the Hispanic American Coalition
for Economic Revitalization met several times to decide on the
goals of the new organization. Since HACER had recently received
funding from the Economic Development Administration, the
members held onekey meeting on June 13 at TELACU's headquar-
ters in East Los Angeles. EDA had awarded HACER a contract to
provide technical assistance to ten emerging economic development
groups anywhere in the nation. The main purpose of the meeting
was to exchange information on organizations that might qualify for
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
160 Regional, National, and International Networks
assistance. In general the EDA required nonprofit corporatestatus,
a board dedicated to economic development, full-time staff, and
specific projects capable of implementation within nine months. In
late 1979 and early 1980, HACER staff, mainly from TELACU, vis-
ited a number of organizations mostly in California, but also as dis-
tant as the states of Washington and Florida. Some organizations,
primarily oriented toward social service, showed little promise, but
others demonstrated viable projects. For example, Economic and
Social Opportunities in San Jose had an ongoing greenhouse project
that could benefit from HACER's assistance.41 As the strongest of
the Mexican-American CDCs, TELACU moved ahead with HACER
in California more deliberately than did its allies in their own areas.
TELACU's activities through HACER received a boost in No-
vember 1979 with a grant from California's Department of Eco-
nomic and Business Development. This year-long grant naturally
helped focus HACER's efforts on that state. Among the California
organizations assisted were the East Long Beach Neighborhood
Center, which sought rehabilitation of a multipurpose building;
Santa Barbara's Casa de la Raza, which opened La Cocina Restau-
rant; the Center for Employment and Training in Salinas, which
needed help with an electronics plant; Campesinos Unidos of
Brawley, which hoped to build a shopping center; the Small Cities
Economic Development Commission, which planned an industrial
park in Fresno County; North Coast Opportunities of Ukiah, which
sought wool-processing facilities; Siskiyou Opportunity Center,
which needed a woodwork shop for the handicapped; Central
Coast Counties Development Corporation of Salinas, which hoped
to build a strawberry cooler plant; and Proteus Adult Training,
which was developing an ethanol project. Though all the organiza-
tions and projects differed, HACER staff assessed the feasibility of
each project and its fit with the specific organization's overall
goals. 42 As the long list of groups, locations, and projects suggests,
HACER filled a definite need for an economic development net-
work among Latino communities. The varied list suggests such a
network's potential for integrating still autonomous communities
into a larger unit capable of exercising greaterregional and national
power.
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The success of HACER's program in technical assistance varied,
according to the situations of local groups. For example, after HA-
CER's staff visited Campesinos Unidos twice, the latter decidedto
drop plans for a shopping center. The meetings with HACER had re-
vealed that the staff of Campesinos Unidos lacked the concep-
tual maturity to undertake serious economic development. HACER
could only serve as an adviser, and Campesinos Unidos seemed
overly dependent on the coalition for conceptualization of the proj-
ect. To its credit, HACERrestrained Campesinos Unidos from em-
barking on a project beyond its current ability. The wool-processing
operation of North Coast Opportunities went through initial plan-
ning with HACER quite well, but differences with county officials
with regard to further local economicgrowth stalled the operation.
On the other hand, HACER succeeded with several other groups.
For example, Siskiyou Opportunity Center and Casa de la Raza
both developed their projects to the point of winning appropriate
funding. 43
In design the Hispanic American Coalition for Economic Revi-
talization allowed TELACU the opportunity to spread its ideology
and practical knowledge throughout the Southwest and beyond.
Ideally, HACER offered to unite Latinos behind organized eco-
nomic development in a movement to free themselves from the
subordination of internal colonialism. In practice, with some aid
from the Spanish Speaking Unity Council, TELACU implemented
projects where its strength lay—in California. The other Mexican-
American CDCs similarly operated in their own subregions. How-
ever, this promising effort came to naught before it gained much
ground. In 1980 Jimmy Carter's failure to win reelection put a halt
to many federally funded social programs. Since HACER's EDA
grant was due to expire in mid-1981, TELACU scrambled to re-
place the funds with grants from philanthropic groups, such as the
Whitney Foundation, the Lilly Endowment, and the Hearst Foun-
dation. This effort failed, and HACER folded with the social
spending cuts implemented by the new administration of President
Ronald Reagan.44
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Latin American Ventures
But before the seemingly halcyon days of the Carter administra-
tion came to an end, TELACU stepped beyond the scope of PLA-
CER'S regional and even national activities. Because of the CDCs
Washington contacts and especially Esteban Torres's position as
ambassador to UNESCO, an opportunity arose for TELACU to be-
come involved in international ventures. In August 1980, after two
years of preparation, TELACU started up an International Devel-
opment Department to provide technical assistance to economic
development organizations of various types in other countries. As
David Lizarraga commented, he and his staff naturally focused on
Latin America:
We have always compared East Los Angeles to the developing countries
of Latin America. We share many common problems, such as a lack of
capital and resources. And because we share a commonbond between
our two communities, it was only natural that the principles and tech-
niques that have proven effective here can be applied in other Latin
countries as well.
Lizarraga clearly saw East LA as a country in microcosm, one more
developing Latin nation. Of course, "developing countries" in colo-
nial theory remained such because outside economic powers
drained away the resources.45 Lizarraga believed TELACU had
learned to reverse the flow of capital from the metropolis to East
LA. While doing the same for Latin America was obviously beyond
any CDC, TELACU could now spread its ideology and tactics in
microcosmto a degree never imagined in 1968. In a new, perhaps
grandiose Pan-Americanism, including U.S. Hispanics and Latin
Americans, Lizarraga hoped to promote both self-sufficiency and
international cooperation.
Be that as it may, the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID), the key office for assistance to foreign countries in
economic development, encouraged TELACU's new initiative. In
June 1980 AID invited staff from several U.S. Hispanic develop-
ment organizations to a seminar in Washington on program design.
Peter Theobold, TELACU's vice president of community develop-
ment, and Jaime Lopez of the Community Research Group at-
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tended. The twowere then invited to visit five countries—Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia, Honduras, and Panama—in Latin America over a
two-month period. During the tour Theobald and Lopez met with
various AID officials and representatives of Latin American agen-
cies as well. The purpose of the trip was to uncover potential proj-
ects that could benefit from TELACU's expertise.46
The trip ended so successfully that Lopez commented, "Our
problem was not a lack of contract opportunities, but rather . . .
[of] prioritizing. ..." The first contract, to begin in August 1980,
involved spreading information on community development organi-
zations, essentially a training program in Quito, Ecuador. A second
contract for a more specific project, to develop wind power in Bo-
livia, was scheduled for October, and a third contract was in the
works for Panama City. Rather than risk overextending itself, TE-
LACU decidedto hold off on further contracts until it had success-
fully implemented the first three.47 Of course, no further projects
came about, because President Carter lost his bid for reelection in
November. TELACU's direct line to Washington snapped.
Jimmy Carter's defeat especially hurt TELACU because the line
to the White House had never been tighter. Indeed, by the end of
the Carter administration, Esteban Torres had risen to become the
most prominent Latino at the White House. During his two years
in Paris as ambassador to UNESCO, Torres had served with dis-
tinction. In late 1978 the general membership had elected him to
UNESCO's "board of trustees by the largest margin in the organi-
zation's history." His rapport with Third World countries had
gained him the votes needed to join the leadership of UNESCO.
Torres's success in Paris subsequently led the administration to ap-
point him directly to the YvHiite House senior staff. On August 10,
1979, at a White House conference of two hundred Latino leaders,
President Carter named the highly popular Torres, special assistant
on Hispanic matters. In that capacity Torres had direct access to
the president on such affairs, including those affecting Mexican-
American CDCs.48 Federal support for HACER and TELACU's In-
ternational Development Department had followed.
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Retreat to the Eastside
The defeat of Carter's reelection bid thus ended many of TELA-
CU's ventures beyond East Los Angeles. Fortunately for the com-
munity and the CDC, TELACU had not ignored local issues during
its regional, national, and international forays. Indeed, the Com-
munity Research Group, the think tank behind HACER and the In-
ternational Development Department, continued expending energy
at home. At home CRG carried out another planning project ofcul-
tural as well as economic importance, the Historical Preservation
Survey. With funds from the National Endowment for the Arts,
CRG catalogued hundreds of architecturally and historically signifi-
cant buildings on the Eastside by gathering information from com-
munity residents themselves.49 Through this project TELACU
committed itself to preserving the historical landscape of the com-
munity while redeveloping it. In fact, TELACU would eventually
restore some of the very buildings in the survey, while finding new
uses for them.
Perhaps the project most beneficial to Eastside residents was the
TELACU Family Health Center in Highland Park. This project,
opened in early 1981, had resulted from the comprehensive health
needs studies concluded by CRG. Because the studies had shown
that the medical establishment woefully underserved the Eastside,
TELACU had gained funding for the new barrio clinic. Atlantic
Richfield, the Johnson and Mott foundations, the county and city
of Los Angeles, and the Community Services Administration
backed the project. Emphasizing pediatrics and family practice, the
clinic offered several distinctive features, including health educa-
tion, extensive outreach services, and fees based on ability to pay.
Hospitalization and specialized care were covered in conjunction
with White Memorial Hospital and the University of Southern
California School of Medicine. The staff, headed by Gloria A.
Garcia, a graduate of UCLA's School of Public Health, spoke both
English and Spanish, of course.50 Unfortunately, TELACU later had
to disengage itself from the center when criticism of the CDC
threatened to close the clinic.
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Lost Opportunity for National Integration
Jimmy Carter's campaign and his election to the presidency in
1976 had drawn TELACU back into the political arena after a few
years ofwithdrawal. This resurgence of interest in politics and gov-
ernment, however, had not eclipsed the business orientation the
CDC had set; new federal connections only allowed TELACU to
engage in more wide-ranging economic planning and development.
During the Carter administration, while TELACU Industrial Park
rose on the Eastside, TELACU launched CRG, HACER, and the In-
ternational Development Department in an attempt to promote
the CDC model well beyond the Eastside. As we have seen,
HACER briefly linked Mexican-American communities throughout
the Southwest in a network of mutual support that promised to lift
these colonias from economic dependency to full participation in
the society. This would certainly have gone far toward fulfilling the
Chicano dream of recovering the Southwest. While TELACU's ven-
tures in Latin America had extended the CDCs vision too far, the
forced abandonment of the Hispanic American Coalition for Eco-
nomic Revitalization destroyed an important opportunity for Mexi-
can-American and Latino integrationinto the nation.
The advent of the Reagan administration brought apprehension
for TELACU and Mexican-American activists in general. In an edi-
torial for TELACU Today in early 1981, Lizarraga commented on
what the new presidency might mean for Mexico and people of
Mexican descent, "As the Carter Administration leaves, the Reagan
Administration sets out on what appears to be a new era of coop-
eration and understanding. Whether that spirit will continue the
next four years is a question of keen interest for Mexicans and
Mexican Americans alike." Because of its huge recently discovered
oil reserves, Mexico in early 1981 had high hopes for rapid devel-
opment.51 That nation seemed about to throw off neocolonial de-
pendency and become a full economic partner ofthe United States.
Many Mexican Americans saw their own imagereflected in the po-
tential economic independence of Mexico, inasmuch as it could
stimulate self-sufficiencywithin their own southwestern communi-
ties. But escaping colonialism would not be so easy.
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7. The Roybal Center. East LA's comprehensive health clinic housed in a
solid, multicolored structure featuring a horizontal band ofAztec glyphs.
Photographby author, 1997.
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Democratic Recovery
Because of the momentum gathered from the construction of
Nueva Maravilla, the nearby area by the early eighties had substan-
tially improved. For example, in 1981 just south of the housing
project, Los Angeles County dedicated a new section of Belvedere
Park, Alberto Diaz Plaza, in honor of the publisher of the Belvedere
Citizen. Since the park already included a public library, a sheriff's
station, and a courthouse, this complex formed the "civic center" of
unincorporated East Los Angeles. Even though these facilities rep-
resented continuing county governance, the added recreational
space did much to transform the area's blighted image. More sig-
nificant culturally and politically was the construction of a medical
center in the vicinity. Inspired by pre-Columbian architecture, the
newstructure included a multicolored frieze depicting Aztec life in
a detailed replica of an ancient Mexican codex. The building was
suitably named after the area's venerable congressman, Edward R.
Roybal, a native New Mexican whose efforts extended the provi-
sions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act to the Spanish-speaking. 1 The
Roybal Comprehensive Health Center not only improved the
health and physical appearance of the community, but also symbol-
ized its increasing political self-determination. Given the close con-
nection between government and economic betterment on the
Eastside, such landmarks held much promise for the Mexican-
American community.
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Despite the end of the Carter administration in 1981, the East-
side retained and expanded its political strength in subsequent
years. The major reason was the rise of the Latino population,
which spilled out of the traditional Eastside barrios into the sub-
urbs, especially those in the San Gabriel Valley. Rapidly, much of
the valley had become part of a new "Greater Eastside," extending
past El Monte, ten miles beyond unincorporated East LA. Reap-
portionmentof many political districts followed the changing dem-
ographics. Much redistricting resulted from Roybal's 1975 amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act, which forbade the dilution of the
minority vote through gerrymandering and other maneuvers. In
1982 the power represented by growing numbers would culminate
in the election of several new Mexican-American legislators and
congressmen, as well as numerous local officeholders. 2
Despite a brief hiatus after the failure of the incorporation cam-
paign in 1974, the East Los Angeles Community Union (TELACU)
became heavily involved in electoral politics from 1976 through
1982. Although politics did not upstage TELACU's economic ac-
tivities, as had happened during the incorporation drive, the CDC
became so involved behind the scenes that its public image became
increasingly controversial. Nevertheless, TELACU's politicking ben-
efited the community as several of the Mexican Americans elected
to office owed their technical experience and trainingto the CDC.
Most prominent of these politicians was Esteban Torres, elected to
Congress in 1982.3 Indeed, the increased political participation of
TELACU and the community signified increasing self-determina-
tion and integration into the larger democratic system. To the de-
gree that Mexican Americans in the Los Angeles area won elec-
tions, they were recovering their historic place in the government
of the region.
Political History of the Eastside
The history of Mexican-American disfranchisement in the Los
Angeles area extends into the nineteenth century. After the mili-
tary occupationof 1846-47, the population remained overwhelm-
ingly of Mexican descent until about 1880 when the railroads
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brought massiveAnglo-American immigration into the region. Until
that time Los Angeles City and County had significant numbers of
Spanish-speaking officeholders, including Mayors Antonio Coronel,
Jose Mascarel, and Cristobal Aguilar, and Supervisors F. Palomares
and Francisco Machado. However, with the decline in the propor-
tion of Spanish-surnamed voters, their political representation dis-
appeared. By the turn of the century virtually no representativeof
this groupcontinued in prominentlocal, let alone state office.4
Congressman Edward Roybal
The lack of representation by 1900 made it even more difficult
to recover political poweronce immigration increased the Mexican-
American population in the following decades. Then various forms
of gerrymandering kept the Spanish-speaking from electing their
own once again. While an occasional individual broke through the
system to win office—for example, Sheriff Eugene Biscailuz in the
1940s—Mexican Americans could not succeed one another in the
same office. 5 No such permanent gain occurred until the election of
Ed Roybal to Congress in 1962. He would remain in office for
thirty years and be replaced by a Latino at retirement. His election
proved the first in a cumulative series of victories that regained per-
manent representation for the Mexican-American community by
the early 1980s.
Still in 1967 Ed Roybal was the only Chicano holding a seat in
the various legislative bodies that supposedly represented the East-
side. Though occasionally Mexican Americans sat on the city coun-
cils and school boards of the San Gabriel Valley's numerous incor-
porated suburbs, the Eastside itself remained almost completely
unrepresented. Chicanos entirely lacked representation on the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors, the board of the LA Unified
School District, the LA City Council, the California senate and as-
sembly, and the board of the LA Community College District—in
other words every major governing body of the Eastside. Needless
to say, no Mexican Americans occupied such major local offices as
county sheriff or mayor of Los Angeles, let alone statewide offices
such as attorneygeneral or lieutenant governor.
Mexican Americans had, of course, long protested this situation
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and campaigned to overcome it, with some temporary successes.
For example, the nonpartisan Mexican-American Political Associa-
tion in the early 1960s succeeded in placing Philip Soto and John
Moreno in the assembly, but these legislators failed to hold their
offices and pass them on to other Chicanos. Also, as we have seen,
in 1967 the Congress of Mexican-American Unity, with TELACU's
support, helped elect Julian Nava to the LA school board. Unfortu-
nately, when he later resigned, he too failed to pass on his office.
Not until 1968 with the election of Alex P. Garcia to the assembly
did Chicanos add to the permanent gains begun by Roybal six years
earlier. 7 Garcia's victory proved a milestone because thenceforth
Mexican-American representation from the Eastside in the assem-
bly accumulated.
Alex Garcia and Richard Alatorre, State Legislators
Despite this, progress was not steady. In 1970 Garcia kept his
assembly seat, but Democrat Richard Alatorre 's attempt to win an-
other in a 1971 special election failed when the Mexican-American
vote in his district split. That year La Raza Unida Party, making its
debute in a local election, nominated Raul Ruiz for the same office.
Ruiz, also supported by the Congress of Mexican-American Unity,
lost the election, but gained enough votes to throw it to Republican
Bill Brophy. This of course followed La Raza's strategy—to prevent
the complacent Democratic party from taking Chicanos for
granted. The strategy worked; the Democrats learned the lesson. In
1972 they once again nominated Alatorre and gave him strong fi-
nancial backing. Alatorre, also having learned not to take his own
community lightly, campaigned especially well along ethnic lines.
Since La Raza stayed out of the race this time, Alatorre readily de-
feated Brophy. 8 Alatorre's election set another Chicano milestone
as he eventually became one of the more powerful legislators in
Sacramento.
Alatorre and Alex Garcia formed the Eastside contingent in the
California assembly between 1972 and 1974, but as juniormembers
of the lower house, the two initially wielded little power. Ideologi-
cal differences also complicated theirrelationship. Though both be-
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longed to the Democratic party, Garcia had conservative instincts
that contrasted with Alatorre's solid liberalism. Despite this, they
cooperated in reaching out to potential candidates in the com-
munity so that the Chicano presence could become larger and con-
tinuous. When Garcia decided to run for the state senate in 1974,
both he and Alatorre supported Art Torres for Garcia's old assem-
bly seat. Thus they set a pattern—whereby an established Mexican
American, running for higher office, left his former seat to an aspir-
ing newcomer. The plan succeeded in placing Garcia in the senate
and bringing in another Chicano politician who would eventually
wield considerable power. The elections of 1974 were successful in
this respect, even though they involved the failed measure to in-
corporate East LA and Esteban Torres's loss of a congressional race
in the Mayprimary.9
Assemblyman ArtTorres
The addition of Art Torres to the assembly proved auspicious
because he and Alatorre over the next decade formed what some
called the political "machine" of the Eastside. With only Congress-
man Roybal holding a more prominent position, and Garcia operat-
ing individually in the state senate, liberals Alatorre and Art Torres
linked themselves to the Democratic power structure in the as-
sembly to gain increasing influence. As their tenure in office length-
ened, they climbed the political hierarchy. As they gainedprestige,
important corrimittee seats, and access to greater political contri-
butions, Torres and Alatorre increased their power on the Eastside.
As longtime supporters of these assemblymen, TELACU's members
made the CDC seem an integral part of the machine. Since they
made political contributions of various sorts, TELACU's requests
for government contracts received attention. The simultaneous
election of Governor Jerry Brown in 1974 also increased the power
of local Chicano Democrats because he replaced conservative Re-
publican Governor Ronald Reagan. Adding to the potential of the
machine, four other Mexican Americans joinedthe legislature from
beyond the Eastside. Thus from 1967 to 1974, Chicano legislative
representationwent from 0 to 6. For the remainder of the decade,
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the further electoral aspirations of Eastside Mexican Americans re-
mained largely on hold until the 1980 census permitted redistricting
based on an expanded Latino population. 10
Though still severely underrepresented, Chicanos had obviously
made strides toward political self-determination by 1980. The
movement had nevertheless been slow and tentative. For example,
Roybal had held a seat on the LA City Council in the 19505, but
when he left it to run for Congress in 1962, he was not succeeded
by another Mexican American on the council until 1985, twenty-
three years later. A similar situation occurred with the election of
Julian Nava in 1968 to the LA school board. He served for twelve
years, but when he retired in 1980, going on to become ambassador
to Mexico, another Latino did not win a seat on the board until
1984. Just the same, over the years many groups, including the
Mexican-American Political Association, the Congress of Mexican-
American Unity, TELACU, ACTIELA, and La Raza, had struggled
with increasing success to enfranchise and elect Mexican Americans
to office at various levels. Other prominent groups increasingly in-
volved were the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund and the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project. By
the early eighties, these local, state, and national organizations had
improved the generalpolitical situation of Latinos on the Eastside. 11
TELACU's "Political Machine"
Because of TELACU's status as a nonprofit community devel-
opment corporation, direct involvement in political campaigns al-
ways threatened to create problems with the CDCs funding
sources. While organizations such as the Southwest Voter Project
remained officially nonpartisan, their functions much more clearly
entailed political participation. TELACU's economic focus, with its
reliance on government contracts and private sector partnerships,
put the CDC in an especially delicate situationwhen it came to po-
litical campaigns. Nevertheless, from its earliest support for Nava in
1968 through the Congress of Mexican-American Unity, TELACU
was heavily and necessarily involved in politics, a pattern that
would continue, though usually through its members' independent
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participation or through surrogate groups. Unfortunately, this pat-
tern would add to the controversy surrounding the CDC. 12
TELACU carried out its behind-the-scenes political involvement
in a number of ways. So much of its business relying on government
contracts, TELACU made sure it lobbied politicos faithfully, both
Anglo and Latino, though it tied itself firmly to the Democratic
party. A steady stream of politicians visited TELACU's facilities
and participated in its events. These visits helped the CDC gain
notice for its accomplishments as well as gain more funding; in
turn, the visits gave the politicians publicity and campaign contri-
butions of various sorts. Political contacts naturally occurred more
often during election years, but since TELACU kept close ties with
local, state, and national officials, election campaigns and visits
were constant. 13
A gubernatorial campaign year, 1974 naturally called for contacts
of many kinds, especially since Esteban Torres and East LA incor-
poration appeared on the ballot. That spring Torres, no longer di-
recting TELACU, endorsed Ed Edelman for the board of supervi-
sors, a judicious decision since the latter subsequently became the
most powerful official directly affecting the Eastside. Torres also
publicly endorsed Ruben Ayala of San Bernardino and Alex Garcia
for the state senate, wise moves since the two won office. That
such connections directly affected TELACU's efforts is evident; for
example, in the December after the election, Supervisor Edelman
appeared with David Lizarraga, informing the public of TELACU's
food stamp distribution program. An electoral off-year, 1975 still
found TELACU members meeting with officials, such as Assembly
Speaker Leo McCarthy and state health and welfare Secretary
Mario Obledo, discussing TELACU's transportation programs and
similar matters.14
During 1976, a presidential election year, TELACU became
more directly involved politically, but again through surrogate or-
ganizations, such as ACTIELA in the earlier incorporation effort.
That year TELACU created two organizations to advance its politi-
cal interests and those of the Chicano community. These organiza-
tions were People for TELACU State Action, a political action
committeeregistered to solicit funds for local and state campaigns,
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and Voter Organization through Education (VOTE), a technically
nonpartisan group formed to register voters. 15 These groups helped
keep TELACU in touch with some of the most prominent politi-
cians, local, state, and national.
TELACU's Political Action Committee
Listing an office on Wilshire Boulevard as its headquarters, Peo-
ple for TELACU formally registered with the state on June 23,
1976. Despite continual registration until August 1980, the organi-
zation only functioned during its first summer of official life. Ac-
tually, People for TELACU carried out only one major activity, a
formal fund-raising dinner—a noteworthy event nonetheless. Only
three days after the organization's registration with the state, Peo-
ple for TELACU held a private reception and dinner in honor of
numerous elected officials at the Beverly Hills home of prominent
Westside Democratic supporter Leo Wyler. The formal host was
David Lizarraga, and the honorees made up a veritable "who's who"
of California's leading Democratic representatives: Congressman
Edward Roybal, Senate Majority Leader David Roberti, Senator
Alex Garcia, Assembly Speaker Leo McCarthy, Assembly Majority
Leader Howard Berman, Assembly Majority Whip Joseph Mon-
toya, Assemblyman Terry Goggin, Supervisor Edmund Edelman,
and California Democratic party Chairman Charles Manatt. 16 Even
though it communicated through a political action committee, TE-
LACU clearly kept in touch with California's powers-that-be.
A variety of people from around the Los Angeles areamade the
one-hundred-dollar-per-plate donation and more. They included
representatives of large institutions, such as Union Oil Company of
California, Chemical Bank, Commonwealth Bank, and Coopers and
Lybrand CPA. But other businesses also contributed: Bell Best Pies,
Jason D. Groode Enterprises, lan Caterers, Atlas Aquarium Engi-
neering, Stone Outfitting, W.R. Company, and Norman F. Swanton
Associates. A couple of companies whose names indicated Mexi-
can-American ownership were donors too, Martinez Chevron and
John L. Espinosa Realty. Representatives of community service
groups, such as Cleland House and the Ayudate Project, attended
as did a number of individuals, including Gregory Villanueva, an ar-
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chitect involved in several TELACU projects. 17 Because many of
the smaller businesses hailed from the Eastside, TELACU clearly
sought to bring Eastside Chicanos into contact with traditional
Westside power brokers. In this way, Mexican Americans would
gain greater access, not only to politicians, but to the political
arena.
Voter Registration for Jimmy Carter
Of somewhat longer duration than People for TELACU, Voter
Organization through Education formed another of the CDCs legal
political "fronts." Founded on August 26, 1976, VOTE resulted
from informal conversations held at the Beverly Hills fund-raiser.
The organization lasted about a year, long enough to participate in
the 1976 presidential campaign and the Los Angeles municipal
elections of the following spring. In setting up VOTE, TELACU was
influenced by the San Antonio-based Southwest Voter Registration
Education Project, the nonprofit organization funded by the Ford
Foundation that had such dramatic success registering Mexican
Americans in Texas. With this technical assistance and with the
sponsorship of leading Democratic politicians, VOTE launched its
efforts during Jimmy Carter's 1976 campaign. Co-chairmen of the
committee were David Lizarraga and Leo Wyler. A partnership be-
gan to form between the Latino Eastside and the liberal Jewish
Westside, long a wing ofLA Mayor Tom Bradley's coalition. 18
TELACU hired political consultants Winner, Lovell, Taylor &
Associates to put the VOTE proposal together. This group, experi-
enced in Democratic campaigns, had both the expertise and the
contacts to help launch the new organization. Leslie Winner had
helped manage Edmund Muskie's campaign for president in Cali-
fornia in 1971-72; locally, she had managed a campaign for LA City
Council in 1974. She had also served on Jerry Brown's staff during
his time as secretary of state. In 1976 John Lovell was manager of
the Jimmy Carter presidential campaign in southern California and
had onceworked as a student coordinator in Bobby Kennedy's Sen-
ate drive. He had also served on the staff of Supervisor Ed Edel-
man. Rick Taylor had once been on the national staff ofpresidential
candidate George McGovem. 19 Clearly, this group could provide
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the political expertise VOTE needed to register the right kind of
voter.
TELACU set up an executive committee for VOTE, including
honorary chairmen and honprary members, as well as regular mem-
bers. U.S. Senators Alan Cranston and John Tunney, Congressman
Ed Roybal, and Supervisor Ed Edelman held the honorary chairs.
State Senator Alex Garcia, Assemblymen Richard Alatorre, Joseph
Montoya, and Art Torres, and LA Deputy Mayor Grace Montanez
Davis served as honorary committee members. Clearly, these posi-
tions gave prestige to the organizationby allowing its letterhead and
publicity to list prominent support. In addition, the list made it
obvious that the Democratic party completely backed this "nonpar-
tisan" organization. The twenty or so regular committee members
were less prominent, though important members of the commu-
nity, such as TELACU officials. These lesser lights included Gloria
Molina, aide to Assemblyman Torres, Armando Rodriquez, presi-
dent of East LA College, and Grace Castro Nagata, former director
of TELACUcommunications. 2
Despite the luminaries on VOTE'S letterhead, a professional
staff carried out the real work of the organization. Generally fol-
lowing the recommendations of Winner, Lovell, Taylor & Associ-
ates, the staff included a coordinator and field directors; the former
would be Tom Castro, the latter Ron Noblet and Rachel Ruiz. The
political consultants also recommended a preliminary budget—to
be funded by TELACU, Wyler, and other Democratic contribu-
tors—of $114,000 per year, two-thirds of which would go to the
consultants and directors, with the rest going to standard expenses,
such as telephones, postage, and rent. In 1976VOTE first planned a
registration drive in unincorporated East Los Angeles, then a "get-
out-the-vote" campaign in the days immediately preceding the No-
vember general election. An innovative aspect of the registration
drive, one indicating TELACU's social concerns, was the recruit-
ment of female gang members to register voters.21
"' During the first two weeks of September 1976, this unconven-
tional force completed 90 percent of the voter registration. Rachel
Ruiz had close ties with the young women of the colonia and con-
sequently succeeded in soliciting their strong support for the effort.
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Since these women knew their neighborhoods well, they carried
out their task on a barrio basis, rather than on the conventional
precinct basis. Though nominally volunteer workers, the registrars
received fifty cents per voter card submitted, as compensationand
as an incentive. Door-to-door registration was most arduous, but
most effective in getting to know the community. Registration at
shopping centers and social gatherings garnered many new voters,
but resulted in less direct knowledge of the community, informa-
tion vital to getting out the vote on election day. TELACU also fun-
neled job trainees to VOTE, trainees paid under the federal Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), a program ad-
ministered locally by the county through the CDC. In other words,
TELACU used federal funds to pay workers of a nonpartisan or-
ganization to register voters who would overwhelmingly vote
Democratic. Although such questionable activities contributed to
TELACU's controversial image, VOTE's registration drive netted
30,000 newvoters, an obvious success for the community. 2
In terms of getting the electorate to the polls, VOTE proved just
as successful, encouraging a local turnoutof 75 percent in the 1976
presidential election. Volunteers canvassed the barrios door-to-door
and by telephone to get voters to the booth, a process that began
about two weeks before election day. Volunteers were so thorough
that they contacted each voter face-to-face in fifty key precincts at
least once and telephoned each household within the same area a
minimum of three times by election day. Indeed, volunteers
stopped calling when some residents complained of being reached
once too often. On election day TELACU itself provided most of
the workers for the get-out-the-vote campaign. The CDC closed
down for the day, and about forty of its employees volunteered to
make phone calls, drive people to the polls, and do the many other
tasks necessary for a successful turnout. Casa Maravilla, Cleland
House, and local Catholic high schools also contributed volunteers.
Although Jimmy Carter lost California to Republican Gerald Ford,
Carter won 82 percent of the Latino vote, no small portion of it
from East Los Angeles. Without a doubt, this constituency had
earned some consideration from President Carter's new admini-
stration.23
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Political Self-Criticism
The 1976 campaigntaught VOTE and TELACU members a good
deal about themselves and their relationship to the community, in-
cluding much that disturbed them. Ron Noblet and Rachel Ruiz,
field directors of VOTE, found a persistent problem in their deal-
ings with individuals and other organizations in the barrios—a
negative image of TELACU and consequently of VOTE. According
to the field directors' report on the election,
One of theproblems we had ... in the area was that thepeople other
than [in] top administrative positions knew little or nothing about
VOTE and tended to discount it. VOTE is seen as an arm ofTELACU
and is therefore painted with the same brush of suspicion. We found
this suspicious attitude prevalent throughout East Los Angeles, in most
agencies, public and private, and in lower administrative levels. We feel
that this suspiciousattitude tinged with ignorance and fear, is a normal
feeling toward the "big boy on the block."
While the analysis of the problem at this point lacked deep insight,
it did reveal the serious public relations problem haunting the
CDC. Because the field directors had extensive contact with opin-
ion on the street, their observations were damning—obviously, or-
dinary people in East LA disliked TELACU. Unfortunately, the di-
rectors' seeming denial of VOTE's links to TELACU further fed
that suspicion. Moreover, the reasons they inferred for the "sus-
picious attitude" toward TELACU—fear, ignorance, and resent-
ment—were superficial. 24 Why did TELACU elicit such feelings?
In a later section of their report, Noblet and Ruiz interpreted
TELACU's image problem more critically. They argued that much
of the CDCs staff had lost its sense of dedication to the commu-
nity and needed a program of political education to revive that
dedication. Especially in need of such motivational training were
the administrators of TELACU Industries and the Community
Planning and Development Corporation. These divisions had sent
virtually no volunteers to VOTE on election day, suggesting an
unwillingness to mingle with the community. Indeed, the report
charged these administrators with feeling "paternalistic and conde-
scending toward the community." Certainly, condescension would
elicit resentment from the residents of the barrios. In addition the
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report argued that "lower echelon staff" felt alienated from the
CDC at large and consequently "Less than 50 percent of the people
feel the commitmentto community that TELACU, as a community
development corporation must have to be relevant and succeed."
Apparently, the officers of the CDC had lost contact not only with
the community, but with their own rank and file. The report went
on to ask rhetorically, "If the people within TELACU are unaware
of or have forgotten the goals and aims of the organization; if they
lose sight of themselves as individuals within the organization, then
how can they possibly give full enthusiasm or support to VOTE?"25
The question cut to the heart of difficulties the CDC would expe-
rience in subsequent years. Indeed, could a leadership that had ap-
parently become self-centered lead an organization of alienated
workers toward the goal of self-determination for an entire com-
munity?
Another serious charge leveled at TELACU by Noblet and Ruiz
concerned the status of women in the CDC as a whole. The field
directors claimed that female TELACU employees did not volun-
teer in great numbers for VOTE, a potentially serious handicap
since womenformed the backbone of both organizations. The rea-
son, according to the report, was pervasive male chauvinism. The
CDC as a whole tendedto treat women "as second rate humans" in
three ways. First, the male administrators often displayed open
hostility; second, they devalued the ideas of women; and third,
they constantly interrupted the input of women at meetings. The
field directors recommended a reevaluation of the role of womenat
the CDC, a reevaluation that would hopefully lead to a complete
change of attitude. Despite the successes of Maggie Aparicio's
Business Development Office and the awards granted by TELACU
to outstanding local women, the CDC had obviously not solved its
internal problems with sexism.26 The progressive public image TE-
LACU sought to promote with regard to sexual equality seemed
less than candid.
Despite these serious criticisms, the field directors' report on
the 1976 presidential election concluded on a somewhat positive
note; after all, the registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns had
been successful:
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One of VOTE's strengths during the campaign was its willingness and
ability to act as a liaison to all community and political groups [sic] One
of the reasons for this was VOTE's non-partisan image which allowed
for a broad base ofallies. It is essential that we keep this image of non-
partisianship [sic] for at least another year; i.e. early 1978. . . . the more
groups that do not feel threatenedbyVOTE, the better . . .
VOTE had succeededin unifying the community politically, despite
the suspicious connections with TELACU. VOTE had also some-
how projected a "non-partisan image" successfully, despite its open
connections to the Democratic party.27 Unfortunately, VOTE's im-
age, like TELACU's as- a whole, remained enigmatic for even as
VOTE hoped to gain the trust of the community, an element of
dissimulation entered the picture. Did VOTE expect to become
openly partisan at some future date? If so, was it presenting a false
image to the community at present? Such questions reflected the
overall problem TELACU and its affiliates had in their relations
with the public.
Mayor Tom Bradley's 1977 Campaign
Success in the presidential election of 1976 encouraged TELA-
CU and other supporters of VOTE to involve the organization in
the Los Angeles municipal election of April 1977. The target area
therefore changed from unincorporated East LA to the eastern
barrios of the city of Los Angeles—Lincoln Heights, El Sereno, and
Boyle Heights. Although VOTE continued its registration activities,
it stressed a get-out-the-vote drive because in local elections victory
meant encouraging a generally apathetic electorate to vote. Though
VOTE remained nonpartisan, TELACU had three political goals for
the organization. The first and second were to reelect Democrats
Burt Pines and Tom Bradley to the nonpartisan offices of city at-
torney and mayor, respectively. The third was to encourage voters
to elect several nonpartisan candidates for the board of a new
health services agency, which the federal governmenthad recently
established to meet the health needs of the area.28 The third aim
involved TELACU's long-term plans for a medical center on the
Eastside and showed that the CDC had not completely forgotten
the basic needs of the community.
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In January 1977 VOTE held preliminary meetingswith the Pines
and Bradley campaigns to coordinate strategy. Semiweekly meet-
ings continued with Grace Montafiez Davis, deputy mayor of Los
Angeles and Mayor Bradley's liaison with the Chicano community.
Since municipal elections in California remain officially nonparti-
san, close cooperationbetween VOTE and these campaigns was le-
gal. Indeed, VOTE became a formal part of these campaigns in
separate meetings on February 4, 1977. On that date George Pla—
"TELACU's director of economic development and [at that point]
VOTE's operations director"—together with Tom Castro, Rachel
Ruiz, and Ron Noblet, met the managers of the Pines and Bradley
campaigns. At these meetings VOTE agreed to run the campaigns
and the get-out-the-vote drives for Pines and Bradley in Lincoln
Heights, El Sereno, and Boyle Heights. In return Pines offered
VOTE $8,500, with an unspecified amountcoming from Bradley. In
late February Pines met for discussions with David Lizarraga and
made a tour of TELACU's facilities. 29 Without a doubt TELACU
had become an informal but important supporter of the Demo-
cratic party in the Los Angeles area.
Indeed, in an unofficial capacity, several members of VOTE had
attended the convention of the state Democratic party at the end
of January 1977. Those attending were David Lizarraga, Roy Escar-
cega, George Pla, Ron Noblet, Richard Polanco, Carlos Garcia, and
Rachel Ruiz—all members of VOTE or TELACU. At the conven-
tion these people succeeded in having their candidate, Bruce Cor-
win, chosen southern section chairman of the state party—a post
Lizarraga would fill a few years later. In an interoffice memoran-
dum following up on the convention, VOTE coordinator Tom Cas-
tro discussed the importance to TELACU of the political contacts
made in Sacramento:
The State Party apparatus and the party officers represent a significant
potential resource for TELACU. The State Party activists, officers, and
fundraisers are influential and well-connected individuals. Among their
ranks are included many influential businessmen, and a good number of
the "movers and shakers" in Los Angeles and California. I can foresee
these people being helpful to TELACU; political appointments and
economicdevelopmentactivities, just to namea few.
These resources will onlybe available to us, however, if we cultivate
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them. For a little money and time we can accomplish this. Our task is
all the . . . easier because a "demand" exists for TELACU and its ac-
tivities. As Chicanos become a greater and greater proportion of Cali-
fornia's population, the power structure "needs" Chicanos it can relate
to. Our role is not to become their "houseMexicans," but rather to be
preparedto sit down atthebargainingtable to negotiatefor ourpeople.
As we have seen, TELACU already had many contacts in the party
and among contributors and would soon receive appointments not
only in Sacramento, but Washington. In reality TELACU officials
had become de facto representatives of the Chicano community in
the party because they had learned the inner workings of the politi-
cal system. With their technical expertise they could discuss eco-
nomics and politics on an equal basis with the powers-that-be. TE-
LACU officials were indeed integrating into the system, but doubts
about their dedication to the community remained.
The April 1977 municipal elections turned out well for VOTE.
Both Bradley and Pines wonreelection, thereby guaranteeingTELA-
CU a voice in city hall. In the election for the board of health serv-
ice agency, candidates supported by VOTE won five of the seven
seats. Turnout in an area traditionally indifferent to local elections
equaled that of the city as a whole, indicating that VOTE had had a
positive effect. This success resulted from VOTE's ability to recruit
volunteers from key elements ofthe community. In addition to TE-
LACU employees, college students, senior citizens, and members of
the East LA Jaycees volunteered. The Chicana Nurses Association
took a special interest in the campaign because of the health issues
involved. Cesar Chavez and two hundred members of the United
Farm Workers also joined the fray, the former receiving a special
tour of the soon-to-be demolished Goodrich Tire plant. 31 Indeed,
TELACU had shown the ablity to gather grass-roots support, as
well as skill in cultivating prominent powerbrokers.
In early June of 1977, VOTE organizers hoped to make the
group permanent. Since it already had an office at Soto and Brook-
lyn on the Eastside and an experienced staff, VOTE expected the
voter education and registration operation to continue. In fact, or-
ganizersforesaw "Establishment of a precinct captain system" head-
ed by volunteers from local neighborhoods. Interestingly, the organ-
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izerswere developing "a concept similar to the 'Daley Machine'" of
Chicago, designedto call up volunteers to saturate the arearapidly.
Comparison with the boss system in general had been made during
the campaign itself in a letter encouraging voters to go to the polls.
In the letter John Echeveste, TELACU's director of communica-
tions, issued an invitation:
to witness firsthand the workings of a political machine of sorts as it
combs through the precincts of East Los Angeles in an attempt to get
everyregistered voter out to thepolls.
The "machine" is VOTE, Voter OrganizationThrough Education, a
non-partisan, non-profit educational communittee [sic] set up by The
East Los Angeles Community Union (TELACU) to increase political
awareness in the Chicano community.
The unwise comparison would come back to haunt the CDC. Be-
cause of the popular association of political machines with corrup-
tion, critics would examine TELACU in the same dim light. The
fact that the boss system had historically givenethnic groups access
to employment as well as political office had been forgotten. TELA-
CU had obviously hoped to connect itself with the machine's posi-
tive past, but that past had become too obscure. In any case, by the
end of June TELACU decidedto discontinue VOTE because fund-
ing proved a problem in non-election years.32
Hispanic Democrats
After the discontinuation of VOTE, TELACU's political activi-
ties revolved around lobbying the Carter administration for Mexi-
can-American appointments—a successful effort, as we have seen.
Political appointments, however, syphoned off some of the CDCs
major talent. For example, in early 1978, George Pla, TELACU's
liaison with VOTE, was appointed director of Business and Eco-
nomic Development by Governor Jerry Brown. Curiously, this left
TELACU politically disorganized during Brown's reelection cam-
paign in 1978. TELACU nevertheless proved influential as candi-
date Brown appeared at the CDCs "Domingos Alegres" program,
in May just before the primary. In July U.S. Senator Alan Cran-
ston, long supported by the CDC, also made an appearanceat Nue-
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va Maravilla with TELACU officials. During this period, David Li-
zarraga, as a Carter appointee to the National Commission on
Neighborhoods, remained extremely busy, which may explain the
temporaryslowdown in the CDCs grass-rootselectoral activities.33
David Lizarraga, Democratic Party "Boss"
In early 1979 the situation changed somewhat when Lizarraga,
freed of his service to the Carter administration, won the chair-
manship of the southern section of the state Democratic party. In
this position Lizarraga gained responsibility for coordinating fund-
raising and general electoral strategy for the party throughout
southern California. This meant, of course, that he would make
major decisions regarding party endorsements and financing for
candidates for the numerous offices throughout the region.34 This
consequently meant that Chicanos would have greater opportuni-
ties to get the money and connections needed to win political of-
fice. Needless to say, Lizarraga's selection to sopowerful a post was
a coup for TELACU and the Chicano community. TELACU could
certainly claim leadership in the movementfor Chicano self-deter-
mination, as well as credit for Mexican-American integration into
the democratic system.
The 1980 Presidential Campaign
One of Lizarraga's major duties was, of course, preparation for
the 1980 presidential campaign, for both the primary and the general
election. He also clearly hadresponsibility for getting out the Latino
vote.As part of the latter effort in early 1979, he helpedform a new
organizationcalled HispanicAmerican Democrats (HAD). This orga-
nization would operate on a nationwide basis with branches at the
regional and state levels. Because of the national contacts made by
TELACU during the Carter administration, Hispanic American Dem-
ocrats included individuals from throughout the nation and from
varied Latino groups. Headquarters were located in Washington,
D.C., with regional offices in New York City, East LA, and Coral
Gables, Florida—obviously, in the population centers of the major
Latino subgroups, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, and Cuban
Americans, respectively.35
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The bylaws of Hispanic American Democrats stated its inten-
tions. Following the broad stategy necessary for a presidential cam-
paign, the organization embraced all Latinos, not just Mexican
Americans. Moreover, it sought to integrate these groups into the
power structure of the national Democratic party. The organization
was to
provide a politically unified and directed voice for the Hispanic com-
munities within the United States that is attentive to the needs and
well-being of the Hispanic people; ... by causing to bring about effec-
tive Legislative State and/or Federal action, as an official representative
within the Executive Committee body of the Democratic National
Committee.
Revisions in Democratic party rules during the George McGovern
presidential campaign of 1972 had permitted greater participation
of nontraditional groups. Hispanic American Democrats exempli-
fied those changes. Its governance indicated the new organization
intended to become a functioning component of the Democratic
party: "In every instance, rules and regulations promulgated by
HAD should parallel DNC [Democratic National Committee] rules
and regulations."36
Unfortunately, unlike VOTE, Hispanic American Democrats re-
lied on a top-down strategy because of the breadth of the presi-
dential campaign. The organization sought torecruit "hispanic lead-
ers (community, political, labor, and business) throughout the
country so that these persons can become the nucleus of HAD in
their respective communites." Elected officials would serve on the
national council; regional and state councils included their respec-
tive elected officials and other prominent individuals. The national
convention would have delegates apportioned by the Hispanic
populations of the various states. Local chapters Were formed by
interested individuals or from existing organizations. From its in-
ception HAD naturally had the support of prominent elected offi-
cials: Assemblyman Richard Alatorre and Congressman Ed Roybal
of California, Representative Baltasar Corrada of Puerto Rico, and
Congressman Robert Garcia of New York. The organizationalso set
up a nationwide network of prominent local people supposedly to
reach the grass roots. David Lizarraga became national chairman of
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HAD, and in addition to these duties, took on the task oforganizing
the California branch, appropriately assigned the acronym CHAD.37
Hispanic American Democrats essentially operatedfor the dura-
tion ofthe 1980 presidential campaign. During the primaries HAD,
like the rest of the Democratic party, split over the candidacies of
Jimmy Carter and Edward Kennedy. Having become part of the
regular party establishment, Lizarraga and much of HAD's leader-
ship leaned toward the president; unfortunately for HAD, the La-
tino electorate had a sentimental attachment to the Kennedys, es-
pecially in California, which the senator won.38 Garnering votes for
Carter at the grass-roots level proved difficult. At best HAD suc-
ceeded in gaining financial support through direct mailings, but
lacked an organized campaign like VOTE to operatesuccessfully in
thebarrios.
During the general election of 1980, HAD and the Democratic
party in general won the Latino vote for Jimmy Carter, but not by
the overwhelming margins of the past. The charismatic Ronald
Reagan, former governor of California, in carrying the state made
inroads into the traditionally Democratic Latino constituency, even
in southern California. Carter's failure to win reelection ended an
important period of Mexican-American influence in Washington.
TELACU's hard-won appointments in the federal government dis-
appeared with the Carter administration. While President Reagan
would also appoint Hispanics to his administration, obviously they
would be Republicans or at least supporters of his policies. 39 TELA-
CU and the Democratic Latino majority once againfound them-
selves without a voice at the White House.
Historic Victories on the Eastside
Despite this setback, TELACU and other Latino groups saw the
potential for major political gains in the near future because of the
rise of the Latino population. Having actively participated in the
census of 1980, TELACU recognized the impact the new figures
would have on the reapportionment of political bodies. The CDC
geared its political efforts to take advantage of redistricting, espe-
cially in the 1982 midterm elections. In these efforts the CDCs
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contacts in Sacramento and within the state Democratic party
proved invaluable. Chief among these contacts were Assemblymen
Richard Alatorre and Art Torres, who after nearly a decade in the
statehouse had gained seniority and moved into powerful commit-
tee positions. Having supported the successful bid of Willie Brown,
a black, for assembly speaker, Alatorre received the powerful
chairmanship of the assembly's Elections and Reapportionment
Committee. Since this committee would redraw California's legis-
lative and congressional districts, Alatorre could now enhance La-
tino representation, especially on the Eastside. Alatorre and Torres
could also facilitate the appointmentof Latinos to various commis-
sions and, more importantly, influence who the party would sup-
port for various offices. 4 As a longtime supporter and ally of Ala-
torre, TELACU had also positioned itself to gain political advan-
tage, particularly through Lizarraga's chairmanship of southern Cali-
fornia's Democratic party.
The Pivotal 1982 Elections
In the two years between the elections of 1980 and 1982, there
was a flurry of political activity in California among Mexican
Americans, naturally including the members of TELACU. Besides
lobbying on redistricting, TELACU supported Governor Brown's
appointment of Cruz Reynoso to the state Supreme Court, an ap-
pointment severely criticized by increasingly powerful conservative
voices in the state. This appointment,of course, signified the resto-
ration of Mexican-American representation at the highest levels of
state government. In early 1982 the euphoria over the impending
political rise of Latinos even led a Mexican American to run for
governor. Mario Obledo, California's former health and welfare
secretary, decided to run for the office being vacated by Jerry
Brown. Obledo, however, lacked the support of Brown and the
Democratic establishment, which lined up behind LA Mayor Tom
Bradley. Needless to say, Latino politicos, such as Alatorre and Tor-
res, kept their distance from the maverick Obledo campaign. They
considered his drive premature and believed it might discourage
more viable candidates for statewide office in the future.41 TELA-
CU, ofcourse, aligned itself firmlywith the establishment.
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Indeed, the Latino Democratic establishment was planning care-
fully for the future, especially of the Eastside. Prominent politicos
realized that the opportunity of a century had arrived, and if Mexi-
can Americans were to take full advantage of it, they neededviable
candidates and a coordinated strategy. Since the selection of can-
didates would naturally create some resentment, the leadership
needed to coordinate its decisions to minimize disunity, win the
general elections, and serve the constituents. The first step taken
demonstrated the difficulties involved. Art Torres, with the bless-
ing of Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, decided to run against fel-
low Mexican-American Alex Garcia for the state senate. Although
Garcia had pioneered the Chicano advance into the legislature, he
had become ineffective and had made the serious mistake of sup-
porting Reagan in the previous presidential election. Though Garcia
still had powerful allies, such as Cesar Chavez, the Alatorre-Torres
team decidedto challenge the senator as they believed he no longer
served theparty or his constituents.42
A more important move to improve the representationof Mexi-
can Americans came about through the influence of Alatorre and
Torres on Governor Brown. When a position on the state Court of
Appeal opened up, they convinced him to appoint Congressman
George Danielson to the seat. This left the predominantly Mexi-
can-American Thirtieth Congressional District open to Latino can-
didates on the Eastside. In February 1982 the Los Angeles Times
noted the importance of this change for the ethnic politics of the
area:
A wide-ranging struggle has now begun from East Los Angeles through
much of the San Gabriel Valley. It involves possession of two congres-
sional seats, one of them created through reapportionment [and Ala-
torre's influence], two Assembly seats and Garcia's state Senate seat. If
Latinos win the two congressional seats, they will triple, from one to
three, the number of Latino congressmen from Los Angeles County.
Tripling the Greater Eastside 's congressional delegation repre-
sented the opportunityof a century and would certainly stand out
as a major victory in the Mexican-American drive for self-deter-
mination.
Over the previous decade, Congressman Ed Roybal, state Sena-
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tor Alex Garcia, and Assemblymen Alatorre and Torres had been
the major Chicano representatives on the Eastside, but as middle-
class Mexican Americans moved into the suburban San Gabriel
Valley, they too had put their own into office. Joseph Montoya of
Whittier had actually joinedthe assembly in 1972, the same year as
Alatorre, and had moved to the senate in 1978; in 1980 Marty
Martinez of Monterey Park had also entered the assembly. While
Mexican-American Democrats generally cooperated, Montoya and
Martinez represented more multiethnic districts and could not
support Chicano issues quite as strongly, at least initially. But as the
Mexican-American population expanded, the suburban Democrats
realized their own increasing ethnic power base and resisted the
dictates ofthe traditional Eastside "machine."44 These "power bro-
kers" had to accommodate one another to assure a sweeping Mexi-
can-American victory in 1982.
Conclave at Steven's Steak House
Fearing that political infighting might ruin the opportunitiesevi-
dent in the 1980 census, the key Mexican-American Democrats
decided to meet and coordinate strategy. According to the Los An-
geles Times,
Within two daysof Danielson's appointment [made February 4, 1982],
a secret meeting of the area's Latino political leadership—with the ex-
ception of Garcia—was convened at Steven's Steak House in the City
of Commerce, under the chairmanship of veteran Latino Rep. Edward
Roybal (D-Los Angeles), to try to impose some political order in the
situation.
At the conclave sat Alatorre, Art Torres, Martinez, and Montoya, in
addition to Roybal and three prominent men from TELACU—
Esteban Torres, David Lizarraga, and George Pla. Lizarraga, of
course, remained sectional party chairman, while George Pla had
served as TELACU's liaison to VOTE. Significantly, Esteban Torres
with his extensive local, as well as Washington, experience had
been invited as a potential candidate for office. 45 On this momen-
tous occasion, TELACU was playing a critical role in the recovery
of political self-determination for Mexican Americans, for the ram-
ifications of this meeting wouldripple well beyond East LA.
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The major decisions at the meeting involved who would run for
what. Suburban Monterey Park's Marty Martinez, relatively newto
the assembly but with a strong base in the area, seemed most
electable to Danielson's old congressional district. Of course, Este-
ban Torres also had a base in the district but had lost to incumbent
Danielson in 1974. To avoid a clash between Martinez and Torres,
the gathering convinced Torres that in the interest of Mexican
Americans he should seek election in the newly created, but even
more suburban, Thirty-Fourth District. Since Torres had raised his
family in La Puente, within the new district, and still owned a
house there, establishing residency would be no problem. This de-
cision, however, did not receive unanimous consent because Joseph
Montoya, whose senate district overlapped the Thirty-Fourth, per-
ceived the move as carpetbagging. Montoya preferred someone
with solidly suburban credentials, such as City Councilman Luis
Escontrias of Santa Fe Springs. However, the conclave as a whole
agreed that Torres had much more national and international expe-
rience, than any other local candidate; his qualifications for office
were simply superior. Torres shortly thereafter received the en-
dorsement of the caucus of California's Democratic delegation in
the House ofRepresentatives.46 Montoya could not match the clout
ofthe traditional Eastside politicos.
With the congressional candidates set, decisions on seats in the
legislature followed. Once the conclave ratified Art Torres's deci-
sion to challenge Alex Garcia for the state senate, the question of
the two assembly seats to be vacated by Martinez and Art Torres
remained. Charles Calderon, a Montebello school board member,
received the nod to replace Martinez. As might be expected, the
conclave favored candidates associated with TELACU in one way or
another. The replacement for Art Torres was to be Richard Po-
lanco, a member ofthe inner circle at TELACU at least since 1974.
Although the selection of Calderon caused no controversy, the
choice of Polanco did. Though designed to reduce infighting among
Mexican Americans, the meeting at Steven's Steak House did not
entirely succeed. As we have already seen, the conclave excluded
Alex Garcia, and Joseph Montoya left unhappy. The selection of
Polanco created further dissension because another strong candi-
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date decided to ignore the recommendations of the politicos and
run against him. This development proved particularly significant
because the candidate was Gloria Molina, the first Latina ever to
contend seriously for a seat in the legislature.47
Assemblywoman Gloria Molina
Interestingly, Molina, like Polanco, had strong ties to the Mexi-
can-American political establishment, including TELACU. As we
have seen, TELACU had employed Molina briefly in the early sev-
enties. From there she had gone on to serve in the campaigns and
on the staffs of Tom Bradley, Willie Brown, Art Torres, and Jimmy
Carter; she had obviously done her time in the trenches. However,
when she sought the support of the establishment for her assembly
campaign, she was denied. According to Frank del Olmo, columnist
for the Los Angeles Times, "Many Latino political activists, most of
them men, had serious doubts that a woman could win office in a
Latino district." 48
Indeed, the only meaningful difference between Polanco and
Molina proved to be gender. Like Molina, Polanco had served as an
aide to prominent Democrats, including Governor Brown and Su-
pervisor Ed Edelman. Polanco had also worked for TELACU, in-
cluding a period as vice president of the Community Research
Group, the CDCs vaunted think tank. Both candidates had roots in
the community—Polanco's deep in East LA, Molina's in the inner
suburb of Pico Rivera. When it became apparent that Molina in-
tended to run despite the decision of the conclave, the establish-
ment tried to convince one or the other to drop out or to move to
another district. The established officials even offered campaign
support to the one who would move, but to no avail. With so few
differences between the candidates, the campaign focused on en-
dorsements, a situation that created factionalism as the two sought
support from individual leaders of the establishment. Indeed, even
longtime allies Alatorre and Torres split over this race; the unity
achieved at the conclave dissolved, though not acrimoniously. 49 The
dissension, on the other hand, undermined the notion that the
Eastside establishment, including TELACU, constituted a political
machine. The politicos were hardly bosses.
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Molina succeeded in convincing Ed Roybal and Art Torres to
break with the conclave's recommendation for Polanco. This move
benefited her immensely because she gained the support of the
area's venerable congressman and the support of the assemblyman
whose district she sought. Polanco retained the backing of TELA-
CU, where he had recently worked, and of Alatorre, whom Molina
alienated by claiming his endorsement prematurely. Ultimately,
bright and articulate Molina convinced the electorate she could do
the job. In winning she shattered the myth that the Mexican-
American community would not elect a woman to office.5 This
victory was only the first of many that would lead the independent
Molina to the top of Los Angeles politics.
Congressmen Esteban Torres and Marty Martinez
Despite the conclave's failure to maintainunity behind Polanco,
the decisions made at Steven's Steak House proved excellent. All
of the candidates selected at the meeting proved viable. Charles
Calderon joined the assembly, Art Torres defeated Alex Garcia for
the state senate, and though Molina defeated Polanco, the latter
would win an assembly seat in 1986. Most importantly, the Greater
Eastside's congressional delegation jumpedfrom one to three. Both
Marty Martinez and Esteban Torres won seats in Congress. Twenty
years after Edward Roybal's first election to that body, he was
joined by fellow Mexican Americans from the Greater Eastside.
Though still underrepresented in virtually all government bodies,
the Mexican-American colonias had clearly progressed.51
Democratic Integration
The election of Congressman Esteban Torres especially demon-
strated that TELACU was providing the political leadership to re-
cover the self-determination of the Chicano community. Through-
out the years, and most evidently in 1982, the CDC had in one way
or another assisted virtually every Mexican-American elected offi-
cial in gainingthe positions necessary to empower the Eastside. De-
spite the imagery of boss rule and machine politics, TELACU and
Mexican-American officeholders had played the electoral game ac-
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cording to the formal and informal rules of American politics.
These rules allowed political action committees, nominally nonpar-
tisan registration drives, and back-room deals. Although TELACU's
nonprofit, nonpartisan status had made its political involvement
controversial, the CDC acted through legitimate third parties, again
in time-honored tradition. Indeed, TELACU and Mexican-Amer-
ican politicians had learned the techniques required to integrate
fully into the nation's democratic system, a system immersed in
ethnic politics from its inception. But even as the East Los Angeles
Community Union shared in the electoral triumph of 1982, and
even as The Pride of Our Heritage took shape on the facade of TE-
LACU's new headquarters, the federal governmentand theLos An-
geles Times were conducting major investigations into every phase
ofthe CDCs activities.52
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In 1982 the crowning edifice of the Eastside's new industrial
park neared completion—the TELACU Center, an attractive five-
storyoffice building of lava rock and black glass. The facade of this
structure would soon display The Pride of Our Heritage, the epic
mural depicting the history of Mexican-American Los Angeles. As
the new headquarters of the East Los Angeles Community Union,
this veritable monument would signify the institution's increasing
strength. However, before the building reached completion, TELA-
CU's very existence was threatened by the institutions that had
sustained it—agencies offederal, state, and local government. From
its inception the community development corporation had infil-
trated the political institutions of the capitalist system in hopes of
freeing East LA from what TELACU interpreted as internal colo-
nialism. However, in 1982 as the CDC steadily advanced toward its
objectives of political self-determination and socioeconomic inte-
gration, the system seemingly retaliated. Amassed in the attack
were the United States Department of Labor, a multitude of other
governmentagencies, and the Los Angeles Times.
Federal auditors probed deeply into TELACU's finances and
operations, uncovering a plethora of questionable practices on the
part of the CDC.2 In the meantime the LA Times revealed these
practices to the public, seriously damaging TELACU's reputation.
Because the CDC advocated self-determination while accommodat-
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ing the sytem, the image of TELACU had been enigmatic from its
beginnings. After that its close relations with big unions, big gov-
ernment, and big business had made the CDC suspicious to other
activists and ordinary people in East LA. But the controversy of
1982 produced an even more negative image of TELACU. While
most of the charges resulted from a misunderstanding of TELA-
CU's legal structure and overall purpose, the issues raised were not
simply questions of legality or imagery, but of ethics. For the in-
vestigations questioned the fundamental value of TELACU to the
community, by revealing that TELACU's management dispropor-
tionately enjoyed the benefits of the CDCs success. Despite this,
TELACU's overall history demonstrated that the CDC had moved
the Eastside toward significant political and socioeconomic recov-
ery, progress now threatened.
Federal Audit
TELACU's troubles began in early 1980 when Jerome Gold, a
former employee, charged that the CDC had violated the provi-
sions of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CE-
TA). As participants in a jobs program, CETA workers were paid
for work with private and public employers with federal money
funneled through local governments. Since government provided
their salaries, theseworkers could not participate in partisan activi-
ties. Gold charged, among other things, that since 1976 TELACU
had illegally used CETA workers to solicit votes for Democrats, in-
cluding Jimmy Carter. TELACU immediately labeled Gold a dis-
gruntled employee fired for reasons unconnected with his accusa-
tions. Though TELACU reached a settlement with Gold after he
appealed to the state, his earlier complaints to Los Angeles County
officials reached the Department of Labor, the federal office ulti-
mately responsible for CETA.3
The Department of Labor decided that the situation warranted
an audit, which began in April 1980. This audit continued for two
and a half years and expanded beyond the original areas of inquiry
to touch on all public and private funding connected with TELACU
from October 1, 1976, to September 30, 1979. Although audits by
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both private accounting firms and government agencies were nor-
mal operating procedure for organizations like TELACU, the dura-
tion, scope, and method of this particular audit created increasing
tension between the CDC and the government. Because the audit
had originally involved Only CETA contracts, David Lizarraga and
his staff resented the decision to expand into other areas of the
CDCs operations. TELACU especially resented the government's
audit of federal funds involved in for-profit ventures because, the
CDC argued, such funds lost their public character once they en-
tered the private sector. Despite TELACU's initial objections on
these grounds, it decided to provide some information for the audit
after discussing the matter, in late 1980, with the U.S. Community
Services Administration. This agency, the major federal funding
source for CDCs, suggested cooperation, a suggestion that TELA-
CU could hardly refuse. 4
The Department of Labor's auditors, Don B. Byrd and A. J. Bo-
dero, met repeatedly with TELACU management, especially Exec-
utive Vice President George Pla, General Counsel Carlos J. Garcia,
and Senior Vice President Jess Garcia. Problems nevertheless con-
tinued as mutual suspicion poisoned the relationship. In early 1981
the two parties had agreed to cooperate, but apparently disagreed
on the meaning of the term. TELACU's executives agreed to pro-
vide documents requested by the auditors while the latter agreed
to provide biweekly progress reports. Despite this, the executives
interpreted the progress reports as simply more requests for docu-
mentation while the auditors became increasingly dissatisfied with
the amount of information received. TELACU's executives became
irritated that requests for information never indicated the specific
concerns of the auditors, in other words, the purposes of the in-
quiry. Lizarraga and his executives suspected a fishing expedition.
When TELACU management complained that providing documen-
tation was taking an inordinate amount of staff time, the auditors
suspected intentional lack of cooperation. By mid-1981 Byrd and
Bodero ceased their requests and progress reports and decided to
continue the audit via an alternate route. The federal auditors con-
tinued by examining the "workpapers" of three accounting firms
that had previously conducted audits of TELACU. Byrd and Bodero
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finished the on-site review on October 23, 1981, though they
would not make the complete reportpublic for another year.5
A sample listing of social program costs by Byrd and Bodero
themselves indicates that TELACU's executives always responded
to the auditors' requests, though frequently with only partial doc-
umentation.Management claimed its staff at times could not supply
the documents because they were in use, lost, or nonexistent. Ul-
timately, TELACU's managers argued they had supplied 80 percent
of the papers requested, but the auditors claimed they received
only about 50 percent.6 Whatever the exact amount, the documen-
tation including the workpapers obtained by the Department of
Labor created further problems for the CDC. From TELACU's per-
spective, that the auditors gathered such troublesome evidence in-
dicated that the CDCs staffhad hidden nothing; from the auditors'
perspective, the evidence suggested they had only seen the tip of
the iceberg. In either case TELACU soon faced trial by the media.
Shattered Image in the LA Times
As early as April 1980, the press knew about the audit of TELA-
CU, but in early 1982 the Los Angeles Times apparently received a
tip that the auditors had uncovered serious problems. Assigned the
story, investigative reporters Claire Spiegel and Robert Welkos
published a three-part series in March, with many follow-up arti-
cles appearing in later months. Although a summary ofthe auditors'
report did not surface until May and the full report not until much
later, the Times gained access to much of the material through ap-
parent leaks. Though the auditors denied leaking the information, a
comparison of the final audit report with the earlier news stories
indicates that the Times had an inside source. In a matter of weeks,
on their own the newspaperreporters could not have accumulated
the data that had taken the auditors years to compile, especially
since TELACU had denied the reporters access to its records. 7 In
any case at the end of March, the story became public well before
the auditreport appeared.
The Times's investigative series dealt a shattering blow to TELA-
CU's image and threatened the CDCs very survival. The headline
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to the first article suggested the impact the series would have,
"Anti-Poverty Agency Leaving Barrio Behind: East L.A. Community
Union's Spending Runs into Millions, and Now Official Suspicion."
A shotgun blast of allegations followed—over fifty in the first arti-
cle alone. The accusations spread across several broad categories:
political corruption, financial mismanagement, conspicuous con-
sumption, and poor community service.8 While the articles alleged
some illegal activity, essentially the series challenged the fundamen-
tal ethics of TELACU's board, its management, and its entire op-
eration.
Political Corruption
In a companion article to the first in the series, the Times's
charges of political corruption basically involved misuse of govern-
ment-paid workers and campaign contributions. The former cen-
tered on the already public charges that TELACU had used CETA
workers in the campaigns of such Democrats as, Mayor Tom Brad-
ley, Congressman Ed Roybal, and President Jimmy Carter, accusa-
tions refutable due to the legally nonpartisan status of TELACU's
voter registration organization. However, additional charges sur-
faced regarding possibly illegal contributions of over $60,000 made
by the CDC to a variety of Democratic officeholders, including
many in positions to influence TELACU's funding. To the Times
the contributions seemed illegal because federal law prohibited
corporations from engaging in such activities, especially with gov-
ernment funds. TELACU responded that the applicable laws were
California's, which permitted corporate contributions, and that the
funds came from corporateprofits, in other words, private and not
governmentfunds.9 As TELACU's major line of defense, this argu-
ment rested on the underlying principle that to promote the self-
determination of a community a CDC required independence. If
governmentstrictly controlled the budgets of CDCs, their underly-
ing purpose disappeared.
Despite TELACU's generally credible defenses, the impression
of political corruption set firmly because of the vivid details pro-
vided by the Times. For instance, the newspaper claimed that CE-
TA workers during the 1976 get-out-the-vote campaign received
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precinct packets with photographs of Jimmy Carter and Walter
Mondale on the cover. When asked to comment on this, a TELA-
CU spokesman declined, naturally leaving the impression of mis-
conduct. Another specific noted by the Times was a special bank
account set up for a committeecalled the Friends of David Lizar-
raga. A $10,000 bank loan guaranteed by TELACU Industries and
paid off by several other subsidiaries had been deposited in the ac-
count for use as political contributions. 10 While the account con-
tainedprivate funds and thus proved legal, its very name suggested
venality. The hint of political corruption, justified or not, badly tar-
nished the imageof TELACU.
Financial Mismanagement
The Times's charges of financial mismanagement involved poor
investments far from East Los Angeles and lack of adequate finan-
cial controls. The newspaper claimed that despite TELACU's offi-
cial mission to improve East LA, the organization "spent most of its
venture capital on business deals . . . , in places as far away as the
Midwest, the East Coast and Europe." The reporters understated
the fact that TELACU usually invested in other minority enter-
prises, with the long-term plan ofreinvesting the dividends in East
LA. It was, nevertheless, true that large profits had not material-
ized. Indeed, in 1980 overall profits had declined to $188,000 from
the previous year's $490,000, due to the unusual risk involved in
minority investments. Regarding financial accountability, the Times
cited an unnamed auditor in asserting that funds were so inter-
mixed between companies, and from government and private
sources, "that control appears to be lost." In response TELACU ar-
gued that the auditors simply misunderstood the flexibility inher-
ent in the operations of a community development corporation. On
the other hand, the Times's reporters did reveal a fundamental
problem with the board of directors when George Pla acknowl-
edged that it sometimes failed to oversee management adequate-
ly"
Repeatedly, the vivid details the Times used to illustrate its
charges did more harm to TELACU's image than the general
charges themselves. For instance, in the series' second part, which
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focused on investments, the reporters discussed TELACU's in-
volvement in Michigan Peninsula Airways, "a minority-owned air
cargo company." After investing $100,000 in the company, TELA-
CU bought and leased a DC-8 for the business, a plane without
"any navigational equipment." Though the airline's management
had dreamed of flying planes to South America and elsewhere, the
company sank into debt, and TELACU's stock became worthless.
TELACU's standard reply was that such investments involved risk,
but the picture painted by the Times suggested incompetence.An-
other example concerning the problem of accountability proved
similarly damaging. Jose Elizondo, a board member, admitted he
"felt ill-equipped to evaluate complex business deals." As a mainte-
nance man, he represented blue-collar East LA; indeed, he and sev-
eral other board members held their seats for that very reason. But
despite training programs in business, they only rarely challenged
the professional expertise of the full-time managers.12 The impres-
sion set that the corporate managersran TELACU as if they, rather
than the community, owned the CDC.
Conspicuous Consumption
Most damaging to TELACU's corporate image, however, were
the accusations of conspicuous consumption and possible embez-
zlement on the part of both the board and managment. The Times
charged that TELACU functionaries pocketed money illegally from
their positions in the CDC and led extravagant lifestyles. The re-
porters claimed TELACU president David Lizarraga borrowed
thousands from the corporation in order to make personal invest-
ments. Although the governmentwould later judge this practice le-
gal due to the private character of the funds, the readers of the
Times must certainly have inferred a conflict of interest in the ex-
ecutive's behavior. The newspaperalso charged that TELACU staff
spent unnecessarily high sums on luxurious surroundings, expensive
travel, and fancy automobiles. TELACU's response that the busi-
ness world demanded such trappings for participation drew little
sympathy. For the Times had labeled TELACU an "anti-poverty
agency," not a community development corporation engaged in
business. 13
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The Times's vivid illustrations of allegedembezzlement and con-
spicuous consumption particularly besmirched TELACU's reputa-
tion. For example, in describing the loans for Lizarraga's personal
investments, Spiegel and Welkos reported that "his name was
sometimes 'whited-out' on TELACU ledgers." Clearly, the report-
ers were implying that the staff covered up illegal activity since
they offered no interpretation of this descriptive comment. De-
scriptions of the apparent extravagance of TELACU functionaries
had the longest effect on the CDCs image. One particularly illus-
trative example supported the adage that a picture is worth a thou-
sand words. In the opening column of their series, the reporters
noted that "TELACU Industries . . . operated out of a lavish office
suite decorated with a $10,000 table and a $400 wastebasket."
Other, similarly sensational descriptions of the CDCs physical sur-
roundings appeared throughout the series. With regard to corporate
travel, the Times noted, "TELACU's . . . expenditures have ranged
from a trip to Mexico City for the board of directors and their
guests to a $25,000 bill for travel and other expenses ... to Swit-
zerland and Lebanon." TELACU justified the former as a reward
for the unpaid service of the directors, and the latter as a business
trip in search of financing for a hotel project that later proved im-
practical. Again TELACU's explanations Were credible for a busi-
ness corporation, but seemed dubious for what the Times con-
stantly called an antipoverty agency. No doubt, readers inferred
that antipoverty officials driving around in Mercedes-Benzes must
be corrupt. 14 TELACU's defense that the corporate culture re-
quired business suits and expensive cars had some merit, but the
overall imageremained negative.
Poor Community Service
The imagery of conspicuous consumption proved particularly
shocking when juxtaposed with TELACU's mission of community
service. Headlining the final part of its series "Giant Anti-Poverty
Agency Did Little to Create Jobs," the Times charged that TELA-
CU had violated its pledge to serve the community, especially with
regard to employment. The reporters described TELACU's job-
training programs, real estate projects, and loan programs as inef-
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fective and self-serving. According to the Times, "Much of the
money spent on job training has not yet been audited, but more
than 50 program violations were reported in a 1979 county audit of
$1.1 million." On the other hand, the reporters did recognize that
TELACU's home-repair projects and their job trainees were gen-
erally well received by community residents. Regarding TELACU's
vauntedreal estate projects, however, the newspaper criticized TE-
LACU Industrial Park for not creating enough employment because
tenants generally brought their work forces with them. TELACU
countered that it could not force the companies to employ locals,
but implied that in the long run they would do so. Additionally, the
Times indirectly criticized TELACU for placing all of Community
Thrift & Loan's branches outside of East LA, but failed to explain
that the thrift used deposits from suburban branches to make small
loans to the businesses andresidents of redlined East LA. 15
Again the illustrations used by the Times to support its allega-
tions of poor community service by TELACU proved even more
harmful than the assertions themselves. Regarding job programs,
the investigative reporters pointed out that Joe L. Gonzalez, chair-
man of the CDCs board of directors, had once enrolled himself
and his wife in a TELACU program funded by CETA. Gonzalez an-
swered that he "was having hard times financially several years
ago"; the Times juxtaposed this disingenous response with the in-
formation that he currently owned "an export-import company and
two art galleries." Concerning the industrial park, the Times re-
ported that one labor-intensive tenant subsidized by TELACU pro-
duced skateboards "four or five years behind the times," hardly
conducive to the image of technical expertise promoted by the
CDC. Finally, regarding loans arranged by the Business Develop-
ment Center, the then retired Maggie Aparicio commented that
the "taco stands, restaurants, [and] body-and-fender shops" of East
LA received much less assistance than clients in Orange County
because to qualify for this federal aid businesses had to have at
least $100,000 in sales. 16 The Times's portrayal of TELACU's serv-
ice to the communitywas indeed bleak, ifone-sided.
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David Lizarraga, "Plutocrat"
Ultimately, the Los Angeles Times painted a picture of an "anti-
poverty agency" that enriched its officials far more than it assisted
the community. Perhaps the most graphic illustration of this theme
was the reporters' description of David Lizarraga's lifestyle: "He
owns a home with a service entrance and a boat parked in the
driveway on 11 acres of land in the Covina Hills. He also owns an-
other house in Ontario, a Brentwood condominium and desert land
in San Bernardino County. ..." Though his salary remained undis-
closed, apparently he received compensation on the scale of chief
executive officers in the business world, not on that of common
bureaucrats. This point revealed a fundamental difference of per-
ception between the newspaper and the CDC. The former imag-
ined TELACU as a wayward governmentwelfare agency, the latter
perceived itself as a business corporation contracting with govern-
ment. 17 Vvmile a major purpose of TELACU was to develop East LA
economically, its managers increasingly perceived that purpose ac-
cording to the "trickle-down" theories just then becoming popular
nationally. If TELACU's management did well, the entire commu-
nity eventually had tobenefit.
Public and Official Reaction
Following the series in the Los Angeles Times, the letters to the
editor revealed a generally hostile public reaction toward TELACU,
as we might expect. In one letter, an Anglo reader from La Puente
commented bitterly, "As I read the articles my sense of outrage
grew and grew." A Latina from Los Angeles echoed the sentiment,
"I am truly angered that the officials in that agency have taken so
much money for themselves so callously while parading as a com-
munity-service organization." On the other hand, TELACU did
have its defenders. For example, a Chicano from Compton tren-
chantly remarked,
Mexican Americans have long been told to learn how to negotiate the
system. What is happening to TELACU's leadership proves that once
they learn, they had better be super-clean. . . . For while the sins of the
founding fathers and their progeny are forgiven . . . Mexicans, blacks
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and other suppressed minorities are kept in their place—especially if
they show signs of having learned how the game is played. 18
It did seem that the Times and the general public expected TELA-
CU's Mexican-American officals to participate in the system as
benign social reformers—not as assertive politicians or aggressive
capitalists.
Government Contracts Canceled
Inresponse to the Times's series and public opinion, government
bodies that had contractswith TELACU began toreview them. The
Federal Communications Commission took the first action of this
type in mid-April 1982. The FCC temporarily revoked earlier per-
mission for sale of a television station to TELACU and a group of
Virginia businessmen, including several prominent politicians. The
station, located in Hartford, Connecticut, appeared on the market
at a low price under federal regulations designed to encourage mi-
nority ownership of broadcasting facilities. Criticism of the sale
concerned the fact that TELACU officials would personally gain
stock without putting up any of their own funds and that the con-
sortium purchasing the station seemed insufficiently "minority."
The FCC acknowledged that it took action "in light of certain infor-
mation . . . highlighted" by the newspapers.19
Moreserious still was thereactionoftheLos Angeles CityCouncil,
which had contracted with TELACU to hire CETA workers. After
publication of the Times's investigative articles, apparently city ad-
ministrators met secretly with A. J. Bodero, one of the auditors
from the Department of Labor, who briefed them on the contents
of the still unpublished audit report on TELACU. At the late April
meetingthe auditor ran through many of the same charges that the
Times had published, including the claim that $47 million, more or
less equaling the total assets of TELACU, was in question. Though
the auditors later admitted that they had exaggerated the figure to
draw attention to TELACU's misconduct, the city became con-
cerned over its liability for such a large amount. On May 14 the city
unilaterally canceled its contracts with TELACU. The direct impact
of the canceled city contracts was not that severe since they were
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due to expire in a few months; furthermore, these contracts only
involved about fifteen CETA employees, whom the city transferred
to other accounts. While the cancellation ended the financial liabil-
ity of TELACU as well as the city, the CDCs reputation suffered
again. 20 This remained a serious matter to an organization whose
dealings with government andbusiness required goodfaith.
Community Health Threatened
In one other area the threat to TELACU directly affected the
community as well. The scandal threatened to undermine the TE-
LACU Family Health Foundation, established in Highland Park in
1981, because the city of Los Angeles became concerned over the
funds it had contributed to the medical center. Fearing TELACU's
mismanagement of that facility, the city seemed ready to pull out
of that financial arrangement. Since such a funding cut would hurt
the veryphysical health of the community, TELACU began to sepa-
rate itself from the foundation. By the end of 1982, the separation
was complete, and the facility had been renamed the Arroyo Vista
Family Health Center. However, TELACU of necessity canceled its
plans to put up a new building for the health center.21 Curiously,
TELACU had to abandon its most ambitious social service project
because of the charges that the CDC inadequately served the East-
side.
In late April 1982 after the city's secret meeting regarding its
CETA contracts with TELACU, state Senator Alex Garcia entered
the fray. Garcia,whom TELACU opposed for reelection, released a
statement to the press, calling for an investigation of the CDC by
the state's Small Business Development Board. Since TELACU and
its subsidiaries had received over $2 million within the previous
two years from the state, Garcia's call meant more trouble for the
CDC. As a member of the board, Garcia's opinion carried some
weight. In his press release, Garcia commended the Los Angeles
Times, not so much for uncovering a situation already under audit,
but "for placing this story in its proper social and moral context."
He went on to condemn TELACU's activities, adding a few suspi-
cions regarding state funds along the way. Garcia's efforts would
fail, however, as the state board in June unanimously declined to
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conduct a full investigation, concluding that Garcia's charges were
"politically motivated and unfounded in fact." Garcia nevertheless
proved right about one thing: "The recent press reports on TELA-
CU have tapped an undercurrent ofsuspicion. . . . That suspicion is
now widespread." The public's suspicious attitude toward TELA-
CU concerned not simply its legal and financial activities, but its
moral principles.
The next body to question TELACU's reputation was the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors, which also had CETA con-
tracts with the CDC. After also receiving a briefing from the De-
partment of Labor auditors, the supervisors on May 25 met with
TELACU officials to discuss the CETA contracts. TELACU's ex-
ecutives had finally been briefed by the auditors, but only a few
hours before facing the supervisors. Like the LA City Council, the
supervisors seemed most concerned about liability for the $47 mil-
lion figure bandied about by the auditors. The supervisors forgot
the specific purpose and value of the contracts at hand and also de-
cided to cancel. Though the county planned to reassign the CETA
workers, TELACU found itself once again losing face. TELACU lost
contracts, not because of specific violations, but because of general
charges that it had scarcely had a chance to answer, having only re-
cently received a summary of the audit report. The eventual con-
viction of Joe L. Gonzalez, former chair of TELACU's board, for
false statements concerning his CETA employment, partially vin-
dicated the contract cancellations. However, without a doubt the
city and county reconsidered the contracts in the first place be-
cause of the Times's investigative series.23 The media had put TE-
LACU on trial.
Legal Battles
Following the Times's series, the FCC, the city, the state, and
the county had reviewed and in most cases revoked contracts with
TELACU, but the CDCs problems persisted. TELACU had had a
longstanding disagreement with the U.S. Small Business Admini-
stration, which flared up again during the audit by the Department
of Labor and especially after the media publicized the issue. As we
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have seen, in late 1975 TELACU had succeeded in obtaining a li-
cense for a Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Com-
pany (MESBIC), an entity designedto provide capital for disadvan-
taged businesses. With the license the SBA advanced $700,000 to
get the new MESBIC off the ground. Thus appeared TELACU In-
vestment Company, a subsidiary placed under the management of
Leonard Rutkin, a former New York stockbroker and part-time
consultant to the CDC. While Rutkin seemed well qualified, he had
had personal financial problems for years; indeed, a former partner
commented, "He gave the impression he knew what he was doing,
but he couldn't handle money." Rutkin, moreover, was accustomed
to a lavish lifestyle.24
TELACU Investment Company Besieged
In 1978 the inspector general of SBA had ordered an audit of
TELACU Investment Company that unearthed five violations.
Most serious of these was that the company had borrowed money
using its assets as collateral without SBA approval. TELACU had
notrevealed this fact while applying for andreceiving another $700,-
-000 from the SBA. More damaging, however, was that Rutkin and
his vice president tried to cover up the matter when questioned by
the auditors. After the audit uncovered the deception, the federal
governmentdecided not to prosecute the officials, apparently de-
ciding that the original infraction had been unintentional. Moreo-
ver, "The investigation disclosed that none of T.l.C.'s assets were
diverted to any of its officers or the officers of the TELACU orga-
nization."25 SBA, nevertheless, placed the company on informal pro-
bation and advanced no further funds.
At this point, Rutkin naturally lost the confidence of TELACU's
central management and resigned in May 1979. On his departure he
stated that except for a few problem areas, TELACU Investment
Company remained healthy and should resist SBA's threats to liq-
uidate it. He regretted the misunderstandings with the CDC and
wished to negotiate the terms of his separation. The terms negoti-
ated proved quite generous, including the continuation of several
months' salary, justifiedas consulting fees. TELACU also made ar-
rangements for him to pay off thousands of dollars he owed the
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CDC. At his departure he continued to live at a condominium
owned partially by David Lizarraga and drove away in a company
Mercedes-Benz whose lease he promised to pay. Despite this fa-
vorable separation,Rutkin could not pay his debts to TELACU; ap-
parently, his new independent consulting firm in Santa Monica did
not produce enough revenue. In any case, by March 1982 when the
Times's series reported on Rutkin's activities,TELACU was desper-
ately trying to recover some $65,000 owed it by this former offi-
cial. 26
'
Independent of the Department of Labor audit initiated in early
1980, the Small Business Administration had continued to monitor
TELACU after the problems under Rutkin's management, but the
difficulties persisted. Apparently, his successor, Gustavo Paladines,
proved no more competent as the SBA found even more violations
and finally about December 1981 decidedto liquidate the MESBIC.
(The violations generally involved conflict of interest and self-deal-
ing.) TELACU sought to avoid the liquidation, fearing criminal pros-
ecution of the former managers might follow. The negative pub-
licity generated by the Times's investigative series made TELACU
even more leery of acquiescing to the SBA's decision. In June 1982
TELACU offered to sell the MESBIC to a third party, but the SBA
refused this informal settlement.27 Consequently, the matter dragged
on.
Strategy Session in Washington
The complexity of TELACU's funding sources led federal offi-
cials from a variety of agencies to meet in Washington on July 1,
1982, to discuss the ramifications of the Department of Labor's
yet-to-be-completed audit report. In attendance were nearly thirty
bureaucrats from the Agency for International Development, the
Community Services Administration, the Department of Com-
merce, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Small Business
Administration, the Department of Transportation, the Office of
Management and Budget, and of course the Department of Labor.
Labor's Inspector General Tom Mcßride presided. Each of the
agenciesbriefly described their connections with TELACU and the
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actions they expected to take in light of the audit. AID and HUD
reported that they had recently terminated contracts with TELA-
CU, and other agencies continued to review theirs. Given the pos-
sible cancellations, Mcßride commented that the CDC might "be
facing a shaky future." The officials discussed whether coordinated
action might be necessary. Though no conclusion arose with regard
to this, such action seemed unlikely because of the complex rela-
tionships involved. Mcßride noted, "on a separate track, matters
related to possible criminal prosecution had been referred to the
U.S. Attorney's office in Los Angeles. . . ."28 Though these matters
were not the focus of the meeting, they were certainly uppermost
in the minds of TELACU's executives. The high-level meeting
demonstrated the extensive federal scrutiny TELACU experienced
in 1982; that the CDC survived at all surprised many in Washing-
ton, as well as Los Angeles.
Under the barrage of accusations from the media and contract
terminationsby government, TELACU at first retreated. To many
of the charges made by the Times, TELACU initially had no com-
ment. David Lizarraga, under the advice of attorneys, refused in-
terviewswith the investigative reporters. For the same reason John
Echeveste, TELACU'S public relations director, also frequently re-
fused comment.29 Moreover, the executives' situation on publica-
tion of the story remained precarious because they did not know
the specifics of the Department of Labor's audit. Unfortunately for
the CDC, the initially weakresponse left the impression that they
had something to hide. TELACU nevertheless marshaled a counter-
attack.
TELACU's Counterattack
As early as April 7, 1982, the East Los Angeles Tribune printed
the following headlines: "TELACU Fires Back: Agency Cites Ac-
complishments in Wake of Investigative Series." TELACU issued a
statement to the local community paper, and Lizarraga granted it an
interview defending the CDC in general terms and listing its various
projects. More important than the list, however, was the image TE-
LACU sought to project in the Tribune. Though labeled an antipov-
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erty agency by the Times, Lizarraga stressed that TELACU was a
community development corporation. As such, the CDC had be-
come "the prime economic catalyst for the East Los Angeles area."
He pointed out that no other organizationinvested as much private
capital in the community; indeed, at the time both the private sec-
tor and government were disinvesting in the area. TELACU's press
release added that the CDC competed "in the business world along-
side Bank of America, Chrysler and other corporate giants."30 In
other words, the Times failed to see TELACU in the contextof the
business world. Unfortunately for the CDC, despite the credible
article, the Tribune had nowhere near the circulation of the Times.
This article began a broad offensive by TELACU, which had to
hire a number of law firms to fight its battles. After the city and
county cut their CETA contracts with the CDC, TELACU appealed
the decisions within the judicial systems of the two bureaucracies.
In both forums it argued that the governingbodies had terminated
the contracts without dueprocess, that these bodies had takenrash
actions based on the one-sided briefings of the federal auditors and
the Times's series. However, in both cases TELACU faced the in-
surmountable stipulation that either party to the CETA contracts
could terminate them unilaterally, within thirty days, without
cause. TELACU appealed just the same, in hopes of getting its side
of the story told. 31
In late July 1982 Jess Garcia, TELACU's seniorvice president of
finance, testified in hearings before county and city administrative
judges. Garcia received the best opportunity to present TELACU's
side of the story in the city hearing. Although the legal issue was
due process, the proceedings revealed that Garcia and TELACU's
managementworried most about the adverse publicity the contract
terminations had dealt the CDC, in other words the damage done
to its image. During the proceedings, Joseph Connolly, counsel for
TELACU, made this point evident. Although he did not accuse the
city of defamation, Connolly stated, "We accuse the DOL auditors
of doing that and of intimidating and stampeding the City into
terminating TELACU's status as a contractor and stigmatizing it
with this brand of being, lacking integrity, being dishonest and try-
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ing to cover things up. . . ."32 To carry on its business, TELACU
needed to recover its reputation, which indeed the governmentand
media had injured.
The city hearing officer understood the underlying purpose of
the complaint and allowed TELACU's counsel substantial latitude
in presenting his case. TELACU clearly hoped to use any favorable
findings from this hearing in other forums, especially against the
Department of Labor. Connolly put the matter thus:
We have been looking ... for somebody to stand up and say what these
DOL auditors did and what they caused these local government offi-
cials to do violated fundamental principles of due process. . . . Politi-
cians are thoroughly intimidated by The Los Angeles Times and . . .
these Department ofLabor auditors. . . .
The counsel for the city responded that with no way of double-
checking the auditors' claims, the city had to cut the contracts to
prevent liability for any subsequent problems. The hearing officer
ultimately agreed that the city could cut the contracts unilaterally,
basically dismissing the question of defamation as irrelevant (the
county hearing officer followed the same thinking). TELACU, nev-
ertheless, decidedto appeal, still hoping to repair the damage done
to its image.33
Rural Development Loan Challenged by U.S.
Even as TELACU took the offensive against the media, the city,
and the county, pressure from the federal government continued.
In August 1982, even before the unfavorable rulings in the city and
county matters, the inspector general of the Office of Community
Services conducted another audit of TELACU, an audit clearly in-
spired by the recent negative publicity. This audit involved $1 mil-
lion from the Rural Development Loan Fund for a project to be
administered by TELACU. The federal office had loaned TELACU
the money in January 1981 so that the CDC could in turn lend the
money to disadvantaged businesses in rural areas. Over a year and a
half later, however, TELACU had only made one loan of $30,000
and that to an ineligible applicant in the suburb of Fremont, Cali-
fornia. To make matters worse, the recipienthad defaulted. TELA-
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CU had kept the remaining funds in certificates of deposit earning
$230,000 in interest. In addition the auditors cited other problems
regarding administrative costs in their report.34 Once again TELA-
CU faced public charges of incompetence, financial mismanage-
ment, and possibly evenembezzlement.
In response to the audit report from Community Services, TE-
LACU admitted making a mistake with the ineligible loan recipient
from Fremont. The CDC claimed it misunderstood the loan pro-
gram's definition of "rural"—hardly a credible defense. Regarding
the bulk of the million dollars, TELACUreplied that it had planned
to invest these in an industrial park in Parlier, an agricultural com-
munitysouth ofFresno, California, but that after close examination
had decided that the project lacked feasibility. The Office of
Community Servicesrejected TELACU's explanations, pointing out
that the CDC had not provided informative or timely reports of the
Parlier plans. In November 1982 Community Services followed by
terminating the rural loan contract and demanding return of all
funds, plus interest.35 TELACU thus became involved in another
lengthy legal case, attempting to cleanse a public image that had by
nowthoroughly tarnished.
TELACU Partially Vindicated
In November 1982 the Department of Labor's complete audit
report finallybecame available. At this point the three-volume re-
port, including TELACU's responses and exhibits, seemed anticli-
mactic since much of it had leaked over the previous months.
Though the audit had taken overtwo years, TELACU had only had
a few weeks over the summer to reply; consequently, many of the
CDCs specific responses seemed inadequate. On the whole, how-
ever, the final report backed away from some of the most serious
allegations previously leaked to the Los Angeles Times. First and
foremost, the $47 million figure loosely questioned earlier declined
to less than $4.5 million. Second, the charge that TELACU had not
achieved self-sufficiency disappeared. Third, the report dropped
many specific questions, such as those involving a gasoline fund, af-
ter adequate explanation by TELACU.36 In effect the final audit re-
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port signaled that TELACU as a whole would survive because the
vast majority of its operations had passed the in-depth federal in-
spection.
Confirmation of this came on November 12, 1982, when theLos
Angeles Times itself printed what amounted to a retraction of its
March investigative series on TELACU. The headline read: "Pover-
ty Agency Largely Immune from Corruption Probe: Taxpayer Dol-
lars Invested in TELACU's Businesses Became Private Funds." The
article cited Stephen Trott, the U.S. attorney in Los Angeles who
had investigated the possibilities of criminal charges resulting from
the Department of Labor's audit. Trott had consulted, in his own
words, "every expert under the sun," and concluded that TELACU
remained largely "impenetrable."37
As indicated in the final audit report, TELACU had won the
major legal points regarding its operations. The CDC had success-
fully argued that federal funds invested in its ventures entered the
private sector and could be spent in any way deemed appropriate
by TELACU. Indeed, Don Byrd, the auditor who had complained
about the CDCs lack of cooperation, admitted to the newspaper
that he discovered he had "no authority to question." Byrd also
admitted that the CDCs complexity had overwhelmed the audi-
tors, thus supporting TELACU's contention that they did not un-
derstand the operation. Key to this contention was the issue of self-
sufficiency. Because the auditors and the Times had construed TE-
LACU as simply a welfare agency running on federal funds, they
had failed to perceive it as an autonomous corporation that held
private capital. The critics had not understood the Special Impact
Program. Only when the U.S. attorney looked into the possibilities
of prosecution did the applicable laws become clear. As Trott
pointed out to the Times, "The way the project was set vp—to act
as a capital enterprise and investment operation—there's almost
anything you can do." 8 Since Congress had designed the Special
Impact Program to foster community self-determination, it could
not permit excessive government interference in the operations of
community development corporations.
Neither federal officials nor the Times were pleased with this
state of affairs. Though the November article was virtually a re-
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traction, the Times published it without apology. Indeed, the Times
and federal officials left the distinct impression that TELACU offi-
cials were getting away with murder. Despite the general vindica-
tion, the attacks on TELACU's image continued in both the rheto-
ric and the contentof the November article. For example, with re-
gardto the Special Impact Program, former Inspector General Wil-
liam O'Connor of the Community Services Administration stated,
"It's the damnedest piece of legislation I've ever seen in my life in
terms of losing control of federal dollars once they were shoveled
out the door." Even U.S. Attorney Trott resorted to profanity in
showing his displeasure over the matter: "they're [TELACU offi-
cials] right (that) they can damn well do anything they want with it
[federal money] as long as it's arguably within the scope of theproj-
ect." Spiegel and Welkos, authors of the November article as well
as the March series, repeated the imagery used earlier, "federal
dollars . . . became private dollars—free to be spent on big salaries,
fancy cars, personal loans, worldwide travel and plush accommoda-
tions, among other things."39 The ethical issue of conspicuous con-
sumption remained; despite winning legal vindication, TELACU
had not cleared its image.
Though the November article conceded that TELACU had used
the vast majority of its funds legally, the Times's reporters devoted
much space to those still in doubt. The $47 million loosely men-
tioned in the initial series vanished, but the $4.5 million still ques-
tioned in the Department of Labor's final audit report now re-
ceived substantial coverage. Despite this, the Times did recognize
that TELACU might successfully account for much of the smaller
figure on a case-by-case basis before the various agencies involved.
Toward the end of the article, the Times stressed the recent con-
victions of TELACU Chairman Joe Gonzalez and his wife for their
illegal activities in connection with CETA. "Sentenced to five years'
probation and 1500 hours of community service," the two were
nevertheless the only people connected with TELACU finally
brought up on criminal charges by U.S. Attorney Trott. At the ar-
ticle's conclusion, Trott trenchantly remarked regarding his con-
tinuing investigation, "I don't know how many days God had to
render the universe out of chaos, but I think even somebody with
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those types of powers would have trouble making order out of
this."40
TELACUPresses On Against Washington
Encouraged by its general vindication in the Times and by the
U.S. attorney, TELACU intensified its battle with the government
through the courts. As we have seen, in the spring TELACU had
lost its initial confrontations over CETA with the city council and
the county board of supervisors. In August and September of 1982,
appeals in the city and county cases, respectively, had also been
lost; the administrative law courts had ruled that the local govern-
ments could unilaterally break their contracts. But TELACU con-
tinued the process still hoping that along the way an appeals court
would report tangential findings that TELACU might use in its
other legal battles. At the very end of 1982, TELACU and the U.S.
attorney locked horns again, this time over the Small Business
Administration's Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment
Company and the Office of Community Services's Rural Develop-
ment Loan Fund. 41
As we have seen, the SBA matter basically involved questions of
self-dealing and conflict of interest by TELACU Investment Com-
pany, the MESBIC subsidiary of the CDC. SBA charged the MES-
BIC with making investments in other companies associated with
TELACU specifically, board Chairman Joe Gonzalez's art company
and Congressman Esteban Torres's international trading company.
The federal agency also accused the MESBIC of "making unauthor-
ized salary and management payments," specifically the consulta-
tion fees paid to Leonard Rutkin at his separation. Ultimately, the
SBA charged the CDC with ten detailed violations ofregulations. 42
During the summer of 1982, TELACU had been on the verge of
acquiescing to the SBA's liquidation of TELACU Investment Com-
pany, but the CDC backed out at the last minute. On the advice of
counsel, the threat of criminal prosecution had compelled TELA-
CU's executives to seek complete vindication. The subsequent re-
treat of the Department of Labor and the LA Times in November
had further encouraged a counterattack. On December 30, 1982,
the very same day the Department of Justice filed a civil suit over
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
TELACU Under Investigation 217
the MESBIC in Los Angeles, TELACU filed its own complaint in
Washington, D.C. By establishing a venue more to their liking, TE-
LACU's lawyers hoped to control the pace and possibilities for fu-
ture settlement. 43 Over five years of legal wrangling followed, not
concluded until well after TELACU's 1982 crisis had subsided.
Reagan Administration Attacked
As its main argument, TELACU charged that the Small Business
Administration was "discriminatorily and selectively enforcing the
small business laws . . . because TELACU's executive management
and members of its Board of Directors . . . [were] active politically
in the Democratic party." TELACU argued that the Reagan admini-
strationsought to deter TELACU's political activities and thus im-
prove the Republican party's future success in California. TELACU
believed that the executive branch sought vengeance against the
CDC and that the administration wanted nothing more than to re-
place TELACU's officials with Reagan supporters. The fact that
President Reagan in September 1981 had downgraded the Com-
munity Services Administration gave credence to TELACU's suspi-
cions. This agency, already demoted once, had been the successor
to Lyndon Johnson's Office of Economic Opportunity, the contro-
versial heart of the War on Poverty. Of course, Community Serv-
ices managed the Special Impact Program, the basic funding agency
of CDCs. Community Services' operations had been cut, disbursed,
or consigned to the lesser, newly created Office of Community
Services, within the Department of Health and Human Services. 4
Since TELACU's problems with the SBAextendedback to the Car-
ter administration, the charge based on political persecution lacked
substance. Yet the argument revealed what the CDC regarded as
the underlying source of the continuing troubles with the federal
government.
To make matters even more complicated, TELACU and the U.S.
attorney also sued each other over the Rural Development Loan
Fund monies supplied to TELACU by Community Services. In an
attempt to preempt the plaintiff's position in any litigation on this
matter, TELACU in late December 1982 sued the Office of Com-
munity Services in Washington, again hoping to argue a case in a
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more favorable venue. A short time later Community Services
countersued in Los Angeles. As we have seen, the issue involved $1
million in loan funds that the federal government claimed TELACU
had failed to use as required. TELACU argued that Community
Services had failed to provide the technical assistance necessary for
the CDC to administer the monies properly. In their testimony TE-
LACU officials claimed that they were not clearly informed of the
conditions of the rural loan program and consequently misunder-
stood it. This proved a disingenuous argument at best, making TE-
LACU officials look like bunglers, rather than the technocrats they
claimed to be. More convincing was their argument that the De-
partment of Labor's audit so preoccupied them that they never had
a chance to carry out the provisions of the loan program.45
As in the SBA lawsuit, TELACU also claimed the executive
branch of the federal government, now under Republican control,
conspired to undermine the CDC because of its Democratic party
associations.This conspiracy defense,elaborated before the U.S. dis-
trict court in Los Angeles, had several parts. TELACU argued first
that the Reagan administration, by distributing incomplete reports
to the press and local government, sought "To damage and destroy
defendant's ability to function as a community development corpo-
ration by publicly besmirching its business reputation. ..." Second,
TELACU argued that the executive branch sought to place indi-
viduals on the CDCs board and in its managementmore favorable
to the administration. The third argument was that Republicans
hoped to improve their chances in the 1984 elections by undermin-
ing the CDCs political position. Basically, TELACU claimed the ad-
ministration hoped "To reward Republican politicians and busi-
nessmenof Hispanic background in the Los Angeles area by turning
over to them control of what might eventually remain of defen-
dant's activities after the Republican Administration's attack." The
conspiracy took effect, according to TELACU, through the constant
threat of new audits and intensification of those already under
46way.
The government's case was much simpler. The loan documents,
which TELACU officials claimed they misunderstood, contained a
provision that allowed Community Services to cancel unilaterally a
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specific rural loan program even if the recipients only seemed in
violation of its requirements. In early January 1983 this provision
had initially allowed a federal judge in Los Angeles to rule quickly
against TELACU even without its presence in court. As in the
CETA cases involving the city and county, the contract provisions
themselves gave TELACU little hope of winning. Nevertheless, TE-
LACU appealed again, in the vain hope of repairing its shattered
image.47 This case would drag onuntil mid-1985.
Closing Skirmishes
Appropriately enough, thefinal legal battles regarding the critical
events of 1982 involved TELACU and the Department of Labor it-
self. The latter had, of course, launched the sweeping audit of the
CDC in 1980 over alleged CETA violations. Since these violations
had involved city and county contracts, most of the litigation had
gone through the administrative law courts of the local govern-
ments. Curiously, the county and TELACU together filed an appeal
through the Department of Labor's own judicial system. They
sought to prevent the department from collecting about $150,000
in CETA funds remaining from their joint contract. In a separate
action launched in late 1983, the department directly sued TELA-
CU within the former's administrative judiciary for recovery of less
than $15,000 in questioned costs, involving rental of space to cer-
tain politicians and political groups. Significantly, the amounts in
these final suits were paltry sums compared with the nearly $50
million figure originally trumpeted by the Department ofLabor and
the Los Angeles Times. These cases would continue until early
1986.48
In the end the East Los Angeles Community Union survived the
assault of government, at least financially. Of the $47 million that
auditors publicly claimed TELACU had misused, they ultimately
challenged less than $5 million officially. As we have seen, of the
funds challenged, TELACU lost most through protracted legal bat-
tles. In mid-1983 the CDC dropped its appeal ofthe city case over
CETA, thus admitting defeat in that matter. In early 1986 the
county and Department of Labor suits were settled out of court,
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with TELACU returning nominal sums to the government. In mid-
-1985 Community Services and TELACU settled the rural loan suit
with the CDC returning the $1 million with interest to the gov-
ernment. After keeping TELACU Investment Company in receiver-
ship for several years, in mid-1988 the SBA liquidated the MESBIC,
reclaimed over $3 million, and finally ended that long legal affair. 49
Of course, Joe Gonzalez had long since pleaded guilty to the
charges against him. Although TELACU had lost virtually all the le-
gal battles undertaken, it had successfully prevented government
officials from challenging the vast majority of its assets in court.
Because those assets remained in the private sector, TELACU had
assured its financial independence.
Of course, TELACU's programs suffered because of the scandal.
As we have seen, the CETA programs were scuttled, though this
would have occurred anyway since the Reagan administration soon
ended the jobs program nationally. TELACU's mismanagement of
the MESBIC denied the community an importantprogramfor eco-
nomic development when the SBA liquidated the company. TELA-
CU's program for expanding into rural areas collapsed because of
the CDCs own ineptitude and possibly federal harassment. On the
other hand, the Reagan administration had also been seeking to
dismantle the Rural Development Loan Fund nationwide. TELA-
CU's international projects ended when the Agency for Interna-
tional Development terminated its contracts with the CDC, again
on mere suspicion of wrongdoing. Even the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, a longtime supporter, cut its funding of
TELACU projects. As we have seen, the loss of the TELACU
Health Center proved especially harmful since it had best symbol-
ized TELACU's fundamental commitmentto the Eastside. Moreo-
ver, TELACU had to close one of its most creative ventures, the
Community Research Group, once more on mere suspicion.50 TE-
LACU could not challenge all of these losses in court because of the
enormous legal costs.
Despite these losses, throughout the scandal Lizarraga and his
officers had worried more about the damage done to TELACU's
image. Without a good reputation they would have difficulty in
their future relations with business, government, the general public,
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and the local community. With regard to the first two, TELACU's
executives could repair the damage through face-to-face contact,
but they would have more trouble changing the minds of ordinary
people. Even before the scandal, TELACU had seemed suspiciously
aloof to members of the local community. The LA Times did al-
most irreparable damage by reinforcing these local suspicions and
extending them to the general public beyond the Eastside. Despite
the virtual retraction of the Times's series against TELACU in No-
vember 1982, the negative press continued into mid-1983 when the
scandal had about run its course.51
On July 9, 1983, the Times reported a memorable event in the
history of the East Los Angeles Community Union: the dedication
of the TELACU Center, the newly completed corporateheadquar-
ters. Unfortunately for the CDC, reporter Claire Spiegel used the
occasion to repeat several charges still pending, such as those in-
volving the MESBIC and the rural loan fund. Again, more damaging
than the charges themselves was the imagery she used in the arti-
cle. For example, in describing David Lizarraga's new quarters, she
again criticized the conspicuous consumption of TELACU's man-
agement: "He's got his own bathroom, shower and kitchenette—
besides an office with plush carpeting and designer furnishings that
include a gleaming round walnut desk with matching coffee table
and a $400 wastebasket." And in describing The Pride of Our
Heritage depicting what she called the "Latino heritage," the re-
porter repeated that the mural's designer had recently been con-
victed of felony charges. 52
Ethics, Recovery, and Integration
Though TELACU had survived legally and financially, the image
problem remained because the imagery brought up ethical ques-
tions. Should an organization dedicated to improving an impover-
ished community engage in conspicuous consumption? More im-
portantly, did the ordinary people of East LA benefit from the
CDC as much as its managers? TELACU had failed to give satisfac-
tory answers to such questions. Despite this, the LA Times noted
that at the dedication of the TELACU
Center,
Cesar Chavez deliv-
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ered a speech commending the CDC for its survival and its
achievement of self-sufficiency. As a Chicano leader close to the
very poor and never given to personal luxury, his supportive com-
ments carried weight. His comments suggested that despite its im-
perfections, TELACU provided services to the the Eastside that no
other Mexican-American organization could match, especially in
economic development.53 TELACU's contributions to Mexican-
American regional recovery and national integration were consider-
able; and for this reason the community-owned institutiondeserved
reevaluation andreform.




Major Institution for Economic Recovery
By mid-1983 the East Los Angeles Community Union had sur-
vived the worst of its confrontation with the federal government
and theLos Angeles Times. Although litigation would continue until
1988, TELACU much earlier concentrated on recovery from the
scandal. 1 As a direct result ofthe scandal, the CDCretreated from
the heavy political involvement of the period from 1976 to 1982.
From 1983 into the nineties TELACU deemphasized voterregistra-
tion campaigns, political fund-raising events, and similar activities
through "front" organizations. Adverse publicity had made such ac-
tions counterproductive. Of course, individuals associated with the
CDC remained politically active, and TELACU maintained the
strong connections it had with politicians from city hall to Washing-
ton. But now more than ever, the CDC focused on economic devel-
opment, especially real estate development.
Other groups, such as the United Neighborhoods Organization
and the MexicanAmerican Legal Defense and Education Fund, had
become important and successful in the political arena, but no
other Latino organization in the Los Angeles area, or elsewhere in
the United States, could match TELACU's expertise in economic
development.2 Despite the damage done to its image by the federal
and media charges of incompetence and financial mismanagement,
TELACU had undeniable successes in an area that few other Latino
organizations had dared enter. This was especially important since
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by the nineties, Mexican Americans were making major gains in the
political arena, but in some ways losing ground economically. Politi-
cally, the Eastside was gradually becoming independent, but eco-
nomically it still resembled a colony. Economically at least, TELA-
CU remained the major institution offering the Mexican-American
community a way toward regional recovery and integrationwith the
larger society.
Revitalized Landscape
The very landscape of East Los Angeles reflected TELACU's
economic influence. By the mid-eighties the area's major commer-
cial strip, Whittier Boulevard, had revived. As we have seen, during
the 1970s TELACU had been involved in several award-winning
studies for the redevelopment of East LA and its major thorough-
fare. The most elaborate had been the Zocalo plan, which had en-
visioned a plaza placed just off the boulevard, a plan obviously in-
spired by Mexican models. The Whittier Boulevard Revitalization
Project had followed a less ambitious but more practical plan. The
most important aspects of the latter had been the establishment of
a local development corporation, composed of the merchants along
the strip, and the formation of a revolving loan fund by TELACU
and the Bank of America. The county ended the CDCs participa-
tionin the designofthe project during the 1982 scandal, but TELA-
CU's influenceremained. 3
Beginning with the original ideas drawn up by TELACU, the
merchants themselves came up with a redevelopment plan to suit
their own needs. The merchants' corporation then convinced the
county to widen and resurface the boulevard. With monies drawn
from the revolving loan fund, the merchants upgraded the facades
of their many small shops uniformly from Atlantic Boulevard to the
Long Beach Freeway—nearly a third the width of unincorporated
East LA. Additionally, a completely new complex arose, the Plaza
Colonial minimall, the first such development in the area in over
forty years. This Spanish-style complex was also financed by the
revolving loan fund and influenced by the Zocalo ideas of the pre-
vious decade. Highlighting the overall renewal of Whittier Bou-
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levard, two arches now spanned the thoroughfare, proudly display-
ing its name and that of the community. The changes had made the
boulevard more attractive and profitable; they had also provided
more jobs and produced more sales and taxrevenuefor East LA. In
the North Broadway area of Lincoln Heights, similar redevelop-
ment had also helped make the Eastside more self-sufficient. 4
These two projects were among the best examples of TELACU's
influence on the economy and landscape of the community; moreo-
ver, they were projects that everyone on the Eastside could enjoy.
Community Services
In spite of the reemphasis on economic development, TELACU
continued its social service projects, though it increasingly referred
to them as "community services" in order to erase any notion that
it was some sort of welfare agency. As we have seen, TELACU's
first activities as an organizationhad been youth and senior citizens'
programs; these continued in both traditional and new forms during
the eighties and into the nineties. More general community serv-
ices, as diverse as cultural events and housing rehabilitation, also
continued as part of TELACU's overall program.5 These services,
nevertheless, remained a secondary part of TELACU's operation;
their relationship to the CDCs business end resembled the rela-
tionship between the activities ofa nonprofit charitable foundation
and its corporate parent. Though TELACU did not make the dis-
tinction so sharply, the CDC had increasingly separated the two
components as it emulated business corporationsmore and more.
Social Services
TELACU's Youth Services Program had evolved from the sum-
mer camp project of 1968 to a more technological approach. In
conjunction with the Young Men's Christian Association and
American Honda, TELACU offered junior high students who had
had problems with the law an innovative path back to respectabil-
ity. According to TELACU's publicity, "The program seeks to
stimulate positive change by using mini-bikes as a motivational
tool." Youths referred to TELACU by the police, the courts, the
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schools, and various other community institutions were taught the
safe use and maintenance of small motorcycles with the idea that
this popular activity would teach a general sense of responsibility as
well as a useful skill. Such a constructive pursuit carried out in
small groups also allowed personal attention and taught coopera-
tion. In addition to maintaining the machines, the youths planned
and participated in competitions, camping trips, and parades with
the idea that they thus developed organizing skills and self-pride.
Though the program may have seemed farfetched to some, TELA-
CU claimed a 70 percent success rate.6 In any case, the program
exemplified TELACU's technical approach to community prob-
lems, as well as its continued success in drawing corporate contri-
butions to the local area.
A more traditional service for youth was the TELACU Scholar-
ship Fund, established in 1984. TELACU set up the scholarships to
help pay the expenses of entering and continuing college students
from the Eastside. The applicants had to show both need and
promise. The institutions participating were those most commonly
attended by Eastside students: East Los Angeles College, the Cali-
fornia State University campuses at Los Angeles and Long Beach,
the University of Southern California, and the University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles. TELACU utilized its leveraging technique even
in the design of this higher education fund; for example, Cal State-
Long Beach matched each TELACU scholarship on a one-to-oneba-
sis, while USC matched each two to one. This obviously expanded
the benefits of TELACU's original contribution. Through 1986 a
hundred students hadreceived a total of $85,000 directly from the
fund, and the numbers continued to increase. To assure the conti-
nuity of these educational efforts, in the late eighties TELACU also
put together a $500,000endowment to build "a strong core of edu-
cated professionals to lead the community in the coming decades."7
Indeed, one of TELACU's enduring legacies would remain the de-
velopment of a professional leadership. The new scholarship pro-
grams could only help but improve the CDCs image and build a
loyal following among a future generationofhighly skilled leaders.
V\fhile youth received renewed emphasis in the mid-eighties,
senior citizens were not forgotten. The TELACU Senior Citizens'
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Club, founded by Glenn O'Loane in the sixties, continued under
his direction in the late eighties and remained one of the most ac-
tive groups of its kind onthe Eastside. Since East LA lacked a mu-
nicipal government toprovide such services, many seniors relied on
this club for recreational and educational activities. A distinctive
feature of the club remained its long-established food cooperative,
which provided a full range ofmarket products at discounts. 8 Given
the low-income senior population of East LA, the cooperative
served an especially useful purpose. This type of grass-roots pro-
gram could only help TELACU's image amongthe needy.
Another project continuing to serve senior citizens and other
needy people on the Eastside remained the TELACU Transit Sys-
tem. Founded in the mid-seventies after a study by the CDC of the
area's transit needs, the system had been one of the nation's first
dial-a-ride operations. In an area woefully short of quality public
transportation, this dial-a-ride system offered the physically and
mentally disabled, as well as the elderly, door-to-door service with
a simple phone call. In addition senior citizens' clubs chartered
minibuses for group excursions to recreational areas, shopping cen-
ters, and elsewhere. According to TELACU's publicity, "The dis-
tinctive fleet ofbeige and brown mini-buses, including lift-equipped
vehicles ... is a familiar sight on local streets." Indeed, to many in
the community these clearly marked vehicles were the most visible
symbols of TELACU. Though many ofthe buses had begun to show
their age by the late eighties, they still projected a positive image of
the CDC. Averaging 200,000 miles per year, the fleet of minibuses
undeniably served the community.9
As with many of the CDCs other community services, the TE-
LACU TransitSystem operated under contract with thecity, county,
and state. Because of this, the 1982 scandal had also threatened the
system's survival, and thereafter requests for continued funding of-
ten encounteredopposition based at least subliminally on the CDCs
tarnished reputation. In September of 1986, controversyresurfaced
in the Los Angeles City Council as this body discussed whether to
grant the system $722,000 to continue its service on the Eastside.
According to the Los Angeles Times, "The council's Transportation
Committee,
at the behest of Councilman Richard Alatorre, who
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represents the Eastside, recommended that the council award the
contract to The East Los Angeles Community Union." Some mem-
bers of the full council objected because TELACU Transit had
scored lower than two other systems on a federal grading system of
such operations. Though the leading competitor, Pacific Busing, of-
fered more vehicles at lower cost, TELACU's defenders pointed
out that its system was familiar with and owned by the community;
it also had a strong affirmative actionprogram. 10 The criticism sug-
gested that TELACU Transit needed improvement, but the CDCs
long support of Richard Alatorre proved decisive in winning the
grant. Since council members effectively controlled what services
their districts received, Alatorre finally steered the funds toward
his supporters. Obviously, TELACU could still manipulate the po-
litical system.
Cultural Preservation
TELACU's commitment to Latino, particularly Mexican-Amer-
ican, cultural preservation demonstrated that the CDCs service to
the community transcended antipoverty programing. Over the
years TELACU's supportof the visual arts had been apparent in the
mural and especially the architectural projects it had promoted.
The CDC had also attempted to support the performing arts
through such for-profit companies as Inter-American Entertainment,
a subsidiary that had failed. However, "Domingos Alegres," as we
have seen, had been a perennial success. Launched in 1976, the La-
tinovariety show of music and dance performed, free ofcharge, for
the community every other Sunday from April to October. Co-
sponsored by the LA County Parks and Recreation Department,
the newspaper Noticias del Mundo, and Spanish-language Radio
KALI, the three-hour shows continued to take place in the "civic
center" of East LA at the Belvedere Park amphitheater. 11
The importance of TELACU's cultural contribution was evident
not only in the centrality of "Domingos Alegres" to the life of the
local community, but also in the quality and extent of the effort.
TELACU recruited top Latino artists from throughout the United
States and Latin America for the Sunday performances. Despite
this, local artists also had opportunities to highlight their talents,
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allowing many to develop their careers further. By 1986 the per-
formances had gained such an impressive following that TELACU
arranged a television contract for a season of sixteen broadcasts.
The series appeared nationally on Spanish-language television in
eight major markets, including of course Los Angeles on KVEA-TV.
This series, made possible through major sponsorship from An-
heuser-Busch and Pepsi-Cola, was "the first domestically-produced
program of its kind for the U.S. Hispanic audience." Of course,
"Domingos Alegres" hadreceived some international attentioneven
earlier through the Spanish-language media, but this telecast of an
entire series reached Latinos in much of the United States. 12
Through such efforts TELACU helped break down the cultural iso-
lation of the colonias within the nation.
Although TELACU's community services and its businesses op-
erated separately, they overlapped far more commonly in the CDC
than in a regular business corporation. TELACU's Weatherization
Service and its Inter-CityEnergy Systems exemplified this overlap.
In conjunction with the Southern California Gas Company, the
Weatherization Service helped low-income people save on their
utility bills while conserving energy. Residents could receive "up to
$500 in free weatherization services, including attic insulation, in-
stallation of low flow showerheads, water heater blankets, caulking
and weather stripping." In addition, free portable heaters, fluores-
cent bulbs, and a money-savingenergy survey were available. As a
result, up to a 40-percent savings on utility bills accrued to most
homes, and from the project's beginning in 1982 to 1987, over
seven thousand homes received the free services. While the
Weatherization Service was free and nonprofit, the for-profit Inter-
City Energy Systems offered the same services for a price to those
who did not qualify as low-income. Besides assisting the needy and
the environment, these projects trained and employed sixty local
workers in installation and sales.13 In these projects TELACU's long
experiencein housing rehabilitation and real estate obviously bene-
fited the community in multiple ways.
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Real Estate and Construction
Despite the scandal of 1982, TELACU's business ventures
moved ahead, especially in areas related to real estate and con-
struction. In the midst of the scandal, TELACU had acquired the
South Coast Shingle Company, a respected building supplier, fam-
ily-owned for over thirty years. Since the firm could supply many
of the basic needs for ventures in construction, TELACU purchased
the company to assure those supplies at a reasonable price. Since
the same experienced management remained in place, the company
posted profits every year after its purchase. In 1985 TELACU also
acquired the Air Management Company, a heating and air condi-
tioning firm serving private residences, new residential develop-
ments, and light commercial construction projects in much of
southern California. Employing about seventy workers, the com-
pany provided training and subsequent employment for East LA
residents. Air Management also served as a supplier for TELACU's
real estateventures. 14
Both of these companies were subsidiaries of TELACU Indus-
tries, the CDCs general business wing, and of TELACU Develop-
ment Company, the CDCs real estate development subdivision.
TELACU Development had undeniably become the core of the
CDC, especially since the demise of such subsidiaries as the Com-
munity Research Group and TELACU Investment Company. TE-
LACU Development absorbed the planning and research functions
of the former, ignored the wide-ranging investment strategy of the
latter, and focused on real estate. After the construction of TELA-
CU Industrial Park, TELACU Development had become increas-
ingly sophisticated and applied its growing technical expertise to a
variety of activities. The company provided "full-service property
development, construction, realty, and management services"; it
specialized "in the construction and development of mid- and low-
rise office buildings, master-planned office and industrial parks, and
multi-tenant residential projects." Of course, the company's major
initial project had been TELACU Industrial Park, which it contin-
ued to manage as it undertook a 6-acre addition to the original 48-
--acre complex. 15 But this was only the beginning. By the mid-
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eighties TELACU Development had launched several other major
projects that would mark a new era in the CDCs brief history.
South Gate Industrial/Retail Park
In early 1986 building directly on its experience with its own in-
dustrial park, TELACU Development undertook a similar project
on the site of an abandoned General Motors plant in South Gate, a
community bordering impoverished South-Central Los Angeles.
Again, because of the community union's early ties with the United
Auto Workers and the automotive industry, TELACU succeeded in
acquiring the site for redevelopment into an industrial and retail
complex. In conjunction with Goldrich & Kest, as well as Sheldon
Appel Company, TELACU demolished the old plant onthe 96-acre
site and by 1992 replaced it "with 1.8 million square feet of indus-
trial, light manufacturing, and retail distribution space, and a 15-
-acre shopping center." TELACU leveraged the project, costing $80
million, in its usual fashion and retained 25-percent ownership.
While automobile assembly had virtually disappeared from south-
ern California, TELACU was helping fill the vacuum. Although the
CDC could not directly replace the high-paying jobs of the auto as-
sembly lines, TELACU did produce four thousand largely service
jobs that helped keep the local economy alive. 16
Tamayo Restaurant
In 1984 TELACU Development Company launched another
ambitious project, a new Mexican restaurant in East Los Angeles it-
self. Of course, East LA had many such restaurants, but it did not
have a first-class establishment. Though the area remained poor, a
feasibilitystudy had shown that a market existedfor the "luncheon
and banquet trade." Indeed, for years surrounding cities had ca-
tered to the trade profitably, with such restaurants as the Quiet
Cannon in Montebello, Luminaria's in Monterey Park, and Steven's
Steak House in Commerce. The growing Mexican-American mid-
dle class with roots in East LA indicated that the market for such
dining was growing, and another elegant restaurant could succeed.
With $500,000 from the Office of Community Services, $1 million
from a partner in Spago on Sunset Boulevard, and another million
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Colonial Revival architecture. Photographby author, 1997.
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of its own, TELACU set out to establish the Tamayo Restaurant,
named in honor of renowned Mexican painter Rufino Tamayo. 17
Clearly, TELACU designed Tamayo Restaurant with cultural
pride as well as economic development in mind. Indeed, as a holis-
tic project, the restaurant gave meaningto the abstract concept of
community development. For one thing, TELACU established the
restaurant in a historic Spanish Colonial Revival structure built in
1927. Located next to TELACU Industrial Park, the structure had
been identified as culturally significant in the heritage survey that
the CDC had conducted in the seventies; the building had never-
theless seen better days and needed renovation. According to the
Los Angeles Times, "The building at various times housed a pipe
supply store, a coffee shop, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the
California Highway Patrol and the Brown Berets. ..." Thebuilding
therefore reflected not simply the area's architectural heritage, but
the community's diverse political history. Taking cultural preserva-
tion beyond renovation of the building, TELACU decorated the in-
terior with examples of Rufino Tamayo's own work, which diners
could appreciate as they enjoyed distinctive Mexican cuisine, such
as huachinango flameado (red snapper) and pavofumaro en dos sal-
sas (smoked turkey). The interior also contained huge tapestries
from Oaxaca and imported tile and marble, as well as an openpit in
the main diningroom capable of seating 165 people. Even as TELA-
CU thus preserved the community's heritage, the CDC generated
new jobsfor the local population in construction and the food in-
dustry. The restaurant's incorporation of culture, history, and eco-
nomics embodied the holistic ideal envisioned by proponents of
community development corporations.1
Nevertheless, Tamayo Restaurant had its critics, some basing
their positions on the negativeimage of TELACU resulting from the
1982 scandal. Reporting on the restaurant's opening in March 1988,
theLA Times once again reminded its readers of the scandal, but in
a more moderate tone, probably because the reporter was Latino
George Ramos. According to Ramos, some activists argued "that
the non-profit corporation . . . should funnel its money into press-
ing social needs, instead of a fancy eatery." They argued that the
CDC should invest in libraries or hospitals. Although these critics
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did not realize that TELACU had previously established a reading
program and a health center, their criticismreflected a deeper igno-
rance of the goals of community economic development and thus
of the long-term purposes of TELACU. 19 Of course, the Times and
even the Justice Department had misunderstood those goals in
1982. TELACU was not a simple antipoverty agency; its goals in-
volved holistic community development, including not only social
service, business development, and job creation, but such matters
as cultural preservation and beautification.
The critics also complained that Tamayo Restaurant was too ex-
pensive for the low-income residents of the area since dinner en-
trees ranged from $12 to $22. To offset these prices somewhat, TE-
LACU had taken care to offer lunches for as little as $5.50; it also
offered Sunday brunches for families at relatively low cost. While
the restaurant remained beyond the reach of many, the community
as a whole benefited from the money spent by more affluent sub-
urbanites drawn to the area, especially through business with TE-
LACU. This, of course, meant at least one hundred new jobs.20
Though these were again largely low-paying service jobs, the many
unskilled workers in East LA preferred such work to unemploy-
ment.
The criticism was by no means universal. Community activist
Lydia Lopez commented just before Tamayo opened, "It's about
time East L.A. had a place like this." She, like many others in the
area, had been skeptical regarding TELACU because of the 1982
scandal, but she had changed her mind. "I think they've learned
from their mistakes and they're going the extra mile," she re-
marked. "The restaurant is evidence of that."21 Though TELACU
often received little credit for projects, such as Nueva Maravilla
and the Whittier Boulevard redevelopment, landmarks such as the
TELACU Center and Tamayo Restaurant helped cleanse the CDCs
tarnished image, at least in the eyes of those who did not romanti-
cize the ascetic life.
TELACU Manor, Retirement Homes
Indeed, local criticismmight have lessenedhad another of TELA-
CU's current projects received nearly as much publicity as the res-
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taurant. Even as TELACU launched Tamayo Restaurant in the late
eighties, the CDC initiated a string of retirement homes in south-
ern California. Subsidized by the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development, the CDC planned to construct, own, and oper-
ate TELACU Manor at different sites in the Los Angeles area. Each
location would include social and recreational amenities geared to
the local community. In July 1988 groundbreaking for an Eastside
branch was celebrated at the site in the city of Commerce. This
first complex included seventy-five units, constructed in a loose
Spanish style. 22 A branch in unincorporated East Los Angeles fol-
lowed. Apparently, HUD had forgiven TELACU's earlier transgres-
sions and decided that the CDC served the needy sufficiently to
receive renewed funding. Considering that Republicans had admin-
istered HUD for nearly eight years, this new funding of TELACU
was certainly a vote of confidence. As expected, long before the
general public, government and business perceived TELACU's im-
age in a more positive light.
Battle for Los Angeles's Historic Plaza
Just the same, controversy seemed to follow TELACU's devel-
opment efforts almost everywhere, especially in metropolitan Los
Angeles. In early 1988 before the establishment of TELACU Man-
or, a dispute broke out over plans to redevelop the culturally sig-
nificant plaza area of downtown—El Pueblo de Los Angeles His-
toric Park. The area embraced the placita, Olvera Street, and the
Avila adobe—respectively, the city's oldest church, its traditional
Mexican marketplace, and its earliest residence. Besides other sites
important to the city's early history, the proposed redevelopment
involved about seventy additional acres important to the city's later
history, including Union Station and the downtown post office.
The difficulties began rather quietly in 1986 when the Olvera
Street Merchants Association commissioned a study concerning
possible renovation of the immediate area.23
The shopkeepers of the Merchants Association worried that the
government was not properly maintaining the popular tourist at-
traction. From the founding of Los Angeles, the plaza had had a
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concentration of Hispanics evenduring the mid-nineteenth century
when other ethnic groups, such as the Italians and Chinese, had had
a strong presence there. In the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, the area had become dilapidated, but Anglo preservationists
had revived it in the 19305. At that time the land had been pur-
chased by the state; the buildings had been renovated, though not
always with the greatest authenticity; and Olvera Street had be-
come a tourist attraction. Although the state owned the property,
the city's Parks and Recreation Department managed it. Finally, the
state decidedto turn over legal title to the city in 1988. In antici-
pation of this, the merchants, mostly longtime Mexican-American
tenants, commissioned their study in hopes of influencing the chan-
ges sure to come once the city had full power to redevelop the
area.24
Gloria Molina Versus Richard Alatorre
and TELACU
Controversy arose when two distinct redevelopment plans were
proposed by competingfactions at city hall and on Olvera Street it-
self: The Merchants Association, backed by Councilwoman Gloria
Molina, and the Business Leadership of Olvera Street, supported by
Councilman Richard Alatorre and TELACU. The Merchants Asso-
ciation sought limited development immediately around Olvera
Street; Alatorre, with plans drawn up by the city's Community Re-
development Agency, sought to revamp a much broader area, in-
cluding Union Station and the post office. The merchants basically
feared that a massive redevelopment, especially competing shops in
the huge revamped post office, would hurt their businesses. They
also feared higher taxes and rents would result. Alatorre saw his
proposal as a chance for more Latino employment downtown and
an increased Mexican cultural presence in the area. TELACU be-
came involved because it planned tobid for the post officeredevel-
opment, expecting eventually to operate the building as well. Since
Richard Alatorre represented the district including theplaza, TELA-
CU stood to gain from its long support of his political career.25
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Mayor Tom Bradley and Other Parties
The politics of the redevelopment were extremely sensitive be-
cause of the potential magnitude of the project. In addition to the
two Mexican-American factions, other parties became involved, in-
cluding Mayor Tom Bradley, thecity's Planning Commission, Coun-
cilman Zev Yaroslavzky, the Los Angeles Conservancy, and MCA In-
corporated. Because of the importance of the project to the city as
a whole, Mayor Bradley could not leave it entirely to the council-
man of the district. Bradley consequently sought to play the role of
mediator in the dispute. The Planning Commission would have to
make decisions on the project if it became a municipal redevelop-
ment. Councilman Yaroslavsky entered the picture because he fa-
vored slow growth and questioned any new development strongly.
The Conservancy's interest was architectural preservation. MCA,
the developer of Universal Studios and other major entertainment
complexes, expected to compete with TELACU for the new proj-
ect.26 Justhow El Pueblo de Los Angeles Historic Park and its envi-
rons changed would involve years ofpolitical haggling between these
and other contending parties.
By early 1989 Mayor Bradley had temporarily reconciled the Mexi-
can-American factions in time for his reelection campaign that year.
Since Mexican-Americans formed an important part ofhis political
coalition, he could not afford to have divisions in their ranks. To as-
suage the fears of the Merchants Association, the city agreed to al-
low them partial ownership of the property and to pay any tempo-
rary relocation costs incurred during any reconstruction. On the
other hand, this meant that the larger development envisioned by
Councilman Alatorre, TELACU, and their allies both old and new
remained a possibility. The merchants and their growing number of
supporters had nevertheless "formed an ad-hoc committee called
the Los Angeles Mexican Conservancy" to protect their interests as
the dispute flared again.27 Progress on the redevelopment slowed
when even more groups entered the fray.
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Conflicting Cultural Images
By mid- 1990 another serious issue entered the picture. As plans
for El Pueblo de Los Angeles went forward, interethnic strife over
conflicting historical images of the area developed. Y\%ile Olvera
Street had since the 1930s highlighted the Mexican heritage, city
planners with the Parks and Recreation Commission began to take
a multiethnic perspective on the area. For example, in a draft of
the guidelines for the project, the planners included a Chinese-
American museum at one end of Olvera Street and permitted
storefronts on parallel streets to "reflect a different historic charac-
ter." The merchants ofthe Mexican Conservancy complained that
this would necessarily deemphasize their culture in the area. While
other ethnic groups had in fact resided in the plaza area during the
nineteenth century, the merchants pointed out that the Mexican
heritage, a fusion of Indian and Spanish, predated the others.28
The members of the Los Angeles Mexican Conservancy were
also upset at suggestions in the guidelines that reinforced cultural
stereotypes Mexican Americans had battled for decades. The
guidelines suggested that the costumes and decorations reflect the
"Romance of California." Historians such as Antonio Rios-Busta-
mante, a member of the Mexican Conservancy, pointed out the
problems with that historical image. At the turn of the century, the
cult of romantic California, promoted first by Anglo-American
writers and then by local chambers of commerce, had emphasized
the "Spanish" past to the almost complete exclusion of things
"Mexican," even the ethnic label. Any redevelopment that revived
that "fantasy heritage" would deemphasize the role of Mexicans in
the city's history and again deny Mexican Americans their connec-
tion to that past. To avoid such distortions, the Mexican Conser-
vancy arguedfor the importance of including Chicano historians in
the planning of the project. 29 The issue was laden with meaning be-
cause it reflected the desire of Mexican Americans not only to
maintaincontrol of Olvera Street, but to control the telling of their
very history. Subliminally, perhaps the entire issue also reflected
their desire to regain control of Los Angeles itself.
Despite the lingering suspicions of many Latinos regarding TE-
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LACU, the CDC was the most qualified developer for the plaza
area. As the only major Mexican-American developer in the Los
Angeles area, TELACU's bid for renovation of the plaza certainly
had more merit than MCA's. Although MCA could marshal greater
resources than TELACU, the former could not address the cultur-
ally and historically sensitive issues as well as the latter. With its
commitment to Mexican-American self-determination, TELACU
would not likely follow a misguided multicultural plan, such as that
proposed by the city's Parks and Recreation Commission. The plaza
renovation called for the holistic approach to development that TE-
LACU had undertaken since its founding. The CDC had long ago
learned that rebuilding communities involved more than applying
newpaint to old buildings; it meant sensitivity to the multifaceted
needs of the community. Despite this, neither TELACU nor any
other developer won permissionto undertake the sweepingrevitali-
zation envisioned for the plaza.30 Through 1993, except for refur-
bished Union Station, the plaza arearemained largely unchanged.
Growing Political Self-Determination
Though TELACU had avoided direct electoral politics since
1982, its contributions to Latino political empowerment had borne
fruit. As we have seen, the Eastside's congressional delegation that
year had jumped from one to three, and Mexican Americans had
succeeded in retaining their legislative seats despite a shuffling of
officeholders. Prior to that year, gains had usually been temporary,
with Mexican Americans having a difficult time succeeding one an-
other in office. In the decade after 1982, important gains accrued,
with the reapportionment based on the 1990 census leading to
more rapid advances.31 Though TELACU remained in the back-
ground, the progress of Mexican-American politicians generally
meantprogress for the CDC, as well as the rest of the community.
The ties between TELACU and Richard Alatorre were just one ex-
ample of the way these connections worked.
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Alatorre to the LA City Council
Mexican-American politicians did not sit on their laurels after
1982. State SenatorArt Torres and Assemblyman Richard Alatorre,
especially, made continual efforts to improveLatino representation
in the various elected bodies of the Los Angeles area. The LA City
Council became a major battlefield because Latinos remained com-
pletely unrepresented in that body despite comprising 28 percent
of the city's population in 1980. Not since 1962 when Ed Roybal
moved from the council to Congress, had Latinos held a seat. De-
spite great effort, Mexican-American activists had failed to wrest
the Fourteenth Council District on the Eastside from Anglo con-
trol.32
Anglo incumbent Art Snyder retained the seat representing the
Fourteenth District for reasons that held in other areas as well.
Most importantly, the legislature had drawn the district's lines in
such a way that middle-class voters in predominantly Anglo Eagle
Rock controlled the seat. Better educated and more attuned to the
political system, they voted in greater numbers than Mexican
Americans and overwhelmingly for Snyder. Moreover, enough of
those Mexican Americans who did vote supported Snyder, allowing
him to win reelection repeatedly. An adept politician, Snyder ca-
tered to the entire community, even taking Spanish lessons to
communicate better with his constituency. In fact his performance
on behalf of the district as a whole had been creditable. TELACU
had had amicable relations with the councilman for years; indeed,
David Lizarraga once commented that Snyder had probably never
voted against a city grant proposed for the CDC. Relations with
Snyder, however, became a liability as the councilman came under
the increasingscrutiny ofthe press.33
In 1981 as a result of revelations made in the LA Times, Snyder
and TELACU had come under investigationby the state's Fair Po-
litical Practices Commission over a real estate leasing arrangement.
Snyder had sublet theproperty in East LA where the CDC had es-
tablished an automobile leasing agency and a job training center.
The newspaper and the state voiced concern over conflict of inter-
est since Snyder was making money from an organization that re-
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ceived city funds. While the lease itself did not involve city funds
or even property within the city, the state commission fined the
councilman $14,000 for failing to disclose the rent paid by TELA-
CU. To make matters worse, Snyder came under increasing attack
because of personal problems with drinking and driving. At various
times Mexican-American activists had unsuccessfully sought his
removal by recalling him or, curiously, by securing him a judicial
appointment. In 1984 they launched another effort to recall him
from office, but to no avail. Nevertheless, the pressure continued as
his personal problems persisted, and in 1985 Snyder finally re-
signed, leaving the Fourteenth District open for Latino representa-
tion.34
Richard Alatorre's decisionto run in Snyder's old district in 1985
underscored the importance of the new opening on the city council.
Since his prominence in Los Angeles assured his election, Alatorre
decided to move from the assembly to the city council to gain
Mexican-American representation on the latter. His move to the
council also left his assembly seat to Richard Polanco, the TELACU
official who had lost to Gloria Molina in 1982. As we have seen,
this strategy had worked well in 1982 and would succeed again.
Alatorre's move was even more important because reapportion-
ment had become a bitter issue in the council. After constant
complaints by Latinos, the U.S. Department of Justice had charged
Los Angeles with violation of the Voting Rights Act. Consequently,
the city council decidedto redistrict, rather than undergo extensive
litigation and possibly a court-ordered plan. Since Alatorre had di-
rected reapportionment of the state legislature in the early eighties,
his election to the city council made him the most experienced
member in such matters. He was consequently placed in charge of
redistricting the city, which meant of course that he could encour-
age moreLatino representation.35
Indeed, Alatorre's move to the council generated more gains for
Mexican Americans. After an acrimonious redistricting process that
temporarily pitted Asian Americans against Latinos, Alatorre suc-
ceeded in creating one more safe Mexican-American seat on the
council. Ironically, Larry Gonzalez, Alatorre's candidate, lost the
race to none other than Gloria Molina, who had also decided to
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leave the assembly. Once again she had challenged the "machine"
to become the first Mexican-American woman on the council, as
she had been the first in the assembly. She amplified her victory by
leaving her assembly seat to another Latina. Lucille Roybal Allard,
daughter of Congressman Roybal, parlayed name recognition and
endorsements to win Molina's former seat in early 1987. Mexican
Americans had thus gained two seats in the council and lost none in
the legislature, a major gain inpolitical self-determination. 36
Since all the candidates were liberal Democrats, factionalism
rather than ideology played the major role in Mexican-Americari
politics. Gloria Molina and other populist candidates had success-
fully challenged what remained of the Torres-Alatorre establish-
ment, even as they benefitedfrom its machinations. Though TELA-
CU had connections in both camps, it had long since identified
with the establishment, a situation immediately apparent after Ala-
torre joined the council. Unfortunately for both the councilman
and the CDC, in early 1988 Alatorre was fined by the state's Fair
Political Practices Commission for attempting to steer a large con-
tract to TELACU. Since the councilman had only recently received
a $1,000 speaking fee from the CDC, the commission judged his
actions improper. 37 Even after the scandal of 1982, TELACU still
managed to overstep the boundaries of political propriety.
Molina to the CountyBoard of Supervisors
Shortly after reapportionment seated Mexican Americans on
the Los Angeles City Council, the county's board of supervisors
came under fire. In 1988 plans for redistricting of the five-member
board were criticized because they perpetuated control by Anglo
males and a conservative majority of three. The Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the American Civil Liberties
Union, and the U.S. Department of Justice sued the county for
gerrymandering district lines and intentionally denying Latino rep-
resentation. The county decided to fight the suit and eventually
pushed it to the U.S. Supreme Court. The bitter redistricting bat-
tle took some curious ethnic turns. For example, longtime conser-
vative Supervisor Pete Schabarum, claiming Mexican ancestry, ar-
gued he had become the object of discrimination. Though he had
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scarcely mentioned his Mexican grandmother in his twenty years
on the board, he found his ancestry convenient when his San Gab-
riel Valley district faced dismemberment in response to Latino
complaints. Schabarum finally decided not to seek reelection when
it became evident that his district would end up with a Mexican-
American majority.38
By mid- 1990 the courts had ordered the board of supervisors to
draw a Latino district and schedule an election. The issue became
more complicated when the county insisted on an election under its
own plan before final approval by the courts. In the race for super-
visor of the San Gabriel Valley, Sarah Flores, a former Schabarum
aide, won a plurality of the votes for his old seat, but failed to gain
the majority needed to claim the nonpartisan office. Though for-
merly a TELACU employee, Flores did not gain the CDCs support
since she had conservative views and had registered as a Republi-
can. Flores's candidacy nevertheless demonstrated once again that
TELACU provided leadership training for the community. The
courts shortly declared the mid-1990 election invalid and ordered a
new one under newdistrict lines for January 1991.39
Since a Los Angeles county supervisor is one of the most power-
ful officials in California, the January 1991 election attracted some
of the most prominent Mexican-American politicians. Indeed, in
early November 1990, in hopes of avoiding factionalism, a private
Latino political summit convened in a Pasadena hotel, a meeting
reminiscent ofthe conclave at Steven's Steak House in 1982. This
time, however, TELACU officials stayed away, indicating that the
CDC had distanced itself from politics. Just the same, many of
those in attendance had long ties with the organization. Among
those attending and expressing interest in the office were Con-
gressmenEsteban Torres and Ed Roybal, and city council members
Richard Alatorre and Gloria Molina, as well as state Senator Art
Torres. The meeting sought to assure the election ofa Latino liberal
to the board. Since Democrats had called the meeting, Sarah Flores
did not receive an invitation. Noting the obvious, she assessed the
situation, "I think they see me as the enemy. . . ."40
Despite the attempt at unity, the Democrats could not reach
consensus on a Latino favorite. In some ways this signified political
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maturity since Democratic Mexican-American candidates felt indi-
vidually strong enough to defeat any Anglo or Republican challenger
in the new district. In the January 1991 election Sarah Flores lost
convincingly in a field that included Gloria Molina, Art Torres, and
state Senator Charles Calderon. Molina and Torres, the first- and
second-place finishers, advanced to the runoff in February. That
battle once again pitted the populists and Molina against the es-
tablishment and Torres. Though TELACU could take no official
position, clearly its interests lay with Torres since Molina was criti-
cal of developers in general.41 As for the community, the Latinos of
the Greater Eastside had a choice between two of their most ex-
perienced and respected officeholders.
Gloria Molina once again made history by winning the election
and becoming the first Mexican-American LA County supervisor in
115 years, not to mention the first woman ever. She did it by split-
ting the middle-class San Gabriel Valley with Torres, and taking a
majority in the inner, lower-income Eastside. Her victory suggested
that the "machine" politics of Torres, Alatorre, and TELACU had
lost favor, especially in the barrios around East LA. Molina was an
iconoclast, critical of any interest—Anglo or Latino—that did not
serve ordinary people. Some of her first acts as supervisorreflected
this attitude. She requested removal of security barriers to the su-
pervisors' meeting chambers; she saw the devices as walls between
the government and the people. She also refused the services of a
chauffeur and an elegant county car. While this seemed like postur-
ing to her critics, such symbolic acts could only improve her public
image. 42 Had TELACU been more careful about such imagery, it
might have had greater community support before, during, and af-
ter the 1982 scandal.
Molina's election in 1991 proved the greatestpolitical victory for
Mexican Americans in the Los Angeles area after 1982; they had
undeniably moved toward political self-determination. Even the
conviction of state Senator Joseph Montoya for bribery in early
1990 did no permanent damage to the community. It replaced him
with Charles Calderon, whose assembly seat in turn went to new-
comer Javier Becerra. Molina's old city council seat also went to
another Mexican American, Mike Hernandez.43 MexicanAmericans
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were again making gains and keeping the ground made in the past.
Moreover, the larger number of officeholders also meant that any
talk of a political machine was obsolete. Clearly, the old Torres-
Alatorre-TELACU establishment of 1982 no longer controlled
Mexican-American politics, if it ever had. While the "establish-
ment" remained influential, it hardly deserved even that label any
longer.
Congressman JavierBecerra
The elections of 1992 confirmed that observation. While pun-
dits talked of a new Molina machine challenging the old Torres-
Alatorre-TELACU machine for supremacy, the factions aligned
themselves loosely and lacked consistent electoral power. For ex-
ample, in the 1 992 primary longtime TELACU allies Art Torres and
Richard Alatorre backed Leticia Quezada in the race to replace re-
tiring Ed Roybal in Congress. On the other hand, former TELACU
director Esteban Torres supported Gloria Molina's candidate, Ja-
vier Becerra. Though Becerra defeated Quezada, this hardly con-
firmed that a new Molina machine had ascended because overall
five of the seven candidates she supported lost. On the whole, nei-
ther Art Torres nor Gloria Molina displayed long coattails. 44 Be-
cause TELACU had connections in both camps, its influence dif-
fused; the CDC no longer exercised the power it had in 1982 and
earlier.
Congresswoman Lucille Roybal Allard
For Latinos as a whole, 1992 proved another strong year politi-
cally. The 1990 census had confirmed the growth of their popula-
tion, and the latest reapportionment allotted them more seats in
both Congress and the legislature. Although Roybal, the dean of
California's Mexican-Americanpoliticians, retired, he was replaced
by young Becerra, who had only two years earlier joined the as-
sembly. In his thirties, he promised to be a political force for years
to come. Even more exciting for the community's prospects was
Lucille Roybal Allard's move to Congress. As a result of the 1990
census, the Eastside's representation in Congress had climbed from
three to four. Roybal Allard captured the new congressional seat,
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assuring continuation of her father's legacy, not to mention becom-
ing California's first Latina in Congress. Becerra and Roybal Allard
joined veterans Marty Martinez and Esteban Torres in that body. 45
In the state legislature the 1992 elections brought a fresh group
of Mexican-American leaders to the fore. In the assembly Latino
representationfrom the Greater Eastside doubledfrom three to six
members; moreover, women captured four of the six seats. With
the departure of Becerra and Roybal Allard for Congress, incum-
bent Richard Polanco welcomed Louis Caldera, Diane Martinez
(daughter of Congressman Marty Martinez) , Martha Escutia, Hilda
Solis, and Grace Napolitano to the assembly. 46 This crop of new
Democratic leaders, many having held local municipal office, was the
harvestofthe early political efforts ofactivist Chicanogroups, includ-
ing TELACU. These new officeholders helped fulfill the hopes for
Mexican-American self-determination on the Eastside.
The Continuing Political Struggle
Despite the impressive gains over the previous twenty years,
Latinos remained significantly underrepresented. For example, al-
though they comprised 28 percent of the state's population, in late
1992 they held only 8 of 80 assembly seats, 3 of 40 senate seats,
and no statewide offices. In their Los Angeles "stronghold," the
situation remained paradoxically weak; 2 of 15 council members
were Mexican Americans though Latinos comprised 40 percent of
the city's population. Representation on the LA school board and
the community college board remained similarly weak. The situa-
tion was little better in the dozens of suburban municipalities,
school districts, and college districts, many with Latino majorities,
especially in the southeastern portion of LA County.47 Though
these governing bodies had served as training grounds for some
Mexican-American legislators, Latinos still lacked full representa-
tion in virtually all these governments. Although Mexican Ameri-
cans had progressed, they had a long way to go before recovering
their historicregional position in terms of political power.
Yet even in the working-class suburbs, dramatic change was dis-
cernible. In late 1991 in Bell Gardens, a low-income suburb just
south ofCommerce, location of the TELACU Center, a portentous
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electoral revolt occurred. Over the previoustwo decades, Bell Gar-
dens's population had shifted from an Anglo majority to a 90-
--percent Latino, largely Mexican and Mexican-American, majority.
The city council had nevertheless remained overwhelmingly Anglo.
Unfortunately, the city council, operating in its own interest, had
undertaken commercial redevelopment that demolished hundreds
of residences and planned to condemn more. Outraged by the de-
struction of homes, especially those of low-income residents, News
for America, a new, largely middle-class group led by small land-
lords, organized a recall election. After registering hundreds of new
voters, the group succeeded in recalling four of the five council
members, leaving only a Latina unchallenged. This election empha-
sized what TELACU and Nueva Maravilla had long ago demon-
strated—that development must not proceed without the consent
and participation of the community. Although the new council re-
mained middle class, its new Mexican-American majority promised
to be morereceptive to the concerns of working-class Latinos. Sig-
nificantly, News for America planned similar insurgencies in sur-
rounding communities. 48 Obviously, in terms of politics, new
groups had moved to the fore, but TELACU continued to lead in
economic development.
Changing Latino Los Angeles
While Mexican Americans had made major political gains since
TELACU's founding in 1968, their economic situation was less
clear. In some ways the situation seemed worse than a quarter cen-
tury earlier because the population of Los Angeles County had
changed so dramatically. The 1990 census revealed that Hispanics,
as the increasing use of this term indicated, had become much
more diverse. In 1970 the community had been overwhelmingly
Mexican in ancestry, with some Cuban, Puerto Rican, and "other"
Spanish-speaking residents. But as early as 1980 a sizable Central
American population, especially Salvadoran, had made its presence
known, and by 1990 other groups such as Guatemalans had also es-
tablished communities in the county. In other words distinct Latino
communities had developed in the metropolitan area, with the
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Mexican-American remaining the largest and still growing due to
the continual infusion of "immigrants" from Mexico.49
The new Latino communities, including many Mexican new-
comers, had established themselves in downtown Los Angeles,
southwest of the plaza, and in "black" South-Central Los Angeles.
The new communitieswere therefore separate from the Eastside,
though they met appropriately enough at the plaza. Mexican
Americans, on the other hand, had dispersedto many other parts of
Los Angeles County. While they remained concentrated on the
Eastside and its San Gabriel Valley suburbs, only on the wealthy
Westside did they not live in significant numbers. Mexican Ameri-
cans, as a result of precedence, became the leading Latino group in
the community, providing virtually all the political leadership, a
situation that other Latinos might not always appreciate.50 More-
over, economic competition between the Latino communities
seemed to be growing.
The Continuing Economic Struggle
The economic impact of the Latino immigrants was controver-
sial. Some observers blamed the new immigrants, Central American
and Mexican, for retarding the social mobility of the earlier Mexi-
can-American population. Movement to the United States, they ar-
gued, tended to act as a leveler since even educated and skilled
immigrants often had to start at the bottom given their language
and certification problems, thus increasing competition for jobs.
Other observers argued that Mexican Americans had progressed,
but that gross statistics on "Hispanics" often hid the progress. For
example, the small homeowners of unincorporated East LA were in
an enviable position compared with the immigrant renters of
South-Central Los Angeles. Moreover, the extensive movement of
Mexican Americans out of the Eastside to scattered suburbs sug-
gested social mobility. However, statistics indicated that even U.S.-
born Latinos, overwhelmingly Mexican American in Los Angeles,
had done poorly in the economy of the eighties. According to a
UCLA study, wage discrimination had actually worsened. Mexican-
American men in 1986-87 earned only 78 percent of the wages
made by Anglo menwith the same training and experience; in 1969
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the figure had been 90 percent. As a result, homeownership by
U.S.-born Latino males had also declined, not a good signfor Mexi-
can-American recovery.51
More serious in the late eighties than the seeming problem of im-
migration was thechanging economy. Many unionized jobs—at B. F.
Goodrich, Uniroyal, and similar plants—had disappeared, breaking
several rungs in the ladder to the middle class. Even though metro-
politan Los Angeles acquired new jobs in high-tech industries and
light manufacturing, the former often required advanced training
and the latter lacked the high pay and especially the benefits neces-
sary for full membership in the middle class. Again, older suburb
Bell Gardens exemplified the pattern. When nearby unionizedplants,
such as General Motors's in South Gate, closed, they were re-
placed by low-paying light industry, which led to the exodus of
middle-class Anglos. Thereal median income of families in the area
fell by half between 1970 and 1990, as immigrants from Mexico
and Mexican Americans from the Eastside moved into the area,
drawn by the new, but low-paying industries. They found employ-
ment, but no longer an unbroken ladder to the middle class. The
paradox of the Greater Eastside was that it had developed new in-
dustries and new employment, as TELACU had hoped, but the
benefits remained uneven.52
The 1992 Riots
In the early nineties the situation only worsened as recession
gripped California with a consequent rise in racial tensions. In early
1992 rioting broke out in South-Central Los Angeles, spreading to
many other parts of the county. Clearly, the socioeconomic prob-
lems that had led to the establishment of the Watts Labor Com-
munity Action Committee and the East Los Angeles Community
Union had persisted. Although the unrest compared in many ways
with the Watts riot of 1965, the situation differed in that Latinos as
well as African Americans became involved, reflecting the changing
demographics of South-Central. According to early estimates, fifty
percent of those arrested, a third of thosekilled, and at least a third
of those who lost businesses were Latino. Interestingly, only a few
isolated incidents occurred on the Eastside, despite the fact that
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the issue was police brutality, long a complaint in the area. Analysts
suggested that East LA's longtime residents had a greater stake in
their neighborhoods than the recent immigrants of South-Central.
Possibly, East LA residents, even disgruntled youth, recognized that
Whittier Boulevard, Maravilla, and the entire community had ex-
perienced improvements since its own riots in 1970. On the other
hand, shortly after the beginning of the violence in South-Central, a
small contingent of the National Guard had moved in to enforce
the peace in East LA. 53 As in 1970, the riots and the occupation
suggested that internal colonialism continued in both South-Central
and the Eastside.
A Vision ofReconstruction and Integration
In any case, the East Los Angeles Community Union could claim
some credit for the stability. The CDC had long ago seen that eco-
nomic development was one long-term solution to ethnic unrest on
the Eastside, even if that development would not soonreplace the
high-paying jobs of the past. Like city redevelopment agencies
throughout the Greater Eastside, TELACU had helped counteract
plant closings and commercial decline, but its efforts had been
ethnic and political as well—holistic in a way government redevel-
opment agencies could not be. 54 Like business corporations, TELA-
CU had started subsidiaries, constructed buildings, and created
jobs,but its ventures were community-owned, cooperativein a way
private businesses could not be. TELACU thus remained a major
institution offering the Mexican-American community a route to-
ward socioeconomic recovery and integration into the larger soci-
ety. Despite TELACU's controversial image, community develop-
ment corporations in general offered a distinct vision of social re-
construction and national integration.
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CONCLUSION
TELACU's Larger Significance
Landmark to Recovery of the
Chicano Homeland
In the twenty-five years following the founding of the East Los
Angeles Community Union in 1968, unincorporated East LA and
the entire Eastside saw physical improvements which TELACU
could justifiably claim as products of its efforts, in whole or in part.
As we have seen, the Nueva Maravilla project replaced notorious
slums with new housing that remained a model of redevelopment
two decades after construction. This project stimulated redevelop-
ment of the surrounding area, as the Maravilla Neighborhood De-
velopment Project and the Belvedere Park expansion reclaimed key
sections of East LA from blight. Whittier Boulevard and Brooklyn
Avenue, the community's major commercial strips, also underwent
complete face-lifts; indeed, in 1993 the latter was renamed in hon-
or of the recently deceased Cesar Chavez. While TELACU mainly
affected the landscape of East LA proper, the greater part of its
original "special impact area," therest ofthe Eastside also benefited
from the physical changes promoted by the community develop-
ment corporation. The North Broadway revitalization in Lincoln
Heights, the TELACU Center in Commerce, and the new industrial
park in South Gate were only a few of the more obvious physical
improvements stimulated by the CDC in Greater East Los Ange-
les. 1 Through such projects, the East Los Angeles Community Un-
ion earned its own place as a landmark in the local community.
The changes promoted by TELACU in the major public land-
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scapes of East LA inspired greaterpride in the image and heritage
of the community. Moreover, this urban renewal occurred without
major dislocation of the area's residents or shopkeepers; in fact,
they had constant input regarding the changes taking place in their
neighborhoods.2 The redevelopment projects had thus evinced not
only the ethnic pride, but the self-determination of the Mexican-
American community. Furthermore, TELACU demonstrated how
the very space of the Eastside could be recovered politically, cul-
turally, and especially economically. Ironically, using the technical
expertise of capitalism, the community could recover its land col-
lectively. Housing rehabilitation, urban planning, real estate devel-
opment, architecture—Mexican Americans needed to master these
and many other fields to regain the land and the wealth arising from
it. Ideally, applying this knowledge as a community offered the
greatest benefits for the community. Through the technical knowl-
edge of cooperative institutions such as TELACU, the Mexican-
American community could recover its historic place in Los Angeles
and a better place in the nation. Finally, beyond the Eastside, such
ethnic, self-help, cooperative, and integrative institutions offered a
distinct vision of social reconstruction to those looking to transcend
a defunct collectivism and an unsatisfactory capitalism.
An Imagist Evaluation of TELACU
Of course, TELACU had by no means solved all the problems of
East LA or the Eastside. Unemployment, crowded housing, low
educational attainment, residential blight, and the other ailments of
impoverished neighborhoods persisted in many barrios and in some
ways became worse. For example, in East LA unemployment stood
at 7.2 percent in 1970, but at 11.5 percent in 1990; meanwhile, the
proportion of the population below the poverty line stood at 19.4
percent in the former year and at 24.2 in the latter. These figures
suggested that TELACU and many other institutions were losing
the battle against joblessness and poverty. On the other hand, the
U.S.-born in East LA had droppedby over 10,000 people, from 72
to 51 percent of the population. As these Mexican Americans
moved out, they were replaced by about 30,000 mostly Mexican
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immigrants.3 The constant movement out of East LA into the sub-
urbs hid a certain amount of upward mobility due at least partially
to the efforts of institutions such as TELACU.
While CDCs could not solve all the social problems of the East-
side, TELACU's success argued for more of its sort of community
economic development. As a business by 1993, TELACU with $300
million in assets had become the second largest minority firm oper-
ating in the Los Angeles area. Nationally, it had climbed to twenty-
first in revenue among the five hundred Latino firms listed in His-
panic Business. Such growth meant TELACU by that year em-
ployed 1,500 people; although this number paled in comparison
with East LA's unemployed (5,900 in 1990), these figures argued
for further development.4 Moreover, as we have seen, TELACU
had stimulated jobs beyond its own subsidiaries and social service
agencies through leveraging and by encouragingother companies to
move into the area.
Although TELACU had helped stimulate employment on the
Eastside, the CDCs forte in the nineties remained real estate de-
velopment. Despite constant criticism of TELACU's role as a de-
veloper, its revitalization of public spaces and rehabilitation of
housing had helped maintain property values, including those of
small homeowners. In 1990 nearly 40 percent of East LA resi-
dences were occupied by their owners, the most stable component
of East LA's population. From 1970 to 1990 homeowners who had
remained in the unincorporated area had seen the value of their
residences rise by at least seven times, well beyond the rate of in-
flation. While this increase reflected the general rise in the value of
southern California real estate, the efforts of TELACU had cer-
tainly helped East LA keep up. With the substantial decline in real
estate values during the recession of the early nineties, TELACU's
redevelopment efforts were even more important in keeping the
area attractive toresidents and buyers.5
Beyond such general statistics, TELACU's full impact was diffi-
cult to measure because of the complexity inherent in the CDCs
holistic approach. For example, it was difficult to quantify the ef-
fects of TELACU's often leveraged activities, leveraged in terms
not only of financing but of influence. As we have seen, though the
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community union played a critical role in gaining direct participa-
tion of the barrio in the redevelopment of Maravilla, the funding
came entirely from government. In the case of the Whittier Boule-
vard revitalization, the merchants' local development corporation
carried out the project, but the plans and the very organization
originated with TELACU. Financially, TELACU had only retained
25-percent ownership of the industrial park in South Gate, but the
CDC had instigated the redevelopment of the General Motors site.
Ofcourse, the importance ofTELACU's promotion ofarchitecture,
painting, entertainment, and other cultural activities defied meas-
urement, as did the institution's symbolism. Unfortunately, the
difficulties in assessment contributed to the CDCs poor public im-
age, a situation necessitating morehumanistic evaluation.
When compared with other Mexican-American organizations,
TELACUfared well in some respects, but not in others. Despite its
training programs, housing projects, and other social services, TE-
LACU did not empowerthe poor so thoroughly as did the United
Neighborhoods Organization, the grass-roots group that forced in-
surance companies to cease redlining the Eastside in the 19705. Nor
did TELACU have the judicial and legislative impact of a group
such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
whose lawsuits in defense of Latinos led to the reapportionment of
several governing bodies. 7 But compared with other organizations,
the CDC could claim to be foremost in economic development.
While private Latino companies of various sorts engaged in busi-
ness, none engaged in the broad economic development necessary
for the improvement of entire communities. While Latino busi-
nesses trained entrepreneurs and managers with the expertise
needed in the private sector, TELACU sought to train leaders with
the same skills, but with a knowledge of government and a com-
munity orientation. These leaders required a holistic perspective,
not narrowly confined to one business or one government agency
for that matter. Though the scandal of 1982 indicated that TELA-
CU had strayed from its original cooperative orientation, the eco-
nomic services performed by the CDC, especially in real estate,
could not be matched by any other Latino organization.
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Neocolonialism on the Eastside?
Despite this commendable service, the scandal of 1982 indicated
that TELACU neededreform. After the scandal TELACU dropped
its more controversial political activities,but it never undertook the
major structural changes necessary to bring the CDC closer to the
community. As we have seen, activists had originally conceived of
community unions as mass membership organizations on the model
of labor unions. By the time of TELACU's founding, this ideal had
been abandoned, and the organizing committee became the entire
institution for the sake of efficiency. Organizing mass participation
seemed impractical for an institution that planned to carry out
highly technical activities. When TELACU became a federally
funded community development corporation, membership on its
board opened to include representatives of other community
groups, but this remained short of mass participation. 8 As TELACU
moved away from the labor union model to a business model, wider
participationseemed less likely to develop.
Some of the precursors of TELACU in community development,
such as Progress Enterprises in Philadelphia, had drawn wider par-
ticipation by asking local people to invest in the corporation. Al-
though such investment clearly embodied the principles of free en-
terprise, TELACU never followed this approach. Although the
community legally owned the holding company that formed TELA-
CU's core, there were no individual stockholders; the community
as owner was an abstraction. The stockholders could not meet be-
cause they did not exist as individual people. This meant of course
that they could not vote, nor could they collect dividends. The
board of directors, comprised of representatives of union locals and
local organizations, represented the community. The board, how-
ever, was weak because many of the members lacked expertise in
business since they necessarilyreflected the working-class people of
the community. This naturally meant that management had an ex-
cessive amount of power, especially the president and chief execu-
tive officer. 9
In most business corporations, the chief executive officer and
management hold the power. The stockholders and the board, less
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
258 Conclusion
aware of the operating details of the enterprise, generally accept
management's decisions. If and when the company begins to lose
money, the board and stockholders step in to assure accountability.
While they play an essentially negativerole, it provides a modicum
of democracy. In the case of TELACU, the lack ofstockholders and
dividends eliminated even this democratic element. Given often
unsophisticated directors with no individual shares in the enter-
prise, accountability was minimal. David Lizarraga, TELACU's pres-
ident for nearly twenty years by 1993, could almost run the opera-
tion as if it belonged to him and his executives alone. 10 This struc-
ture did not change after the 1982 scandal. Indeed, since the scan-
dal initially left the CDC with fewer government contracts, even
the oversight of various governmentagencies declined as the CDC
became by design increasingly independent. TELACU's minimally
democratic structure fueled much of the suspicion directed at the
organization. Had a wide assortment of people in the community
received even small annual dividends, the public would more likely
have had interestand trust in the CDC.
Another matter causing TELACU's negative public image was
the compensation of management. In an area suffering from un-
employment and low wages, the high salaries commanded by TE-
LACU executives hardly endeared them to the people of East LA.
Given that dividends were not distributed in the community, the
personal investmentportfolios put together by TELACU managers
as a result of the CDCs ventures seemed self-serving to say the
least. In its defense, TELACU competed in a market with govern-
ment agencies and businesses for highly qualified architects, urban
planners, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and other technocrats. To hire
and retain such talented professionals, TELACU had to compensate
them well. Given the capitalist system in which the CDC operated,
it could not hope to retain high-quality personnel by relying solely
on the latter's dedication to the community. 11 Such an expectation
might be appropriate for a charity, but not for an institution com-
peting in the business world.
Most likely, the issue of compensation would have caused less
trouble had TELACU engaged in less conspicuous consumption.
The public display of fancy cars and expensivesuits reported by the
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Los Angeles Times had most tarnished TELACU's image in 1982.
The financial questions were complex and difficult to understand,
but the public could see extravagance in the midst of poverty.
While it could be argued that the corporate world required an im-
age of power and wealth, this remained a dubious claim. Business-
like simplicity in dress and transportation exemplified efficiency
and would more likely earn the respect of the community, where
TELACU also neededto function. The elaborate exteriors of TELA-
CU's buildings could be appreciated by the entire community since
they symbolized the power and resources ofEast LA, but plush of-
fices smacked too much of personal luxury. 12 A more ascetic life-
style would have done wonders for TELACU's public image.
Indeed, the ostentation of some TELACU managers brought to
mind the elites of many Third World nations. Having politically lib-
erated their nations from colonialism, these elites too often ac-
quired the lifestyles of the former colonial masters, leaving the
masses in the same poverty and powerlessness they had previously
experienced. Though this neocolonial situation resulted from the
continuing economic control exercised by the metropolis, the na-
tive elites suffered little; in fact, they benefited from their higher
status in the newly independent nations. Since East LA had not be-
come an incorporated city, the analogy with an independent nation
is weak; nevertheless, as the community won greaterpolitical rep-
resentation, TELACU executives had become the area's elite. 13 The
Mexican-American Eastside needed TELACU's economic expertise
to escape colonialism, but only if the subsequent state was an im-
provement for the whole community and not simply a small group
at the top.
Symbol ofEthnic Recovery and Global Integration
TELACU had long ago learned that escaping colonialism and re-
covering self-determination for the Eastside were not sufficient for
full prosperity. Only integration into the national and world
economies would allow for the local area and Mexican Americans
to fulfill their potential. Economically, TELACU had learned that
confining its activities to East LA would suffocate its efforts. Its
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10. The Portals. A mixed-use business complex under construction, with
the Jefferson Memorial in the foreground and the Capitol in the
background, Washington, D.C. Photograph by author, 1997.
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original special impact area, only a bit larger than unincorporated
East LA, had been too constricting. In the late seventies TELACU
had convinced the federal government to allow it to operate
throughout California and eventually wherever it could invest prof-
itably. While early ventures of this sort through TELACU Invest-
ment Company had failed miserably, the CDC persisted. 14 TELA-
CU invested in other minority firms both regionally and nationally,
bringing back profits from investment opportunities unavailable at
home. In so doing, the CDC also assisted disadvantaged minorities
in other parts of the country. For TELACU had also recognized
early that social and cultural interaction on an equal footing in the
larger society was preferible to a provincial separatism.
In the decade following the 1982 scandal, two projects evinced
TELACU's renewed drive toward self-determined economic inte-
gration—one in San Antonio, Texas, and the other in Washington,
D.C. The San Antonio project grew directly out of the defunct
Hispanic American Coalition for Economic Revitalization. As we
have seen, the coalition had sought to unite Mexican-American
community development corporations to train other Latino com-
munity-based groups in economic development. When HACER's
funding disappeared, TELACU continued bilateral contacts with
the other CDCs. Of these contacts, the relationship with MAUC,
the Mexican American Unity Council, bore fruit. In the mid-eigh-
ties the two Mexican-American CDCs undertook development of a
90-acre industrial park on a prime site intersected by a freeway in
Southeast San Antonio. On completion in 1994, the project was
expected to cost $66.5 million and offer employment to several
thousand Tejanos. 15 Certainly, East LA was in no greaterneed than
Southeast San Antonio. If TELACU could most profitably invest in
Texas, its efforts were worthwhile. Indeed, by spreading its exper-
tise, TELACU paradoxically exemplified an integrativespirit by en-
couraging Mexican Americans throughout the Southwest to join
more closely in their drive for self-determination of the Chicano
homeland.
Symbolically, the most noteworthy ofall TELACU's "integrated"
investments was in the Portals, a mixed-use project, at the gateway
to the U.S. capital from National Airport. Beginning in 1980, TE-
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LACU had joined Washington, D.C.'s Anacostia Economic Devel-
opement Corporation and the Harlem Commonwealth Council in a
three-way partnership called the Eastcoast Development Corpora-
tion. This partnership hoped to pool its resources to invest in proj-
ects on the scale of the largest private developers. After looking
over several opportunities, Eastcoast decided to join a larger con-
sortium in the competition for the right to redevelop one of the
most blighted sites in southwestern Washington. The Western De-
velopment Corporation, a major Anglo-American developer, led the
consortium, with several wealthy African-American individuals as
the other associates. Though holding less than an 8-percent share,
TELACU onceagain demonstrated the advantages of leverage in the
struggle for economic power. Since the site remained one of the
most desirable locations for redevelopment in the nation, competi-
tion intensified, but the consortium finally won after five years of
bureaucratic delays. The $600 million development would include
office buildings, shops, restaurants, a first-class hotel, recreation
and health facilities, and a community center. The project was also
expected to employ 9,500 people. Located near the Jefferson Me-
morial, in a direct line to the Capitol, the new development would
be in a modernized Greco-Roman style, befitting its surroundings. 16
No landmark could better symbolize the integrative spirit that
TELACU had long advocated. People of various economic and eth-
nic backgrounds were showing that they could work together in a
holistic approach to change the nation's very capital. Despite its
radical beginnings, TELACU had long practiced such accommoda-
tion with the system, and despite the 1982 scandal, its approach
had succeeded. TELACU and other CDCs offered the nation a suc-
cessfully tested model of cooperative economic development, a
model that Robert Kennedy, Walter Reuther, Martin Luther King,
and Cesar Chavez had advocated twenty-five years earlier. 17 While
this model could not end poverty and its attendant problems, it of-
fered a vision of self-sufficient communities equitably integrated
into larger regional and national bodies for mutual improvement.
In the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots of 1992, the United
States briefly rediscovered the CDC and related institutions. In
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that election year, the candidates discussed urban problems to an
extent not heard in well over a decade. Once again solutions were
sought, but in the conservative political climate of that period, the
broad federal programs necessary to end poverty, unemployment,
poor health care, and similar national problems continued in ill re-
pute. On the other hand, the purely private sector approaches pro-
moted by Republican administrations in the previous decade had
only allowed the seemingly intractable problems of the inner cities
to worsen. As President Bill Clinton took office in 1993, the cli-
mate seemed better for renewed cooperation between the private
and public sectors, for a reconsideration of institutions, such as
employee-owned companies, credit unions, and community devel-
opment corporations. As nonprofit, cooperative institutions that
operated between government and business, CDCs like the East
Los Angeles Community Union offered an alternative in a world
where many had rejected the extremes of collectivism, but still
suspected capitalism. While credit unions and CDCs could not
solve the nation's deepest socioeconomic problems, the jointexpe-
rience and practical results would help prepare society for the
larger cooperative efforts necessary for the progress of the national
and global communities. 18
Despite its failures, the East Los Angeles Community Union
remained a powerful symbol in the historical development of
Mexican Americans. Chicanos—longtime residents of the South-
west, an indigenous people—had lost their homeland in the most
recent cycle of conquest, but they were recovering. Gradually, they
were building or taking over the institutions that controlled their
fortunes and moving toward a society integrated on an equitable
basis. Increasingly, the colonial analogy seemed incomplete. Indeed,
East LA, the Chicano Southwest, and Mexican Americans needed
to throw off colonialism, not for the sake of separation, but to inte-
grate into the larger world as autonomous entities. In the nineties
the model of defiant, independent, but impoverished Cuba no
longer sufficed. Neither independent isolation nor forced integra-
tion had proven viable. Cuba, the dismantled Soviet Union, as well
as the old European empires, had demonstrated the futility of
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those models. Instead, the European Union with its politically and
culturally autonomous states voluntarily integrated into an increas-
ingly cooperative whole showed greater promise. Without losing
their cultures and self-determination, minorities and all peoples
needed to integrate into such larger and freer political and econom-
ic systems, on an egalitarian basis. 19
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Witkin, Bfernard] Efrnest]. Summary of California Law: A Concise and
Critical Manual of theLaw of California. Vol. 3. 7th cd. San Francisco:
Bender-Moss, 1960.
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
Index
In this index an "f" after a number indicates a separatereference on the
next page. A continuous discussion overtwo or more pages is indicated by
a span ofpage numbers, e.g., "57-59."Passim is usedfor a cluster ofrefer-
ences in close but not consecutivesequence.
A&A Camacho firm, 99
AaronBrothers firm, 130
ACTIELA, see Ad Hoc Commit-
tee to IncorporateEast Los
Angeles
Ad Hoc Committee to Incorporate
East Los Angeles (ACTIELA),
95-105passim, 172f
AFL-CIO (Industrial Union De-
partment), 27-32passim
African Americans: CDCs designed
to help, 41; as influence on
Mexican Americans, 11,17-20,
31, 46, 55-58 passim, 146; and
separatism, 1, 11, 19.See also
Black Muslims; Civil rights
movement
Agencyfor International Develop-
ment (U.S.), 162-63, 209-10,
220
Aguilar, Cristobal, 169
AID, see Agency for International
Development
Air ManagementCompany, 230
Alatorre, Richard, 115, 141, 176,
185, 243; as California legislator,
170-7 1, 187-92 passim; and
TELACU projects, 227-28,
236-45passim




Allard, Lucille Roybal, 242, 246-47
Amalgamated Clothing Workers,
34f
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Antiwar movement, 1, 46, 7 1







tion (ARA), 20-25 passim
Arizona, see Chicanos por la Causa
ArizonaMothers Association, 90
Arrow Truck Body Company, 63





Atlantic Richfield Corporation, 164








Aztlan, 54, 71, 75, 102
B. F. Goodrich, see Goodrich tire
plant
Ballesteros, Juan, 50
Banco de San Jose, 114
Bank ofAmerica,211, 224





Barrios, 2, 16, 248-49, 254-55. See
also East Los Angeles





Bell Best Pies, 174
Bell Gardens, 247-48, 250
Belvedere Citizen, 110, 167
BelvederePark, 131, 167, 253
Berman, Howard, 174




Blackfeet Indian Writing Company,
120







Boyle Heights, 3, 48f, 53, 180f
Bradley, Tom, 60, 175, 187, 191,
199, 237; and Esteban Torres,





Brown, Jerry, 171, 175, 183, 187
Brown, Willie, 187-91 passim
Brown Berets, 1, 55-58, 67, 69-71





Calderon, Charles, 190, 192,245
California: HACER activitiesin,
160-61; history of, depicted in
mural, 6-7. See also East Los
Angeles; Los Angeles; Spanish
Speaking Unity Council; Agen-
cies and offices in





can Americans' lack ofrepresen-
tationon, 44, 169





California Fair Political Practices
Commission,
240, 242
California Highway Patrol, 72
California HispanicAmerican
Democrats (CHAD), 186
California Senate: Mexican Ameri-
cans in, 170-71, 189, 192,240,
245; Mexican Americans' lack of
representationin, 44, 169, 247
California Small Business Devel-
opment Board, 206-7
California State Universityat Long
Beach, 226









Carter, Jimmy: Latino appoint-
ments under, 138-43, 165,
183f, 191; Latino support for,
139, 175-77, 184-86, 196-200
passim; reelection failure of,
161-64passim, 168, 186
Casa de la Raza (Santa Barbara),
160f
Casa del Sol Alcoholic Halfway
House (San Antonio), 150
Casa Maravilla,85, 90, 105, 109,
177
Castillo, Martin, 84
Castro, Sal, 59, 67f
Castro, Tom, 176, 181
Castro, Tony, 76
Castro Nagata, Grace, 176
Catolicos por la Raza, 69-70
CCAP, see Citizens' Crusade
AgainstPoverty






Central Coast Counties Develop-
ment Corporation(Salinas), 160
CETA, see Comprehensive Em-
ploymentand TrainingAct
CHAD, see California Hispanic
American Democrats
Chavez, Cesar, 38, 43, 253; as Chi-
cano leader, 1, 11, 16, 30, 33,
46,58, 182, 188,221-22,262;
as UFW leader, 1,32-33,54
Chavez Ravine, 82
Chemical Bank, 174
Chicana Nurses Association, 182
Chicano MoratoriumCommittee,
71-72, 75
Chicanos: activism among, 1-2, 11,
46-76,94,97,135,159,247;
basis ofclaims to Southwest by,
6-7, 13, 47-54; importanceof
land to, 2-13 passim, 32, 45, 47,
51,54-55,71, 102,253-54,
263; as term, 58. See also Brown
Berets; Mexican Americans;
Southwest
Chicanos por la Causa (CPLC)
(Arizona CDC), 145, 152-56




Child care centers, 147, 150




Circle Associates (Boston), 41
Cisneros, Henry, 148
Citizens Committeeto Incorporate
East Los Angeles, 94. See also
Ad Hoc Committeeto Incorpo-
rate East Los Angeles
Citizens' Crusade AgainstPoverty
(CCAP), 27, 30-32, 60, 81
Civil rights movement, 1,17, 25,
32-33. Seealso Black Muslims;
Riots; VotingRightsAct
Cleland House, 63, 109; and TE-
LACU, 83, 90, 109,174,177
Cleveland (Ohio), 41
Clinton, Bill, 263
CMAS, see Congress ofMexican-
American Unity
Colonialism (internal): as analogy
for African Americans, 18-19,
55; as analogyfor Mexican
Americans, 10-11, 15, 44, 46-
-47, 56-61 passim, 71, 75-77,
165; East Los Angelesas exam-
ple of, 93-94, 105, 110-11,
137f, 224, 251; incompleteness
ofanalogy of, 263; in New
Mexico, 159; andpoverty in
U.S., 23, 42-43; TELACU's use
ofanalogy of, 78, 93, 95-99,
121, 135, 141-43, 162
Columbia Broadcasting System, 40
Columbus (Ohio), 41
Commerce (California), 3, 5, 93,
134. See also TELACU Center;
TELACU Industrial Park; TE-
LACU Manor Retirement Home
Commonwealth Bank, 119, 174




Community Bank of California,see





of, 39-44; ethnic emphasis of,
156; federal funding for, 40f,
83-85, 90-91; precursors of,
19-39, 91-92; purpose of, 91;
rediscovery of, 262-63; social
servicesprovidedby, 147-50,
152, 156, 158. See also Hispanic
American Coalition for Eco-
nomic Revitalization; National
Congress for Community Eco-
nomicDevelopment; Special
Impact Program; TELACU
Community Guidance Center (San
Antonio), 150
Community Planning and Devel-
opment Corporation(CPDC),
101,123-25, 132f, 138, 178.
See also Community Research
Group
Community Redevelopment
Agency (Los Angeles City),
236
Community Redevelopment
Agency (Los Angeles County),
117
Community ResearchGroup
(CRG), 125, 133, 138, 145,
148, 165, 191; closing of, 220,
230; Historical Preservation
Survey by, 164, 233. See also
Community Planning and De-
velopmentCorporation;His-







tion (U.S.): funding ofCDCs
by, 120, 123, 129, 146f, 153,
157, 197; in governmenthierar-
chy, 1 14, 217; and TELACU,
115, 119-23 passim, 129, 131,
135, 164; and TELACU investi-
gation, 209, 215. See also Office
of CommunityServices
CommunityThrift & Loan, 108,
112-14, 120-23, 134f, 203;
new buildingfor, 123, 132
Communityunion concept, 27-39,
92, 257. See also Community
Development Corporations
ComprehensiveEmploymentand
TrainingAct (CETA), 127; end
ofTELACU's involvement with,
220; and Los Angeles city and
county government, 205-7,
21 If, 216, 219; TELACU's use
of, 126, 177, 196-97, 199, 205-
-6
Congress of Mexican-American
Unity (CMAS), 55-59 passim,
66, 70; and East Los Angeles in-
corporation issue, 94f, 102; po-
litical influence of, 85, 170, 172;
and 1970sriots, 70-78passim
Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE), 44, 84
Connolly, Joseph, 21 1-12
Construction and Rehabilitation
Enterprises (New Mexico), 158
Conway, Jack, 20, 27-38 passim,
81
Coopers and Lybrand CPA, 174












CPDC, see Community Planning
and Development Corpora-
tion









Davis, Grace Montanez, 176, 181
Debs, Ernest E., 107
Delano (California), 30f
Democratic Party: and Mexican-
Americans, 138-43, 170-71,
176, 184-89, 242-47passim;
and TELACU, 173-87 passim,
196, 199, 21 7f
Denver CommunityDevelopment
Corporation, 145









East Central Citizens Organization
(Columbus), 41
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EastcoastDevelopmentCorpora- EconomicDevelopmentAdmini-
tion, 262 stration (EDA) (U.S.), 22,
Eastland Center (Commerce), 132, 81, 129, 134, 145, 147, 159-
-134 61
Eastland Leasing Company, 122-23 Economic Opportunity Act, 26,
East Long Beach Neighborhood
Center,
160
East Los Angeles, 3-6, 15-16, 114;
annexationissues in, 116, 118-
-19; attempts to incorporate, 78,
92-99,101-5, 108, 116,118,
135, 173; as internal colony, 44,
47-54; Mexican American dis-
franchisement in, 168-69;
"political machine" in, 171-93,
242, 245-46; redevelopment of,
116-18, 125, 253-54; as TE-
LACU's "special impact area,"
253. See also Barrios
East Los Angeles, Maravilla,and
BelvederePark Property Own-
ers Association, see Property
OwnersAssociation
East Los AngelesBank, see Bank of
East Los Angeles
East Los Angeles College,94-95,
118-19,226
East Los Angeles CommunityUn-
ion, see TELACU
East Los AngelesGazette, 61
East Los Angeles Labor Community
Action Committee
(ELALCAC), 10, 35, 37-39. See
also TELACU
East Los AngelesTribune, 210-1 1
EastmontParent-Teacher Associa-
tion, 70




75, 94, 98, 125
Echeveste, John, 183, 210
Economic and Social Opportunities
(San Jose), 160















El Hoyo project, 63
Elizondo, Jose ("Joe"), 117, 201
El Monte, 122
El Pueblo de la Reina de Los Ange-
les, seeLos Angeles
El Pueblo de Los Angeles Historic
Park, 235-39
El Sereno, 3, 50, 180f




Escarcega, Roy, 63, 117, 127, 143,
181
Escontrias, Luis, 190





Fanon, Frantz, 10, 95-96
FCC, see Federal Communications
Commission
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Federal Communications Commis-




Federation ofBarrios Unidos de
Maravilla, 85, 90
Ferraro, John, 115
Figueroa de Ballesteros, Maria, 51-
-52
Financial institutions: and CPLC,
155; and TELACU, 109-14,
119-22,127, 134f
First Southwest Capital, 123
Flores, JuanMaria, 50
Flores, Sarah, 243, 245
Food cooperatives, 126, 227
Food Stamp Outreach, 99, 122,
173. Seealso TELACU Cur-
rency Exchange
Ford, Gerald, 177
Ford Foundation funding: for Chi-
canos por la Causa, 153; for
Citizens' CrusadeAgainst Pov-
erty, 30; for Southwest Council
ofLa Raza, 152; for Southwest
VoterRegistrationEducation
Project, 175; for Spanish
Speaking Unity Council, 147;
for TELACU, 79-81, 129, 147
"A Framework for Greater Los An-
geles Industrial Development,"
133-34
Franciscan missionaries, 6, 49
Freire, Paulo, 10
Friends of David Lizarraga, 200
Gangs, see Juvenile delinquency
Garcia, Alex P., 1 73; Mexican-
Americanoppositionto, 188,
192; as state senator, 139, 170—
76 passim, 189; and TELACU
investigation, 206-7
Garcia, Carlos J., 61-63, 65-66,
80, 109, 142, 181, 197















GOEZ Studios, 127, 130
Goggin,Terry, 174
Gold, Jerome, 196
Goldrich & Kest firm, 99, 231
Gonzales, Rodolfo ("Corky"), 11,
55-58 passim
Gonzalez, JoeL, 203, 207, 21 5f,
220; as mural artist, 12, 221
Gonzalez, Larry, 241
Goodell, Charles E., 44
Goodrich tireplant, 127-30pas-
sim, 135, 182,250
Grand Central Market (Los Ange-
les), 5
Great Depression, 21
Greater Eastside Builders Associa-
tion, 66




Gutierrez, Jose Angel, 1 1
HACER, see HispanicAmerican









Harrington, Michael, 25, 27
Health needs surveys, 133
Hearst Foundation, 161
Hernandez, Albert A., 99
Hernandez, Mike, 245
Hernandez, Pilar, 86, 119
Highland Park, 3, 133.See also TE-
LACU Family Health Center

















Housing: and the Catholic Church,
69-70; CDCs' interest in, 91,
147-58passim; in East Los An-
geles, 16; studies of, 123f; TE-
LACU's influence on, 116-18,
123; TELACU's projects involv-
ing, 62-63, 65-66, 78, 81-89,
99, 107, 109, 229, 253-55. See
also Real estate
Hubbard Street project, 62-63, 80










Image: criticism of TELACU's, 12,
177-79, 198-221, 223, 233-34,
245, 257-59; Gloria Molina's,
245; of TELACU as pro-
business, 115; TELACU's em-
phasis on, 103, 130-31; TE-







101-5, 108,116, 118,135, 173










International Business Machines, 40
JasonD. Groode Enterprises, 174
Javits, Jacob, 39-41, 84
Jews, 175
John L. Espinosa Realty, 174
Johnson, Lyndon 8., 20, 25-26, 28,
84,217
JohnsonFoundation, 164
Juvenile delinquency (gangs) : in Los
Angeles, 35, 37, 85-86, 105,
109, 176-77; RFK's interest in,
24-25
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JuvenileDelinquency and Youth




Kennedy, Edward M., 84, 186
Kennedy, Ethel, 84
Kennedy, John F., 20-23, 25
Kennedy, Robert F. (RFK), 16,
175; assassination of, 1, 41-46
passim, 68, 83; on CDCs, 20,
23, 39, 41-42, 84, 262; and
CDCs' self-determination, 20-
-25 passim, 30, 40-43; and
CommunityAction Programs,
25; and juvenile delinquency,
24-26
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 1,17, 43,
46, 262; and Citizens' Crusade
Against Poverty, 27, 30
KMEX-TV, 73
KVEA-TV, 229
Labor movement: and CDCs, 59,
61; and community union con-
cept, 27-30, 34-35; and War on
Poverty, 26-27. See also Names
ofspecific labor unions






Land (and Chicanos' sense of
place), 2-13 passim, 32, 45, 47,
51,54-55,71, 102,253-54,
263. See also Landscape; Real
estate
Land banking system, 134
Land Law of 1851, 51f
Landscape: CDCs' interest in, 150-
55 passim; TELACU's emphasis




La Raza (underground newspaper),
58
La Raza Unida Party, 78, 102-5,
148, 170, 172
Liberals, 2, 10, 26-27, 30-31, 56
Lilly Endowment, 161
Lincoln Heights, 3, 49, 180-81;
revitalization projects in, 126f,
133,225,253
Lincoln High School, 57f, 68
Lincoln Park, 65
Lizarraga, David C, 6, 85, 140,
146, 165; business orientation
of, 108-11, 113f, 119,126, 135,
137, 21 1; oncolonialism, 141-
42, 162; and DemocraticParty
politics, 174f, 181-89passim,
240; on National Commission on
Neighborhoods, 143, 145, 184;
as TELACU CEO, 108-9, 134f,
257-58; as TELACU interim di-
rector, 101-8passim, 173; and
TELACU investigation, 197,
201-2, 204, 209f, 220-21. See




sion (LAFCO), 98, 118
Lopez, Jaime, 162-63
Lopez, Lydia, 234
Los Angeles, 3, 164, 169, 172;
gangs in, 35, 37, 85-86, 105,
109, 176-77; history of, 48-54;
Latino diversity in, 248-49;
Mexican Americans in, 1 , 3, 44,
53-54,168,172, 186,239,246;
parks and recreation department
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of, 236-39 passim; political
fragmentation of, 3. See also
East Los Angeles; Los Angeles
City Council; Los Angeles
County; Los Angeles Unified
School District; Specific areas
and agencies in
Los Angeles City Council: Mexican
American representation on, 44,
240-47passim; TELACU's
CETA contracts with, 205-7,
211-12, 216, 219; and TE-




Los Angeles Conservancy, 237
Los Angeles County, 3, 15, 93,
164-69 passim, 248-49. See also
Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors
Los Angeles County Board of Su-
pervisors, 124, 173; on incorpo-
ration ofEast Los Angeles, 93,
103-5; and Mexican American
representation, 44, 169, 242-43,
245; andredevelopmentof East
Los Angeles, 116-18, 125; and
TELACU investigation, 207,
211,216,224
Los Angeles County Commission
on Human Relations, 56
Los Angeles County Departmentof
Regional Planning, 134
Los Angeles County Housing
Authority, 86-87
Los Angeles County Parks and
RecreationProgram, 131,
228
Los Angeles County Regional Plan-
ning Commission, 124f
Los Angeles County Sheriff's De-
partment, 71-72, 94
Los Angeles Mexican Conservancy,
237-38
Los Angeles Planning Commission,
237
Los Angeles Police Department,
68-78passim, 251
Los AngelesTimes, 73, 75, 188-91
passim; on TamayoRestaurant,
233; on TELACU investigation,
193-223passim, 233-34, 240,
259; on TELACU Transit Sys-
tem, 227-28
Los Angeles Unified School Dis-
trict, 117; and Mexican Ameri-
can representation, 57, 169-72











McGovern, George, 175, 185
Machado, Francisco, 169




Majestic Realty, 123, 132
Malcolm X, 1, 10, 17-18
Malintzin, 6
Manatt, Charles, 174




Maravilla Project Area Committee,
117
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Maravilla Service Center, 90








Massachusetts Bay Company, 17,
91-92
MAUC, see Mexican American
Unity Council
Maywood, 3
MCA Incorporated, 237, 239
Meinig, D. W., 8
Memmi,Albert, 10, 95-96
Mendoza, Xavier, 123
















Mexican Americans: basis of claims
to Southwestby, 6-7, 13, 47-
-54; Carter's appointments of,
138-43, 165,183f, 191; educa-
tional concerns of, 56, 57-59,
67-68; history of, in Los Ange-
les, 47-54; immigrant experi-
enceof, 10, 48; lack ofpolitical
representationof, 44, 168-69,
240, 244; Los Angelesland-
marks of, 5-8, 136; network of
CDCs for, 143-61; numbers of,
in Los Angeles, 53-54, 168, 172,
186, 239, 246; in politics, 169-
-93; and United Farm Workers,
31-33. See also Chicanos




Mexican War, 7, 11,50,75
Mexico, 6-7, 50, 159, 165; immi-
grantsfrom, in Los Angeles, 15,
49, 52f, 249, 254-55
Michigan Peninsula Airways, 201
Million Dollar Theater (Los Ange-
les), 5
Minorityenterprises: TELACU's
investment in, 120, 200-201,
261-62; TELACU's success as
example of, 255. See also Minor-
ity Enterprise Small Business In-
vestment Companies;Names of
specific enterprises
Minority Enterprise Small Business
Investment Companies
(MESBICs), 113, 157; TE-
LACU InvestmentCompanyas,
119,208-9,216-17,220
Mobilization for Youth project
(New York City), 24
Mobil Oil Corporation, 79f
Model Citiesprograms, 66
Molina, Gloria: on East Los Angeles
issues, 118, 176, 236; elective
offices held by, 191-92, 243-46
passim; White House appoint-
ment of, 141




Montebello, 3, 5, 93, 118-19, 122,
134
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MontereyHills housingproject, 63
MontereyPark, 3, 5, 93-95, 121,
132, 134, 189; annexationby,
118-19
Montoya, Art, 98, 118, 125






Muhammad, Elijah, 16, 17-18
Muhammad Speaks, 18








National Commission for Man-
powerPolicy, 143
National Commission on Neigh-
borhoods, 143, 145, 184
National Congress for Community
EconomicDevelopment, 143,
146
NationalEndowment for the Arts,
124, 164
National Farm Workers Service






Abuse and Alcoholism, 150
National TrainingProgram
(CCAP), 31
Nation of Islam, see Black Muslims
Nava, Julian,57, 67, 170, 172
NeighborhoodDevelopment Proj-
ect (East Los Angeles), 117-18,
123
NeighborhoodYouth Corps, 37
New Calvary Cemetery (East Los
Angeles), 5
New Left, 18, 57




Nixon,Richard M., 83-84, 87
Noblet, Ron, 176, 178-79, 181
NormanF. S wantonAssociates,
174









Nueva Maravilla: community par-
ticipation in, 82-83, 85-87, 109,
125, 248; as influence on East
Los Angelesredevelopment,
116-18, 167, 253; redevelop-
ment of, 81-83, 85-88, 99-101,
123, 256; success of, 105, 107,
183-84, 234, 251, 253. See also
Headings beginning with
"Maravilla"
Obledo, Mario, 173, 187
O'Connor, William,215
OEO, see Office of Economic Op-
portunity
Office ofCommunity Services
(U.S.), 212-20 passim, 231
Office ofEconomic Opportunity
(OEO) (U.S.), 217; CDC
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funding by, 146, 149; TELACU
funding by, 10, 16, 83-85, 101,
114; and TELACU structural
changes, 88-90. Seealso Com-
munity Services Administra-
tion
Office ofManagement and Budget
(U.S.), 209
Office ofMinority Business Enter-
prise (U.S.), 112, 141
Ojo Caliente Craftsmen, 157
Olmo, Frank del, 191






Orgullo de Nuestra Herencia
(mural), seePride ofOur Heri-
tage, The
Other America, The (Harrington),
25








Pan AmericanBank, 79f, 114, 116
Pasta House restaurant, 115
Patlan, Juan, 148f





Pla, George, 141, 181, 183, 189,
197,200
Plaza deLa Razaproject, 65, 80, 90
Polanco, Richard, 181, 190-92,
241, 247
Political action committees, 173-
-75, 193
Portals (Washington, D.C), 260,
261-62




President's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency, 24-26
Pride of Our Heritage, The
(TELACU Center mural), 5-8,
llf, 131,193, 195, 221
Progress Enterprises (Philadelphia),
19-20,22,41,257
Property Owners Association, 94,
98







Rancho Rosa de Castilla, 50-53
Rancho San Rafael, 5 1
Reading is Fun-damental program,
64
Reagan,Ronald, 56, 161, 165, 171,
186, 188,217-18,220
Real estate: Black Muslims' interest
in, 17-19; CDCs' emphasis on,
42, 147-59passim; Progress En-
terprises' emphasis on, 19-20;
TELACU's emphasis on, 3, 8,
12, 62-63, 65-67, 78, 80-106,
124,133-35,223,229-39,
254f. Seealso Financial institu-
tions; Housing; Urban planning





Republican Party, 217-18, 235,
243, 263
Restoration Corporation,40-41
Reuther, Eric V., 60
Reuther, Victor, 38
Reuther, Walter P., lOf, 16, 38,
262; and community union con-
cept, 27-35 passim
Reynoso, Cruz, 187
Ribera Ranch (New Mexico), 158
Rio Grande Alcoholism Treatment
Center (New Mexico), 156
Rios-Bustamante,Antonio, 238
Riots: in 19605, 1, 33, 77; in 19705,
70-75, 77-79, 94, 137; in South






Roman Catholic Church, 69-70
Roosevelt, Theodore, 142
Roosevelt High School, 57
Roybal, Edward R, 115, 139f, 176,
199, 242-46 passim; onLos An-
geles City Council, 172, 240;
medical center namedfor, 5,
166f; as U.S. Congressman, 127,
169-71, 174, 185-92passim,
240
RoybalAllard, Lucille, 242, 246-47
Roybal Medical Center (Los Ange-
les), 5, 166f
Ruiz, Rachel, 176-81 passim
Ruiz, Raul, 103, 170
Rural Loan DevelopmentFund,
155,21 2-20passim
Rutkin, Leonard, 208-9, 216
St. Basil's Cathedral, 69-70




San Gabriel Mission, 5, 9, 48-50
San GabrielValley, 168, 188f, 245
Santa Fe Springs, 122
Santillan,Richard, 103
SBA, see Small BusinessAdmini-
stration
Schabarum, Peter, 242-43
Schrade, Paul, 28, 33-35, 37, 43,
59
Self-determination: of Black Mus-
lims, 17-19, 55; and community
union concept, 28-30, 38-39;
and federal funding ofCDCs,
40, 62, 85, 89-90, 106, 214f; as
HACERgoaI, 145; ofMexican
Americans, 1-3, 10-11, 38-39/
55, 57, 94, 102-3, 138-39, 254;
and redevelopment and annexa-
tion issues, 116-19; RFK's sup-
port for, 20-25passim, 30, 40-
-41; as TELACU goal, 2f, 1 1-13,
61,78,89-90,96,136, 168,
189-92,239
Seniorcitizens, 124, 126, 147,
226-27
Separatism (ethnic), 1, 10, 17-20,
58,61
Service Sheet Metal firm, 99
ShapellGovernmentHousing, 99
SheldonAppel Company,231
SieteBuilding (New Mexico), 158




(SBA) (U.S.), 113f 119, 149,
207-9, 2 16-20passim. See also
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Minority Enterprise Small Busi-
ness InvestmentCompanies
Small Business Clinic (Spanish
Speaking Unity Council), 148
Small CitiesEconomicDevelop-
ment Commission, 160
Smith, Henry Nash, 8
Snyder, Art, 118,240-41
Soledad Church (Los Angeles), 5





Sopher, David E., 7
Soto, Philip, 170




Southern California Gas Company,
229
Southern California Rapid Transit
District, 124
South Gate, 231, 250-56 passim
South Gate Industrial/Retail Park,
231,253,256
South Shore National Bank ofChi-
cago, 120
Southwest (as Mexican Americans'
historic place), 2, 6-7, 11, 13,
47, 51-59passim, 71, 76, 102,
145,165,263
Southwest Cable Corporation, 157
Southwest Council of La Raza, 80,
152
Southwest Voter Registration




Spanish International Network, 157
Spanish Speaking Unity Council
(northern California CDC),
145-50 passim, 161
"Special impact areas," 2, 21, 153;
TELACU's, 3-4, 16, 133f, 253,
261
Special Impact Program, 39-44,
83-84, 88-91 passim, 111, 126,
146, 149-50, 214-15; as CDCs'
funding agency, 217. Seealso
"Special impact areas"











TELACU (East Los Angeles Com-
munity Union): accomplish-
ments of, 2-3, 9, 253-63; and
ACTIELA, 95, 101-2; audit of,
195-222; as catalyst in commu-
nity projects, 86-88, 95, 99,
101, 211; as CDC, 2-3, 9, 78,
87-92,105,108,135-36,257;
as compromising self-
determination of, 40, 62, 85,
89-90, 106, 1 1 1; criticismof,
12, 120, 177-83 passim, 195-
-222, 233-34, 245, 257-59; and
cultural preservation, 2, 65, 97-
-98, 107, 127, 130-31, 164,
228-30, 233-39, 254; as de
facto governmentagency, 89-95
passim, 125, 137, 227; early
days of, 59-64, 250; economic
development emphasis of, 2-3,
12,30,32,44,47,60-61,76,
99, 101, 105, 135,222-24,
248-51, 255-56; economic de-
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
318 Index
velopment master plans of, 108-
-20 passim, 131-35; federal
funding for, 2, 78-91 passim,
101,105,114,119,124-27,
129, 134, 137, 177, 231; goals
of, 2, 3, 11-13, 61,78, 88-90,
96, 136,168,189-92,234,239;
and HACER, 160-61, 165; in-
ternational ventures of, 162-63,
165; lack ofstockholders or
rank-and-file members of, 90,
257-58; leadership training by,
2, 64-65, 121, 243; "leveraging"
by, 101,111-12, 117,125,255,
262; and Mexican-American re-
covery of place, 2f, 11, 12-13,
45, 253-54; origins of, 2, 10-11,
33-46, 59, 64, 84; political in-
fluence of, 2, 9, 44, 57, 78-79,
117-19, 141,167-93,223,
227-28, 243-48passim, 257;
privatefunding for, 79-81, 129,
147, 161; real estate emphasis
of, 3,8, 12, 62-63, 65-67, 78,
80-106, 124,133-35,223,
229-39, 254f; scandal concern-
ing, 12, 195-222, 224, 234, 242,
245, 256-58; social service mis-
sion denied by, 9, 44, 64, 108,
126, 132,201-4,210-11,234;
social servicesprovided by, 2,
35,37,60,64,78,87, 109,
127-33passim, 206, 225-28,
234, 255; structure of, 2-3, 16,
45, 60-64, 88-90, 131-33, 135,
148, 150, 257-58; urban plan-
ning by, 122-27, 133,137-38,




munity Research Group; His-
panic American Coalition for
Economic Revitalization; Image;
Self-determination;Names of
persons associated with and or-
ganizationsstarting with
"TELACU"













TELACU Headboard Company, 66
TELACU HomeRepair Corpora-
tion, 80
TELACU Industrial Park, 108,
127-30, 134-37, 147, 165, 203,
230. See also TELACU Center
TELACU Industries, 120, 131-32,






216-17, 220; closing of, 220,




TELACU Mattress Company, 66-
-67, 79f
TELACU Mobil Service Center,
79-80
TELACU Resource Center, see
TELACU Center
TELACU Scholarship Fund, 226
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TELACU Senior Citizens Club, 90,
126,226-27
TELACU Today, 141, 165
TELACU Transit System, 227-
-28
TELACU Yen Cap, 123
TELACU Weatherization Service,
229
TELACU Youth Services Program,
225-26
Tennessee Valley Authority, 22





Tijerina, Reies Lopez, 11, 55-58
passim, 159
Tiscareno, Dan, 99
Title VII (OEO) funds, 91
Todman, Terence, 140
Torres, Art, 141, 176; as California
legislator, 171-72, 187, 191f,
240, 242; campaign againstAlex
Garcia of, 188-90; political in-
terests of, 118, 139,243-46
passim
Torres, Esteban E.: colonial analogy
used by, 1If, 46-47, 93, 95-99;
and Congress of Mexican-
AmericanUnity, 57, 59-60, 70-
-78 passim, 85, 94; depicted on
mural, 6, 12; and incorporation
efforts, 93-99, 103f; interna-
tional trading companyof, 216;
political careerof, 101, 104,
108, 163, 173,243, 246; politi-
cal meetings of, 189f; as TE-
LACU board member, 109,
139; as TELACU director, 37-
-39, 44-45, 61-67, 78, 79-80,
84-88passim, 92, 101, 105,




42, 162f; as U.S. Congressman,
168, 192,247
To Seek a Newer World (RFK), 42
Tovar, Ed, 35
Transit studies, 123f, 133, 227
Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, 50
Trott, Stephen, 214-16
Tunney, John, 176
UAW, see United Auto Workers
UCLA, see University ofCalifornia
at Los Angeles
UFW, see United Farm Workers




"TheUnincorporated East Los An-
gelesEnvironmental Assessment
Program," 123, 124-25





Uniroyal tire plant, 134-35, 250
UnitedAuto Workers (UAW), 63,
231; and community union con-
cept, 30-32; and Esteban Tor-
res, 38, 104, 139; and TE-
LACU's origins, 10, 16, 27, 33-
-35, 37-38, 46, 59-60, 64, 90,
127.See also Reuther, Walter P.
United Farm Workers (UFW), 7;
and East Los Angeles issues,
102, 182; grapestrike by, 1,31,
54, 68; as Mexican American
union, 38-39, 54; and National
Farm Workers Service Center,
31-32. See also Chavez, Cesar
United Mexican-AmericanStu-
dents (UMAS), 55-58, 67, 69
United Neighborhoods Organiza-
tion (UNO), 148, 223, 256
U.S. Commerce Department, 112,
209
(c) 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. 
320 Index
U.S. Congress, 21-26passim, 113;
Esteban Torres'sbid for, 101,
104, 108, 168, 192; and 1851
Land Law, 5 1f; Mexican Ameri-
canrepresentation in, 44, 168,
192, 246-47; and Special Im-




U.S. Health, Education, and Wel-
fare Department, 133
U.S. Healthand Human Services
Department, 155-56, 209, 217
U.S. Housingand Urban Develop-
ment Department (HUD): and
TELACU investigation, 209-10,
220; andTELACUprojects, 86-




U.S. Labor Department, 29, 37;







U.S. Treasury Department, 116
University of California at Los An-
geles, 56, 64, 134,226
University of Chicago, 24
University of Southern California,
164,226
UNO, see United Neighborhoods
Organization






Verdugo, Julio, 5 1
Vernon, 3





Education), 141, 174, 175-77
Voting Rights Act (1965), 167f,
241
VTNLos Angelesfirm, 87
W. R. Company, 174
War on Poverty, 10, 20-26 passim,
31,39-44,147,217




Watts riots, 77, 250







White Memorial Hospital, 164
Whitney Foundation, 161
Whittier (California), 189
Whittier Boulevard (East Los Ange-
les), 5; commercial revitalization
project for, 126, 133, 137,224-
-25, 234, 251-56 passim; riots




Wilson High School, 57f
Winkler-Flexible Corporation, 130
Winner, Leslie, 175
Winner, Lovell, Taylor& Associ-
ates, 175-76
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WLCAC, see Watts Labor Com-
munity Action Committee
Women (inTELACU), 109, 115,






poration (St. Louis), 41
Yniquez, David, 154
Young, Andrew, 30, 140
Young Citizensfor Community
Action, 56. See also Brown Be-
rets
Young Men's Christian Association,
225
Zocalo project, 97-98, 123-25,
224
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